Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Branks v. Kern | 348 S.E.2d 815 (N.C.App.,1986) | 348 S.E.2d 815 (1986) |
In this negligence action, a cat owner brought suit against veterinarian and veterinary clinic after she was bitten by her own cat while the cat was receiving treatment by the veterinarian. At issue, is whether the veterinarian owed a duty to the cat owner to exercise reasonable care in preventing the cat from harming the owner while the cat was being treated. In review of the lower court’s grant of motion for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals held that substantial issues of material fact existed to preclude the grant of summary judgment. However, this was overturned on appeal at the Supreme Court. ( See , Branks v. Kern (On Appeal) 359 S.E.2d 780 (N.C.,1987)). |
Case | |
| TN - Dog, dangerous, felon - § 39-17-1363. Violent felony conviction; custody or control of dogs; application | T. C. A. § 39-17-1363 | TN ST § 39-17-1363 | Under this Tennessee law, it is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence. Additionally, it is an offense for any convicted violent felon to own or have custody of a dog that is not microchipped or spayed/neutered. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010. | Statute | |
| WA - Vehicle - 46.61.660. Carrying persons or animals on outside part of vehicle | West's RCWA 46.61.660 | WA ST 46.61.660 | This Washington law states that it is illegal to transport any living animal on the running board, fenders, hood, or other outside part of any vehicle unless suitable harness, cage or enclosure is provided that protects the animal from being thrown. | Statute | |
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium | 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2299, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 517, 2018 WL 385682 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) | PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. | Case | |
| Morgan v. State | 656 S.E.2d 857(Ga.App., 2008) | 2008 WL 142325 (Ga.App.), 289 Ga.App. 209 (2008) |
Deputy removed sick and malnourished animals from Defendant's property, initiated by a neighbor's call to the Sheriff. Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of cruelty to animals. He appealed, alleging illegal search and seizure based on lack of exigent circumstances to enter his property. The court found that deputy's entry into the home was done with Morgan's lawful consent, and, as such, the subsequent seizure of the dogs in the home was based on the deputy's plain view observations in a location where he was authorized to be. |
Case | |
| OH - Horse slaughter - Chapter 919. Horse Meat | R.C. § 919.01 - 919.99 | OH ST § 919.01 - 919.99 | These Ohio statutes deal with horse slaughter and horse meat. Any person who has any establishment that processes and sells horse meat for human food must be licensed by the department of agriculture. The statutes also stipulate certain labeling, signage, and record-keeping requirements. A violation is a first degree misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| State v. Ancona | 991 A.2d 663 (Conn.App.,2010) | 120 Conn.App. 324 (Conn.App.,2010), 2010 WL 1190539 |
Defendant Michael Ancona appealed his conviction of permitting a dog to roam at large in violation of General Statutes § 22-364(a). The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly held him responsible as a keeper of a dog when the owner was present and known to the authorities, and (2) the state adduced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The plain language of the statute § 22-364(a) states that an “owner or keeper” is prohibited from allowing a dog to roam on a public highway. Either the owner or keeper or both can be held liable for a violation of the statute. The court also found sufficient evidence that defendant was the keeper of the pit bull: the dog stayed at his house, he initially responded to the incident and tried to pull the dog away, and defendant yelled at the Officer Rogers that she was not to take "his dog." |
Case | |
| US - Eagles - § 83.7 Mandatory criteria for Federal acknowledgment. | 67 FR 44347 |
[Regulation removed 2010. Summary of former text provided.] This provision describes the mandatory criteria for establishing the existence of an American Indian tribe for purposes of recognition by the federal government. These criteria implicate federal status for purposes of acquiring eagle parts for use in Indian religious ceremonies under the BGEPA. |
Administrative | ||
| Coos County Board of County Com'rs v. Kempthorne | 531 F.3d 792 (9th Cir., 2008) | 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7939, 2008 WL 2522202 (C.A.9 (Or.)) | The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations. | Case | |
| U.S. v. Street | 257 F.3d 869 (8th Cir.2001) |
The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment. For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case |