Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MO - Florissant - Breed - SECTION 205.395: REGULATION OF PIT BULL DOGS | FLORISSANT, MO. MUNICIPAL CODE § 205.395 (2010) | In Florissant, Missouri, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own, or possess any pit bull, except pit bulls licensed on the effective date are allowed. Such dogs are subject to certain requirements, such as owners taking identifying photographs, keeping the dog properly confined and/or secured, posting a "Beware of Dog--Pit Bull" sign, keeping $100,000 liability insurance, and sterilizing the dog. A violation may result in seizure and impoundment of the dog. | Local Ordinance | ||
| Horton v. State | Horton v. State, 27 So. 468 (Ala. 1900). |
The defendant was charged under the Alabama cruelty to animal statute killing a dog. The trial court found the defendant guilty of cruelly killing the dog. The defendant appealed the descision to the Supreme Court for the determination if the killing of the dog with a rifle was cruel. The Supreme Court found that the killing of a dog without the showing of cruelty to the animal was not a punishable offence under the cruelty to animal statute. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's descision and remanded it. |
Case | ||
| Colombia - Cruelty - LEY 84, 1989, Statue of Animal Protection | LEY 84, 1989 | Ley 84 is the National Statute of Animal Protection in Colombia. Ley 84 establishes the general duties of humans towards animals. Among these duties includes the duty to provide animals with enough food, water and medicine to guarantee their well-being; the duty to provide animals with appropriate space so they can move adequately; and the duty to provide appropriate shelter. Article 7 contains the exceptions to the duty to protect animals, meaning that the practices listed in this section are legal under the current legal system even though they might be inherently cruel. These exceptions correspond to the different variations and forms of bullfighting rejoneo, coleo, las corridas de toros, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas y tientas, and cockfighting. Ley 84 also regulates the slaughter of animals for non-consumption, animals in experiments and research, animal transportation, as well as hunting and fishing, resources, penalties, legal competency, and procedures to follow in regard to this law. | Statute | ||
| Lessman v. Rhodes | 721 N.E.2d 178(1999) |
Plaintiff, a participant in a horse show, was injured when a stallion bucked and kicked him; he sued the show’s sponsor, and the stallion’s rider and owner alleging negligent and willful and wanton misconduct, by failing to conduct background checks into the horses and by failing to separate the stallions participating in the show, inter alia . The Equine Activity Liability Act, which was established to shield those persons who participate in equine activities from liability, provides an exception to the general rule by permitting liability for equine activity sponsors that commit “an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury.” In this case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that showed that the defendants behaved in a reckless or intentional manner, therefore the summary judgment in favor of the defendant entered by the trial court was founded to be proper. |
Case | ||
| Dodge v. Durdin | 187 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.-Hous. (1 Dist.), 2005) | 2005 WL 3214618 (Tex. App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)) |
Employee brought a negligence action against employer for injuries suffered when administering medicine to an untamed horse. District Court granted summary judgment stating that the plaintiff was considered a "participant" under the Equine Act. Plaintiff appealed. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case stating that the Equine Act did not apply because the Act covered consumers, not employees. |
Case | |
| Australia - Animal Cruelty - Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Animal Trades) Regulation 1996 | Agency Citation |
This Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Animal Trades) Regulation 1996 identifies certain businesses as animal trades for the purposes of POCTAA, and prescribes Codes of Practice relevant to the conduct of those businesses. It also creates offences relating to the conduct of businesses classed as 'animal trades'. |
Administrative | ||
| ME - Hunting - § 11215. Use of motorized vehicle to kill, injure, or molest wild animals or wild birds | 12 M. R. S. A. § 11215 | ME ST T. 12 § 11215 | This Maine statute states that a person may not intentionally kill, injure or molest a wild animal or wild bird with a Motor vehicle, Motorboat, or Aircraft. A person who violates the statute commits a Class E crime. | Statute | |
| BARKING HOUND VILLAGE, LLC., et al. v. MONYAK, et al. | 299 Ga. 144, 787 S.E.2d 191 (Ga., 2016) | S15G1184, 2016 WL 3144352, (Ga. June 6, 2016) | In 2012, Plaintiffs Robert and Elizabeth Monyaks took their dogs Lola and Callie, for ten days to a kennel owned by Defendants Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Callie, had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis pain. However, three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure and died in March 2013.The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the arthritis medication prescribed for Callie. BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and the Monyaks failed to prove that Lola had any market value. The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog’s fair market value. The court stated that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating injuries, as well as by other economic factors. However, evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed in part and held that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he value of [a] dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown.” The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and found no error in the court's determination that Georgia precedent does not allow for the recovery of damages based on the sentimental value of personal property to its owner. | Case | |
| Department of Local Government and Regional Development v Emanuel Exports Pty Ltd | Western Australia Magistrates Court, 8 February 2008, Magistrate C.P. Crawford |
The central allegation was that the defendants transported the sheep in a way likely to cause unnecessary harm. Magistrate Crawford found that the sheep, some of which died from inanition, suffered distress and harm and that this harm was unnecessary. Proof of actual harm, however, was unnecessary as it only had to be shown that it was likely that the sheep would suffer harm. This required evidence pointing only to the conditions onboard the ship, and voyage plan, as at the first day. The defences of necessity and honest and reasonable belief were both dismissed. |
Case | ||
| Youngstown v. Traylor | 123 Ohio St.3d 132, 914 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio,2009) | 2009 WL 2634570 (Ohio), 2009 -Ohio- 2971 | Defendant was charged with two misdemeanors after his unrestrained Italian Mastiff/Cane Corso dogs attacked a wire fox terrier and its owner. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that YCO 505.19(b) is unconstitutional and a violation of his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Youngstown municipal ordinance was constitutional because it was “rationally related to the city's legitimate interest in protecting citizens from vicious dogs,” provided “the dog owner with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the dog's classification,” and did not “label dogs as dangerous or vicious” solely based on their breed type. | Case |