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Displaying 41 - 50 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE - Invasive/non-native - § 802. Non-native wildlife injurious to native wildlife, agriculture, and other interests | 7 Del.C. § 802 | DE ST TI 7 § 802 | This Delaware statute leaves to the discretion of the state whether to authorize an entity or persons to take, harvest, or capture any species of non-native wildlife that is or has the potential to become injurious to native wildlife. | Statute |
| In the Matter of a Protective Order for Jean Marie Primrose - Cat Champion Corporation, Appellant v. Jean Marie Primrose, Respon | This series of actions stemmed from the seizure of 11 cats from Jean Marie Primrose from her Linn County, Oregon home. The cats were neglected, thin, and missing patches of hair when they were removed from Ms. Primrose's home and placed in the custody of Cat Champion, a non-profit rescue organization. Ms. Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree, but the trial court dismissed those charges because she was found incompetent due to a cognitive impairment. Because the case was dismissed, the cats were not forfeited by law and Primrose remained the rightful owner. Further, Cat Champion had incurred a $32,510 debt in caring for the animals. In lieu of returning the cats to Ms. Primrose, who Cat Champions felt was incapable of adequately caring for them, Cat Champions filed a petition for a limited protective order as a fiduciary for the care and placement of the cats. The probate court ruled against Cat Champions, finding that nothing in the relevant chapter allowed the court to permanently divest Ms. Primrose of her personal property (the cats). On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's order and held that the probate court did indeed have authority to enter a limited protective order under ORS 125.650 as a "fiduciary necessary to implement a protective order." | Pleading | ||
| State v. Warren | 439 P.3d 357 (Mt. 2019) | 2019 MT 49; 395 Mont. 15; 2019 WL 926113 (Mt. 2019) | Cathie Iris Warren was convicted of three felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty, five felony counts of aggravated cruelty, and a misdemeanor cruelty to animals count. Warren appealed contending that the district court erred by denying Warren’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of her commercial kennel property, denying Warren’s Baston challenge, and in imposing costs to be reimbursed by Warren under Montana law. Cathie Iris Warren operated a kennel on her residential property in Libby, Montana. Warren obtained her initial license to operate her business in 2013. In 2016 it was discovered that Warren was operating her kennel despite the fact that her business license had expired in October of 2015. In order to obtain a new license, Warren needed to have an inspection of her property. Warren ended up having three separate inspections of her property. After each inspection, Warren had failed to meet the requirements. The members of the Health Department who were involved in the inspections became concerned that the animals were not being adequately cared for and were not of good health. Warren could not provide appropriate vaccination records for all of her animals. A search warrant was executed on Warren’s property on August 2, 2016. Warren’s animals were seized the same day. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained arguing that a warrant was required for each inspection that had been conducted on her property. The court concluded that there was no search because Warren did not have an expectation of privacy in her commercial kennel operation that society would consider objectively reasonable. The trial court convicted Warren and found that Warren owed statutorily-imposed costs, including veterinary care, food and supplies, excess hours worked by county employees, and travel costs as well as the shelter’s lost revenue. Warren appealed her conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of Montana found that Warren treated parts of her home as part of her kennel, therefore, those areas of her home that were searched were considered commercial property which is subject to a less significant expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the administrative inspection fell within the applicable warrant exception, was reasonable, and did not require a search warrant. Warren also challenged the State’s peremptory challenge of a minority juror (Baston Challenge). The Court concluded that the District Court reached the right conclusion on the Baston challenge but for the wrong reason. Warren’s third challenge was whether the District Court erred in calculating the statutory costs owed by Warren. The Court found that the costs approved by the District Court were reasonably supported by the evidence. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the District Court. | Case |
| State v. Neal | State v. Neal, 27 S.E. 81 (N.C. 1897) |
The defendant was convicted under North Carolina's cruelty to animal statute for the killing of his neighbor's chickens. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court because the trial court refused to give some of his instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court that the lower court was correct and affirmed. |
Case | |
| VA - Ordinances - § 3.2-6543. Governing body of any locality may adopt certain ordinances | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6543 | VA ST § 3.2-6543 | This Virginia statute provides that the governing bodies of counties, cities, and towns of the Commonwealth are hereby authorized to adopt, in their discretion, ordinances which parallel statutory sections dealing with licensing of dogs, taxation, impoundment, and regulation of dangerous dogs. It also provides that nothing in this section shall be construed so as to prevent or restrict any local governing body from adopting local animal control ordinances which are more stringent than the relevant state statutory sections. It further outlines how ordinances may impose civil penalties for violations of the above. | Statute |
| State v. Weeks | 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1090 | Defendant was convicted of violating Ohio's animal fighting statute, and appealed. He challenged the conviction, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court upheld the conviction. The court ruled that although a portion of the statute was overly vague and broad, that portion was severable from the remainder. The court also held that defendant did not demonstrate that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. | Case | |
| OH - Horse slaughter - Chapter 919. Horse Meat | R.C. § 919.01 - 919.99 | OH ST § 919.01 - 919.99 | These Ohio statutes deal with horse slaughter and horse meat. Any person who has any establishment that processes and sells horse meat for human food must be licensed by the department of agriculture. The statutes also stipulate certain labeling, signage, and record-keeping requirements. A violation is a first degree misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Chile - Fishing - Ley 430, 1991 | Ley 430, 1991 | This is the general law of fisheries and aquaculture. It establishes the guidelines for the preservation of hydrological resources, extractive fishing activities, and research activities in terrestrial waters, sea beaches, inland waters, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and adjacent areas. This law also regulates transformation and processing fishing activities and storage, transportation, or commercialization of hydro-biological resources. | Statute | |
| Strickland v. Medlen | -397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013) | 2013 WL 1366033 (Tex.,2013) |
The Supreme Court of Texas considers petitioner's appeal from the court of appeals' decision holding that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The facts underlying the action involved the improper euthanization of respondents' dog, Avery. They sued for Avery's “sentimental or intrinsic value” because the dog had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. The trial court found that Texas law barred such damages, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals of Texas became the first court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The Supreme Court reverses that decision here, ruling that dogs are ordinary property, with damages limited to market value, and noneconomic damages based in relational attachment are not permitted. |
Case |
| SD - Fur - Chapter 40-35. Domesticated Fur-Bearing Animals. | S D C L § 40-35-1 to 6 | SD ST § 40-35-1 to 6 | These South Dakota statutes pertain to domesticated fur-bearing animals. These animals are subject to private ownership, and documentation is required to possess live fur-bearing animals. Products made from domestic furbearers are considered to be agricultural products and breeding such animals, or marketing the products, is an agricultural pursuit subject to the Department of Agriculture. | Statute |