Results

Displaying 11 - 20 of 6638
Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
AK - Hunting - § 16.05.797. Computer-assisted remote hunting prohibited AS § 16.05.797 AK ST § 16.05.797 This law makes it a class A misdemeanor to engage in computer-assisted remote hunting or or provide or operate a facility for computer-assisted remote hunting in Alaska. Statute
CA - Circus - Article 5. Circus Cruelty Prevention Act West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 2207 - 2210 CA FISH & G § 2207 - 2210 The California Circus Cruelty Prevention Act, effective in 2020, states that a person shall not sponsor, conduct, or operate a circus in this state that uses any animal other than a domestic dog, domestic cat, or domesticated horse, or exhibit or use any other animals than those animals. The term “circus” means a performance before a live audience in which entertainment consisting of a variety of acts, such as acrobats, aerialists, clowns, jugglers, or stunts, is the primary attraction or principal business, but excludes rodeos. Statute
Derecho Animal Volume 6 Núm 4

Tabla de contenidos

 

Editorial

 

El Derecho Animal en 2015

Teresa Giménez-Candela

PDF

PDF (EN)

 Policy
Lieberman v. Powers 873 N.E.2d 803 (Mass.App.Ct., 2007) 70 Mass.App.Ct. 238 (2007), 2007 WL 2768668 (Mass.App.Ct.)

In this Massachusetts case, Noah Lieberman sustained injuries when he was scratched and bitten by a cat while visiting a “cat lounge” at the Sheldon branch animal shelter, which was operated by the Animal Rescue League of Boston (ARL). Plaintiff alleged that his injuries resulted from the defendants' negligent design and maintenance of the cat lounge. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence, in the form of expert opinion, that an ordinarily prudent person in the circumstances of this case-which include the defendants' knowledge regarding the behavior (and potential for aggression) of cats-would have taken additional steps to ensure the safety of visitors to the cat lounge. At the very least, the defendants should have foreseen that the small size of the room, as well as the set-up (one food bowl, one litter box, two perches) and unsupervised operation of the cat lounge was such that it was more likely than not to increase stress in cats, which in turn made it more likely than not that the cats would behave aggressively.

Case
U.S. v. Stevens 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) 176 L.Ed.2d 435, 78 USLW 4267, 38 Media L. Rep. 1577, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4819, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5779, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 221

Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note:  18 U.S.C. § 48 was amended following this ruling in late 2010).

Case
AL - Restaurant - § 22-20-5.3. Pet dogs permitted in outdoor dining areas Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.3; Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.4 AL ST § 22-20-5.3; § 22-20-5.4 This Alabama law enacted in 2021 states that a pet dog that is under the control of a person shall be permitted in an outdoor dining area of a food service establishment if conditions listed in the law are all met. These include things like the food service facility owner filing a waiver with the State Health Department stating they will adhere to the prescribed rules, a prominent sign that puts the public on notice, a separate entrance for the dogs and owners that does not go through the food establishment, and making sure the pet owners adhere to rules like keeping dogs on leashes or in carriers. Statute
Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh 438 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Md. 2020), vacated and remanded, No. 20-1631, 2021 WL 4452349 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed. Case
US - Chimpanzees - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for Chimpanzee and Pygmy Chimpanzee 1990 WL 325467 (F.R.) 50 CFR Part 17 RIN 1018-AB23

The Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) reclassifies wild populations of the chimpanzee and all populations of the pygmy chimpanzee from threatened to endangered status. Both species have declined through such problems as massive habitat destruction, excessive hunting and capture by people, and lack of effective national and international controls. This rule will enhance the protection of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, for these species. Captive populations of the chimpanzee will continue to be classified as threatened, and individuals of that species in the United States will continue to be covered by a special regulation allowing activities otherwise prohibited.

Administrative
The Future of Animal Law

The Future of Animal Law, David Favre, Professor, Michigan State University College of Law,  Edward Elgar Publishing (2021).

 

 Policy
Humane Society-Western Region v. Snohomish County 2007 WL 2404619 (W.D. Wash)

Plaintiff Humane Society Western Region (d/b/a "Happy Paws Farm") filed this lawsuit against Snohomish County alleging provisions of the county code regulating barking are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the state and federal constitutions, and that the SCC provision governing the temporary housing of animals in shelters violates its federal constitutional right to substantive due process. Plaintiff argued that the noise ordinances invite subjective evaluation resulting in arbitrary enforcement because the code contains no reference to identifiable levels of noise, only to noises that are repetitive.  The absence of identifiable levels of noise, or decibel levels, does not render the noise ordinances unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this method is not easily understood by individuals of ordinary intelligence or that it fails to protect against arbitrary enforcement. This opinion was Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part by Humane Society Western Region v. Snohomish County, 357 Fed.Appx. 144 (9th Cir., 2009).

Case

Pages