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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
SC - Veterinary - Chapter 69. Veterinarians. Code 1976 § 40-69-5 to 305 SC ST § 40-69-5 to 305 These are the state's veterinary practice laws amended in 2006. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. Statute
Expte. N° HC-656/21 - Habeas Corpus en favor del Tortugo Jorge Expte. N° HC-656/21 Jorge is an 80-year-old turtle living in the Municipal Aquarium of Medoza, Argentina. In 2021, three animal lawyers filed a habeas corpus on behalf of Jorge, arguing a violation of the turtle’s right to his locomotive freedom and a violation of Mendoza’s law 7.887, 2018, which prohibits the exhibit of animals in circuses or other events. The lawyers stated that Jorge had to be relocated to a more natural environment where he could live the last years of his life, raising concerns for his age and health. After learning that the government is turning the aquarium into a biodiversity center and after consulting with several experts, the tribunal denied the Habeas Corpus as it found the controversy was moot. It also rejected the idea of releasing Jorge into the wild. However, it is important to mention that the tribunal did not oppose his relocation into a sanctuary so long as his physical integrity was protected. Case
Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo 387 P.3d 690 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) 2017 WL 121589, 187 Wash. 2d 509, 92846-1, 2017 WL 121589, at *1–11 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017)

To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an “Operations and Management Agreement” (Agreement) with the City of Seattle. The Agreement gave WPZS exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the care, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Agreement also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo.  Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every government agency to make records available for public inspection and copying.  The Zoo's director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request by asserting that the PRA did not apply because WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was not an agency subject to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford test was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity’s disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford analysis, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the City did not exercise sufficient control over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (3) WPZS was created solely by private individuals and not  government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, “core” government function, the case did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed.

Case
In re: Jennifer Caudill 2013 WL 604009 (U.S.D.A. Feb. 1, 2013) Although the Complaint alleged that Caudill made false or fraudulent statements and/or provided false or fraudulent records to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the emphasis in the Complaint suggested that primary reliance was being placed upon the more general determination of unfitness. The Complaint alleged that Respondents (collectively, including Caudill) engaged in activities designed to circumvent an order of the Secretary of Agriculture in revoking the Animal Welfare Act exhibitor's license previously held by Lancelot Kollman Ramos, and have acted as surrogates for Ramos. Caudill and Kalmanson were alleged to continue to act as Ramos's surrogates, and to facilitate the circumvention of his license revocation order. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found factual support for termination on the grounds of false statements and providing false documents to be lacking. The AJL also found little support for the conclusion that Caudill in any way was operating as a surrogate for Ramos. The ALJ did find that although Caudill had initiated discussions with Ramos concerning the purchase of his animals prior to the effective date of his license revocation, her subsequent consummation of the transaction after his license had been revoked constitutes a violation of 9 C.F.R. § 2.132. In the end, however, the evidence was insufficient to find that Respondent Caudill was unfit to hold an AWA license or that maintenance of a license by her would in any way be contrary to the purposes of the Act Case
NY - Horse Racing - Section 4002.21. License requirements for assistant trainer 9 NY ADC 4002.21 9 NYCRR 4002.21 An assistant trainer's license may be issued to a person who is 18 years old, has three years of experience, is vouched for by the trainer by whom he or she is to be employed, and passes a written exam (or oral) and a practical exam. Administrative
AZ - Hunting - § 17-316. Interference with rights of hunters; classification; civil action; exceptions A. R. S. § 17-316 AZ ST § 17-316 This law represents Arizona's hunter harassment law. Under the law, it is a class 2 misdemeanor for a person while in a hunting area to intentionally interfere with, prevent or disrupt the lawful taking of wildlife as defined under the law. It is a class 3 misdemeanor for a person to enter or remain on a designated hunting area on any public or private lands or waters or state lands including state trust lands with the intent to interfere with, prevent or disrupt the lawful taking of wildlife. "Incidental interference" arising from lawful activity by public land users is not unlawful under this section. Statute
VA - Impound - § 3.2-6547. Acceptance of animals for research or experimentation; prohibition Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6547 VA ST § 3.2-6547 This Virginia statute provides that no animal bearing a tag, license or tattooed identification shall be used or accepted by any person for the purpose of medical research or experimentation, unless the individual who owns such animal consents in writing. Statute
Michigan Compiled Laws 1929: Chapter 285: Section 1 Mich. Comp. Laws ch. 285, § 1 (1929) Chapter 285, entitled "An act for the more effectual prevention of cruelty to animals," concerns Michigan's Law about the treatment of animals from 1929. The act covers what qualifies as cruelty to animals and what is the punishment for crime of cruelty to animals. Statute
OH - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 945. Humane Slaughter of Livestock. R.C. § 945.01 - 99 OH ST § 945.01 - 99 These laws comprise Ohio's humane slaughter provisions. After July 1, 1967, no method of slaughtering livestock or handling in connection with the commercial slaughtering of livestock shall be utilized unless it is humane. Humane methods are defined as those that render animals insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical, or other means that is rapid and effective. Slaughter in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain is also allowed. Violation of the act results in a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. Statute
Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 3

Vol. 2 Núm. 3 (2011)

 

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Editorial

 

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Teresa Giménez-Candela

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