Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch, L.L.C. v. Lange | 326 S.W.3d 549 (Mo.App. E.D., 2010) | 2010 WL 4751676 (Mo.App. E.D.) |
A Missouri statute places liability on a dog owner where such dog kills or maims a sheep or "other domestic animal" of another. On December 10, 2006, three dogs of Defendant Glendon Lange entered Oak Creek’s deer breeding farm and killed 21 of Oak Creek's "breeder deer." The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, disagreed with the trial court, finding that "domestic" should have been interpreted by the "plain meaning" of the word, which therefore includes Oak Creek’s breeder deer. |
Case |
| IN - Cruelty - Section 429 Indian Penal Code 1860 | 45 of 1860 | Killing, poisoning, maiming, or 'rendering useless' cattle, including elephants, or any other animal worth over fifty rupees, is a criminal offence. | Statute | |
| Moore v. Knower | 214 So.3d 165 (La.App. 4 Cir., 2017) | 2016-0776 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/17) | Bruce Moore and Amy Knower were in a relationship and decided to adopt a dog together. Bruce alleged that they both jointly adopted Abby, a Boston Terrier in 2010. The couple jointly shared expenses for the care and management of the dog. After the parties broke up, they agreed to an arrangement in which each party alternated possession of Abby every week. The parties continued this arrangement even during their brief reconciliation up until July of 2015 when Amy Knower refused to exchange the dog with Bruce Moore. Moore filed suit and the trial court found for him and awarded him the use and management of Abby. Knower alleged that she was the sole owner of Abby. Knower appealed, alleging five assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in finding that she failed to support her claim of full ownership; (2) the trial court erred in finding that she co-owned Abby with Moore; (3) the trial court erred in failing to accept the testimony of Sheila Ford of the Mississippi Boston Terrier Rescue; (4) the trial court erred by stating that there was no basis in law for her to decide the custody of a dog and then doing just that; (5) the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The Court determined that the trial court did in fact have jurisdiction over the matter. The Court did not find any errors in the trial court’s findings. It concluded that Abby was indeed co-owned by Moore and Knower and ultimately held that Knower had no right to unilaterally end the arrangement. Knower did not supply sufficient proof to support her claim of full ownership. Moore was awarded Abby and the right to solely determine use and management of the dog. | Case |
| Brazil - Biodiversity Treaty- Acceptance |
Brazil's Ratification of the Biodiversity Treaty: Decree No. 2, dated 3/2/94, |
Administrative | ||
| WA - Research - 19.86.145. Penalties--Animals used in biomedical research | West's RCWA 19.86.145 | WA ST 19.86.145 | This law provides that any violation of RCW 9.08.070 - 9.08.078 (relating to concealing or taking a pet animal with the intent to deprive or defraud the owner) or RCW 16.52.220 (relating to transfer of mammals other than rats or mice for use in research) constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice. Research institutions that violate this provision face only monetary penalties not to exceed $2,500. | Statute |
| WI - South Milwaukee - Vicious dog - § 23.20 REGULATING VICIOUS DOGS. | SOUTH MILWAUKEE, WI., MUNICIPAL CODE § 23.20 | In 2017, the City of South Milwaukee amended its section on "vicious dogs" to remove the prohibition on the keeping of dogs described as "pit bull dogs." This ban was repealed on June 27, 2017. | Local Ordinance | |
| Animal Liberation Ltd v National Parks & Wildlife Service | [2003] NSWSC 457 |
The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent from conducting an aerial shooting of goats as part of a 'cull'. The applicants claimed that the aerial shooting constituted cruelty as the goats, once wounded, would die a slow death. An injunction was granted to the applicants pending final hearing of the substantive action against the aerial shooting. |
Case | |
| Flikshtein v. City of New York | 273 A.D.2d 439 (N.Y. 2000) | 710 N.Y.S.2d 112 |
The New York appellate court held that the dangerousness or viciousness of plaintiff’s pet monkey was irrelevant, and that the city could remove the monkey regardless of its benevolent behavior. |
Case |
| State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne | 505 P.2d 732 (Kan. 1973) |
The Kansas Attorney General had advised the cockfighter that cockfighting was illegal in Kansas under the provisions of § 21-4310 (Supp. 1972). The gamecock fighter believed the Attorney General was wrong and advised a county attorney that he intended to fight gamecocks on his farm so the State then sought a declaratory judgment. On appeal, the court found that cockfighting did not fall within the prohibition of § 21-4310 as constituting cruelty to animals, as Kansas statutes proscribing cruelty to animals had traditionally been directed toward protection of the four-legged animal, especially beasts of the field and beasts of burden. |
Case | |
| Mackley v. State | 481 P.3d 639 (Wyo. 2021) | 2021 WY 33 (Wyo., 2021) | The Wyoming Supreme Court considers whether the jury was properly instructed on the charge of aggravated animal cruelty. The case stems from an incident where a dog escaped his owner and attacked the defendant's dogs at his front door. A local teenager grabbed the offending dog ("Rocky") and dragged him into the street as the dog fight carried on. The defendant responded by grabbing his gun and shooting Rocky as he was held by the teenager. A jury convicted defendant of both aggravated animal cruelty and reckless endangering. At the trial, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on both charges, arguing that the Wyoming Legislature has established that humanely destroying an animal is not animal cruelty and that the State did not provide evidence that he intentionally pointed a firearm at anyone, which defendant contends is necessary for the reckless endangering charge. On appeal here, the court first observed that defendant's challenge to a confusing or misleading jury instruction was waived because he negotiated with the prosecution to draft it. Further, the Supreme Court did not find an abuse of discretion where the district court refused defendant's additional instructions on the humane destruction of an animal in the jury instructions on the elements for the aggravated cruelty to animals charge. While defendant argued that the instructions should include subsection m from the statute, he only now on appeal contends that the subsection should have been given as a theory of defense. Thus, reviewing this argument for plain error, the Court found that defendant's theory that his killing was "humane" and thus excluded from the crime of aggravated cruelty was not supported by the language of the statute. In fact, such an interpretation not only goes against the plain language, but "then any animal could be killed, under any circumstances, as long as it is killed quickly." Defendant presented no evidence that the dog he shot was suffering or distressed and needed euthanasia. The trial court did not commit error when it declined to instruct the jury on subsection m. As to the reckless endangering conviction, the court also affirmed this charge as defendant showed a conscious disregard for the substantial risk he placed the teenager in regardless of whether he pointed the gun at the victim. Affirmed. | Case |