Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OK - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | 11 Okl.St.Ann. § 22-115.1; 21 Okl.St.Ann. § 649.1 - 649.3; 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 1717 - 1718; 4 Okl.St.Ann. § 41 - 47; 391 - 402; 499 - 499.10; 501 - 602; 29 Okl. St. Ann. § 7-304; 70 Okl.St.Ann. § 5-117.6 | These statutes comprise Oklahoma's dog laws. Among the provisions include dog control laws, sterilization provisions for adopted animals, and the use of unclaimed animals in scientific research or experimentation. | Statute | ||
| MO - Breeding - Proposition B | 2010 Proposition B |
The official ballot title asks voters if Missouri law be amended to (1) require large-scale dog breeding operations to provide each dog under their care with sufficient food, clean water, housing and space; necessary veterinary care; regular exercise and adequate rest between breeding cycles; (2) prohibit any breeder from having more than 50 breeding dogs for the purpose of selling their puppies as pets; and (3) create a misdemeanor crime of “puppy mill cruelty” for any violations. |
Statute | ||
| Webb v. Amtower | 2008 WL 713728 (KS,2008 (not reported)) | 178 P.3d 80 (KS,2008 (table only)) |
The court applied the forum's traditional lex loci conflict-of-laws rule to determine what jurisdiction's law governed for both damages and recovery of possession. The "place of injury" for the tort/damages issue was Kansas since that's where the contract was signed. The court remanded the case to determine the law of the place where the dog was found to determine the right-to-possession since that was a personal property issue. |
Case | |
| State v. Wilson | 464 So.2d 667 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1985) | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 602 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1985) |
In this Florida case, the state appeals a county court order that granted appellee's motion to dismiss two counts of an information and which also declared a state statute to be unconstitutional. Defendant-appellee was arrested for having approximately seventy-seven poodles in cages in the back of a van without food, water and sufficient air. In her motion to dismiss, defendant-appellee alleged that the phrases “sufficient quantity of good and wholesome food and water” and “[k]eeps any animals in any enclosure without wholesome exercise and change of air” as contained in sections 828.13(2)(a) and (b) were void for vagueness. In reversing the lower court, this court held that the prohibitions against depriving an animal of sufficient food, water, air and exercise, when measured by common understanding and practice, are not unconstitutionally vague. |
Case | |
| Oshannessy v Heagney | [1997] NSWSC 482 |
The case focuses primarily on the procedural requirements for stating a case. However, there is also discussion concerning what are the appropriate steps that a motor vehicle driver, who has hit and injured an animal with their vehicle, must take. In this case, the trial judge found that a refusal to stop and inspect the animal did not constitute a failure to take reasonable steps to alleviate that animal's pain. |
Case | ||
| Davison v. Berg | 243 So.3d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018) | 44 Fla. L. Weekly D641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018); 2018 WL 1415485 | Deborah Davison volunteered at her local Humane Society to help take care of a dog park. Three years later, Rebecca Berg’s dog who was chasing other dogs collided with Davison. Davison suffered a broken leg that required extensive medical care. Davison then filed an action against Berg under a Florida statute that “imposes liability on dog owners for damage their dogs cause to other persons and animals.” The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Berg for two reasons. The first reason was that the signs outside of the park sufficiently warned Davison of the risks of injury inside. The second reason was that Davison essentially consented to the risk of potential injuries by being a volunteer for the dog park. On appeal, this court stated that the Florida statute was a strict liability statute that makes an owner the insurer of their dog’s conduct. The only defense to the statute is for an owner to display in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign that includes the words “Bad Dog.” Berg presented evidence that the park had two signs prominently displayed at the entrance to the park with the title “Dog Park Rules.” The two signs listed rules for entrance to the dog park. One of these rules stated that park use is at the dog owner’s risk. Another rule stated that rough play and chasing were not allowed if any dogs or owners were uncomfortable with that behavior. The last rule stated that visitors enter at their own risk. Even though Davison entered the park at her own risk, the purpose of the sign requirement in the statute was to give notice that a bad dog is on the premises. The Court found that the trial court erred in finding that the signs at the dog park were sufficiently equivalent to “Bad Dog” signs to preclude liability under the Florida statute. The trial court also found that by virtue of Davison volunteering at the dog park, she was aware that she could be injured during the course of her work and that she signed a volunteer application form that acknowledged that she could be exposed to “bites, scratches, and other injuries.” Davison had also witnessed a prior collision between a dog and an individual that resulted in a broken leg. After witnessing that, Davison began to warn others at the Humane Society about the dangers of being inside the dog park with dogs chasing each other. The Court held that even though there may be evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davison consented to the risk of injury, “an actual consent or assumption of the risk defense cannot bar liability.” The Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Berg. | Case | |
| NJ - Fur - Chapter 14. Fur Products. | NJSA 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | NJ ST 56:14-1 to 56:14-3 | This law represents New Jersey's fur labeling law. Under the 2009 law, no person shall sell or offer to sell any new coat, jacket, garment or other clothing apparel made wholly or in part of fur, regardless of the price or value of the fur, without the name of the animal(s) used to produce the fur and the name of the country of origin of any imported fur. A person who violates this act shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $500 for the first offense and not more than $1,000 for each subsequent offense, to be collected in a civil action by a summary proceeding. | Statute | |
| MD - Hunting - Subtitle 9. Captive Wildlife. | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-901 - 911 | MD NAT RES § 10-901 - 911 | This Maryland statute states that it is in the state's public interest to preserve native species by strictly regulating the possession, importation, exportation, breeding, raising, protection, rehabilitation, hunting, killing, trapping, capture, purchase, or sale of certain wildlife which pose a possibility of harm to native wildlife. | Statute | |
| ID - Exotic Animals - Chapter 27. Rules Governing Deleterious Exotic Animals | IDAPA 02.04.27.100 | ID ADC 02.04.27.100 | These Idaho rules concern the possession, propagation, and exhibition of "deleterious exotic animals." No person may possess or propagate a deleterious exotic animal in the state, unless such person obtains a possession permit issued by the Administrator. Species of deleterious exotic animals include leopards, lions, non-pinioned mute swans, Russian wild boar, and all non-human primates, among others. | Administrative | |
| City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas | 794 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1990). |
City's animal control ordinance banning the keeping of pit bulls was not preempted by state Penal Code provisions governing the keeping of vicious dogs. |
Case |