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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes | 800 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.App.,2011) | 2011 WL 2982992 (Minn.App.,2011) |
The city council ordered the destruction of a dog after finding it to be a dangerous animal and the owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that procedural due process required that the owner should have been given a meaningful opportunity to contest the declaration of the dog as a “potentially dangerous animal” before it was declared a “dangerous animal” under the city ordinance. |
Case | |
| FL - Endangered - Endangered and Threatened Species Act | West's F. S. A. § 379.2291 - 2311 | FL ST § 379.2291 - 379.2311 (formerly FL ST § 372.072 - 074) | These Florida statutes define endangered and threatened species and provide the State's intent to protect these species. Under statute, the intentional killing or wounding of a listed species incurs a third degree felony. Interestingly, the state has a reward program for the arrest and conviction of those who violate state endangered species laws. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Thomas | 887 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989) |
The issue in this case is whether Edward A. Thomas, a Montana hunting guide and outfitter, may be found guilty of conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act where the alleged object of the conspiracy was "to transport, receive and acquire elk in interstate commerce ... in violation of Montana state hunter's law." The Court held that while a prosecution under the Lacey Act may not be sustained for the substantive acts of selling guiding services and hunting permits, an action can be maintained for conspiracies to violate the Act through these types of acts. In this case, the underlying violations were acts of hunting with a transferred license or permit where the acts were allegedly committed by others. |
Case | ||
| Sentencia C-148/22 | Sentencia C-148/22 | El abogado Gabriel Andrés Suárez Gómez presentó una demanda de inconstitucionalidad ante la Corte Constitucional, argumentando que la pesca recreativa violaba el principio de precaución, el derecho a un medio ambiente sano y la prohibición de crueldad animal. Siguiendo el precedente creado con la sentencia C-045 de 2019, que prohíbe la caza deportiva, la Corte Constitucional de Colombia decidió el 2 de mayo del 2022 que las disposiciones relativas a la pesca recreativa contenidas en diversas leyes nacionales eran inconstitucionales, prohibiendo efectivamente esta práctica en todo el territorio. La corte determinó que pescar con fines recreativos, sin ningún otro propósito relevante como comercial o de sustento, constituye una forma de crueldad animal. Específicamente, la corte enfatizó que el mandato de protección animal se deriva del principio de la constitución ecológica, la función social de la propiedad y la dignidad humana. Además, se señaló que, en este contexto, tanto el legislativo como la corte han reconocido previamente a todos los animales como seres sintientes. La corte sostuvo que, aunque no es posible definir con certeza absoluta las consecuencias dañinas de la pesca recreativa en términos de principios de conservación y bienestar animal o la degradación de los recursos hidrobiológicos, existe información científica relevante que debe ser considerada para evitar efectos perjudiciales en los peces y el hábitat. Respecto a la sintiencia animal, tras un exhaustivo análisis, la corte enfatizó que hay razones convincentes para considerar que los peces pueden sentir dolor, y el mandato de protección animal requiere tratar a los seres sintientes con dignidad. De manera similar, según la FAO, actualmente no existe ningún método capaz de eliminar completamente el maltrato a los peces, y hay impactos ambientales que deben ser considerados seriamente junto con los beneficios económicos propuestos a favor de la pesca recreativa. Esta situación llevó a la Corte Constitucional a activar el principio de precaución. La corte determinó que hay un deber de proteger a los animales que implica proteger tanto el equilibrio ecosistémico como a los animales sintientes individuales con valor intrínseco. Esta protección se diferencia y pondera en función del tipo de especie involucrada, ya sea doméstica o silvestre. Además, el deber de protección animal lleva consigo un efecto vinculante indiscutible, que requiere evaluaciones de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en su aplicación tanto por parte de legisladores como de jueces. Tras un extenso análisis de los efectos positivos y negativos que conllevaría la prohibición de esta actividad, la corte concluyó que la pesca recreativa constituye una forma de crueldad animal que viola el derecho a un medio ambiente sano, específicamente la prohibición contra la crueldad animal de acuerdo con leyes y jurisprudencia constitucional que carecían de respaldo constitucional al no estar fundamentadas en límites permisibles constitucionalmente para el maltrato animal, como (a) la libertad religiosa; (b) los hábitos alimenticios; (c) la investigación médica y experimentación; y (d) prácticas culturales arraigadas. Teniendo en cuenta los intereses de aquellos afiliados a la actividad, que se verían significativamente afectados por la invalidación de las leyes sujetas a esta opinión, y que han estado llevando a cabo actividades bajo leyes previamente consideradas constitucionales, la corte decidió posponer los efectos de la decisión por un año. Esto con el propósito de permitir que aquellos afectados adversamente por ella se adapten a las nuevas circunstancias. | Case | ||
| Jackson v. Georgalos | 133 A.D.3d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 WL 7269769 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2015) | Plaintiff appealed an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The personal injury action arises from an incident where defendants' dog, who was barking at the time, jumped on the screen door causing the door to open, whereupon the dog ran out of the house. When the plaintiff turned to get away from the dog, her ankle twisted, causing her to fall on the steps and become injured. To recover in New York on such an action, a plaintiff must prove that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner of the dog, or a person in control of the premises where the dog was, knew or should have known of such propensities. The court held that plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant was aware of the dog's alleged propensity to run out of the house and chase after people. Defendants' motion summary judgment and dismissal was affirmed. | Case | |
| IN - Hunting - Chapter 37. Harassment of Hunters, Trappers, and Fishermen | I.C. 14-22-37-1 to 14-22-37-3 | IN ST 14-22-37-1 to 14-22-37-3 | This section reflects Indiana's hunter harassment law. A person who knowingly or intentionally interferes with the legal taking of a game animal by another person with intent to prevent the taking commits a Class C misdemeanor. A person who fails to obey the order of a law enforcement officer to desist from conduct in violation of section 2 of this chapter commits a Class B misdemeanor if the law enforcement officer (1) observed the person or (2) has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has engaged in the conduct that day or intends to engage in the conduct that day on specific premises. | Statute | |
| Duncan v. State | 975 N.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. Ind. 2012) | 2012 WL 4470240 (Ct. App. Ind.) |
A complaint regarding the welfare of horses led to the defendant being convicted of 6 charges of animal cruelty, all of which were class A misdemeanors. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, that Indiana’s animal cruelty law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome a defense of necessity. The appeals court agreed that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reversed and remanded the case on that issue; however, the appeals court disagreed with the defendant on the other issues. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Case | |
| CO - Equine Activity Liability Statute - Article 21. Damages. | C. R. S. A. § 13-21-119 | CO ST § 13-21-119 | This Colorado statute embodies the intent of the general assembly to encourage equine activities and llama activities by limiting the civil liability of those involved in such activities. This section also contains specific provisions related to llama activities. Liability is not limited by this statute where the equine or llama sponsor provided faulty equipment or tack, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the activity, owned or otherwise possessed the land upon which an injury occurred where there was a known latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. | Statute | |
| IN RE: ERVIN STEBANE | 47 Agric. Dec. 1264 (1988) | 1988 WL 242938 (U.S.D.A.) | Licensed dealer who engaged in recurring pattern of trivial noncompliance with housekeeping requirements, failed to provide records on two occasions and failed to permit inspection on one occasion, is properly sanctioned with 20-day license suspension, $1500 civil penalty, and cease and desist order. | Case | |
| Derecho Animal Volume 4 Núm 4 |
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Policy |