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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
McCall v. State 540 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).

Open fields doctrine; warrantless seizure. It was not unreasonable for humane society members to enter defendant's land and seize dogs where the dogs were kept in an open field clearly in view of neighbors and others, and where it was apparent that the dogs were emaciated and not properly cared for.

Case
In re New Jersey Pinelands Com'n Resolution 812 A.2d 1113 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2003) 356 N.J.Super. 363

This case concerns the approval of a settlement agreement for a residential development project that contained habitat critical to the survival of a local population of timber rattlesnakes, an endangered species in New Jersey.  The court's review of the record found that there is no reason to interfere with the determination by the Commission, since there was ample evidence to support the Commission's decision to approve the settlement.  The court also agreed with the lower court that the environmental organizations lacked standing to bring an endangered species counterclaim before the lower court.  Specifically, the court found that the Department of Environmental Protection and the Commission did not fail to act in implementing the endangered species act; thus, no standing was conferred upon the groups.  The court also noted that the DEP and the Commission acted in their requisite complementary roles in effecting the Act.

Case
Night monkey used in malaria research perched on top of a corrugated pipe nest soiled with feces. Slideshow Images
Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. 249 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) 2017 WL 1411465 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017) As the court here states, "Plaintiff Debbie Coffey knows a great deal about wild horses and burros—and how those animals are treated by the federal Bureau of Land Management—but she wants to learn more." As such, Plaintiff, a hose welfare advocate, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the BLM to obtain communications between its officials and private citizens, namely those with long-term holding contracts, involved in the Wild Horse and Burro Program. In conjunction with her request, the BLM charged plaintiff $1,680 in processing fees, but ultimately refunded her the fees a year and half later because it failed to meet FOIA statutory response deadlines. On appeal, Coffey filed a FOIA suit and both sides moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the BLM violated FOIA when it failed to give her interest on her processing fees. The court, however, found that awarding interest here would violate the longstanding "no-interest rule," where there was no congressional intent to award interest in such cases. As to plaintiff's argument that BLM's search for records was inadequate, the court agreed with plaintiff that the words and phrases used by BLM were too limiting to meet plaintiff's request and were thus unreasonable. The court held that BLM must choose a different set of search terms (including those suggested by plaintiff) and conduct the FOIA search again. However, the court found that plaintiff's additional contentions that: (1) the search terms were too vague; (2) the database and software needed to be identified; and (3) BLM needed to also include phone records in its search to be without merit. The parties' motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. Case
MS - Hunting, birds - § 49-1-39. Killing animals or birds injurious to agriculture; Miss. Code Ann. § 49-1-39; Miss. Code Ann § 49-5-7 MS ST § 49-1-39; MS ST § 49-5-7 Mississippi amended its laws in 2000 to specifically disallow the killing of any bird protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and was further amended to prohibit the killing or molestation of any wild bird (other than a game bird and some excepted species). While the law was written with an evident bias toward agricultural protection, it does specifically mention the eagle as one of the species protected under federal law. Statute
Hampton v.Hammons 743 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1987)

The five-year-old child hopped a fence, which was in disrepair, into his neighbor's yard to retrieve a ball. As he was trying to leave, he was severely bitten by a pit bull that the neighbor was keeping for his son. In reversing the judgment in part, the court held that the keeping of a pit bull might be a violation of Tulsa, Okla., Rev. Ordinances tit. 2, ch. 1, § (2)(d) (1973), so the child's negligence per se theory was actionable. The court held that the neighbor was the dog's owner as a matter of law under the dog-bite statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 4. sec. 42.1 (1981).

Case
People v. Parker (Unpublished) 1999 WL 33435342 (Unpublished Mich. 1999)

Defendants-appellees, who were bound over on the charge of knowingly attending an animal fight and of knowingly organizing, promoting, or collecting money for the fighting of an animal, filed a motion to suppress evidence and motions to quash the information. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed and the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact, and that evidence that had been obtained in violation of defendant Parker's Fourth Amendment rights was admissible against all defendants except Parker. Finally, as to the defendants' challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court declared that it had already determined that the language was neither vague nor overbroad. Reversed and remanded for trial. 

Case
NY - Rehabilitators, wildlife - Part 184. Wildlife Rehabilitators. 6 NY ADC 184.1 - 7 6 NYCRR 184.1 - 7 These New York regulations concern the qualifications for appointment as a state wildlife rehabilitator. Section 184.1 first states that, "The purpose of this Part is to establish a specially trained group of individuals, collectively called wildlife rehabilitators, to provide for the care of injured and debilitated wildlife so that such wildlife may be returned to the wild." Under the chapter, "wildlife rehabilitation" means the practice of providing care for injured or debilitated wildlife, including their capture, housing, feeding, emergency treatment and release to the wild. Administrative
CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL Animal cruelty against any animal has been considered a crime Under the Criminal Code of Mexico City since 2014. Chapter IV contains the provisions regarding the crimes committed by acts of cruelty or mistreatment against non-human animals. Article 350 BIS establishes that "whoever intentionally mistreats or cruelly acts against any specimen of any animal species causing injury, damage, or alteration in their health will be punished with one to up to three years of imprisonment and three hundred to five hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. In addition, intentional acts of cruelty or mistreatment that cause the death of an animal will be punished with imprisonment from two years to up to six years and six hundred to twelve hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. The penalties will be increased by up to two-thirds in those cases where methods that cause serious suffering to the animal are used prior to the death. Methods that cause serious suffering are understood as all those that lead to non-immediate death and prolong the animal's agony. Using an animal for sexual purposes is punishable with one to three years in prison and five hundred to a thousand times the Units of Measure and Update. Enhanced Penalties: The sanctions stipulated in this article shall be subject to a one-half increase if, in addition to the acts mentioned above, the individual responsible or any other person captures visual evidence with the purpose of publicly disseminating these acts through any means. The same increase applies to the killing of a companion animal for purposes of human consumption." Other articles in this code concerning animals include Article 54. 76, 226 BIS, and 226 TER. Statute
Animal Law Index Volume 16, Part 2

Animal Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 (Spring 2010)

 

INTRODUCTION

INCORPORATING ANIMAL LAW INTO PRIVATE PRACTICE

Holly Anne Gibbons

 

 

Policy

Pages