Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Map of States with Disaster Planning Laws | Over 30 states have laws or emergency operation plans that provide for the evacuation, rescue, and recovery of animals in the event of a disaster (including the District of Columbia). The inclusion of pet-related provisions in these laws and emergency operation plans occurred after the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Reports suggest that people were reluctant to evacuate without pets and/or service animals, and little planning was implemented on the transportation and sheltering of pets. Pets were also impounded in shelters and often never reunited with their owners. In 2006, the federal Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards (PETS) Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 5196a-d (2006)) was passed. PETS directs the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop emergency preparedness plans and ensure that state and local emergency plans that consider the needs of individuals with pets and service animals during a major disaster or emergency. Many state laws require that animals be sheltered and evacuated during an emergency. While these plans differ from state to state, most address several key elements, which include the care of companion animals, the implementation of state animal response teams, the sheltering of animals, and identification of recovered animals. | State map | ||
| OH - Endangered Species - Chapter 1518. Endangered Species. | R.C. § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 | OH ST § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 | These Ohio statutes protect both endangered plants and animals as defined by the State of Ohio as well as those species listed on the federal ESA list. Taking of an endangered or threatened animal species constitutes a misdemeanor and the person is required upon pleading guilty to the offense, in addition to any fine, term of imprisonment, seizure, and forfeiture imposed, to make restitution for the minimum value of the wild animal illegally held, taken, or possessed. Notably, if the aggregate value of the animal(s) taken exceeds $1,000, a person is guilty of a felony. | Statute |
| MI - Cruelty, neglect - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | MCL 750.50 | MI ST 750.50 | This statute sets out the Michigan duty of care for all vertebrate animals, including what constitutes sufficient food, water, shelter, sanitary conditions, exercise, and veterinary medical attention in order to maintain an animal in a state of good health. Also explained are the penalty and forfeiture provisions for violations of the statute. The exclusions under the statute include those animals used in hunting, fishing, trapping, horse racing, farming, pest control, zoos, lawful killing under the Animal Industry Act, and scientific research. In 2019, the penalty provisions were revised. A first violation with one animal is a 93 day/$1,000 misdemeanor. If the violation involves two or three animals or the death of any animal, the penalty increases to a 1-year/$2,000 misdemeanor. If the violation involved 4 or more animals but fewer than 10 animals or the person had one prior conviction, it becomes a 2-year/$2,000 felony. If the violation involved 10 or more animals but fewer than 25 animals or the person had two prior convictions, it becomes a 4-year/$5,000 felony. If the violation involved 25 or more animals or the person has had 3 or more prior convictions, it becomes a 7-year/$10,000 felony. Finally, if the person is an operator of a pet shop and he or she has had 5 or more prior convictions, it is a 2-year/$5,000 felony. | Statute |
| Larry BARD et al., Appellants, v. Reinhardt JAHNKE, Individually And Doing Business as Hemlock Valley Farms, Respondent, et al., Defendant. | 848 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y., 2006) | 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 03440, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 2006 WL 1148098 (N.Y.) |
The accident underlying this litigation occurred on a dairy farm owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff Larry Bard, a self-employed carpenter, arrived at the farm to meet defendant John Timer, another self-employed carpenter to repair of the dairy barn. While working, Bard was seriously injured by a bull. Bard, with his wife suing derivatively, commenced an action against both Jahnke and Timer to recover damages for his personal injuries, alleging causes of action sounding in strict liability and negligence. In affirming the Appellate Division's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, this court found that Jahnke was not liable for Bard's injuries unless he knew or should have known of the bull's vicious or violent propensities. The Court noted that the record contained no such evidence. |
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| Wrinkle v. Norman | 242 P.3d 1216 (Kan. App., 2010) | 2010 WL 4539371 (Kan.App.,2010), 44 Kan.App.2d 950 (2010) |
Wrinkle filed a negligence action against his neighbors (the Normans) after he sustained injuries on thier property. The injuries stemmed from an incident where Wrinkle was trying to herd cattle he thought belonged to the Normans back into a pen on the Normans' property. The lower court granted the Normans' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, this court found that the question comes down to Wrinkle's status (invitee, licensee, or trespasser) to determine the duty owed by the Normans. This Court found that the district court properly determined that Wrinkle was a trespasser. Finally, the court addressed the K.S.A. 47-123 claim as to whether the Normans are liable for their cattle running at large. The court found that Wrinkle could not meet the burden under the statute. |
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| In re MARRIAGE OF Kimberly K. Enders and Michael A. BAKER | 48 N.E.3d 1277 (Ill. App. Ct., 2015) |
In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights. |
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| Swanson v. Tackling | 335 Ga. App. 810 (2016) | 2016 WL 718465 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) | This is an interlocutory appeal by the dog owners (the Swansons) in a personal injury lawsuit for a dog bite. The court in this case overruled the lower court’s ruling that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement after defendant’s dog bit a child but the dog had never shown a propensity to injure anyone prior to the incident. Plaintiff was suing defendant after defendant’s dog bit plaintiff’s child on the arm and head. Plaintiff argued that defendant is responsible for the injuries caused by the dog because the defendant neglected to properly restrain the dog. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of defendant, stating that there was no evidence that was presented to indicate that defendant could have or should have known that the dog would act in this way towards the child. In order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to present evidence that the dog had acted in a similar way in the past. | Case |
| NE - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 10) | Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1001 - 1020 | NE ST § 28-1001 to 1020 | This Nebraska statutory section comprises the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The cruelty provision provides that a person who abandons or cruelly neglects an animal is guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. Intentional animal cruelty results in a Class I misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class IV felony for any subsequent offense, unless such cruel mistreatment involves the knowing and intentional torture, repeated beating, or mutilation of the animal where such an act automatically results in a Class IV felony. Animal means any vertebrate member of the animal kingdom, but does not include an uncaptured wild creature (which appears to exclude otherwise heinous, intentional acts to wildlife). | Statute |
| KY - Impound - Chapter 258. Animal Control and Protection. | KRS § 258.215 | KY ST § 258.215 | This Kentucky statute provides that peace officers, dog wardens, or animal control officers shall seize and impound any dog which does not bear a proper license tag or other legible identification which is found running at large. Interestingly, if an officer after diligent effort to do so, should fail to seize the dog, it is his or her duty to destroy the dog by any reasonable and humane means. The statute specifically exempts actively engaged hunting dogs from the "loose dog" prohibition. | Statute |
| Justice for Animals, Inc. v. Lenoir County SPCA, Inc. | 168 N.C. App. 298, 607 S.E.2d 317 aff'd on other grounds, 360 N.C. 48, 619 S.E.2d 494 (2005) | 2005 WL 221226 (N.C. 2005) |
An animal control facility's practice of euthanizing feral cats without holding them for 72 hours was challenged by a non-profit organization. The animal control facility's method for determining if a cat is feral consisted only of poking the animal and gaging its reaction. The trial court dismissed the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. |
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