Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Environmental - National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 | 42 USC 4321 - 4370j | The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision making processes by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions. To meet this requirement, federal agencies prepare a detailed statement known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). EPA reviews and comments on EISs prepared by other federal agencies, maintains a national filing system for all EISs, and assures that its own actions comply with NEPA. | Statute | |||||||
| AR - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty/Animal Fighting Laws | A.C.A. § 5-62-101 - 127; 5-14-122 | AR ST § 5-62-101 -127; 5-14-122 | This section contains the Arkansas anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. A person commits a misdemeanor if he or she knowingly abandons any animal subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, fails to supply an animal in his or her custody with a sufficient quantity of wholesome food and water fails to provide an animal in his or her custody with adequate shelter, kills or injures any animal belonging to another without legal privilege or consent of the owner, or carries an animal in or upon any motorized vehicle or boat in a cruel or inhumane manner. Aggravated cruelty to a cat, dog, or horse is a Class D felony if the offense involves the torture. | Statute | ||||||
| Cetacean Community v. Bush | 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) | 59 ERC 1257, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,120, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9331, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,791 |
In this case, the court was asked to decide whether the world's cetaceans have standing to bring suit in their own name under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Cetaceans challenge the United States Navy's use of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar ("SURTASS LFAS") during wartime or heightened threat conditions. In finding that the Cetaceans lacked standing, the court here agreed with the district court in Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc., that "[i]f Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly." 836 F.Supp. at 49. In the absence of any such statement in the ESA, the MMPA, or NEPA, or the APA, the court concluded that the Cetaceans do not have statutory standing to sue. |
Case | ||||||
| Dauphine v. U.S. | 73 A.3d 1029 (D.C.,2013) | 2013 WL 4556546 |
Defendant, Dr. Nico Dauphine, was convicted of attempted cruelty to animals, contrary to D.C.Code §§ 22–1001, –1803 (2001). After an investigation, Dr. Dauphine was captured on surveillance video placing bromadialone, an anticoagulant rodenticide, near the neighborhood cats' food bowls. On appeal, Dauphine contended that there was insufficient evidence that she committed the crime "knowingly" with malice. This court found the inclusion of the word "knowingly" did not change the statute from a general to specific intent crime, and simply shows that the actor had no justification for his or her actions. The government met its burden to prove that appellant attempted to commit the crime of animal cruelty. |
Case | ||||||
| C.M. v. E.M. | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2023 WL 8360025 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 2023) | This is a family law case concerning, among other issues, the euthanasia of a family companion animal. Defendant argues that Plaintiff violated an order in place by putting the family dog down without reason, necessity, and justification, and that the dog was an emotional support animal whose custody had not been determined. Defendant also argues that plaintiff did not allow defendant the opportunity to spend time with the dog before it was put down, and that he suffered emotional distress due to the dog's death. The court found that the euthanasia of the family dog did not violate the order in place, because the companion animal was not classified as "property" or an "asset" under the order in place, and that animals are afforded additional protection under the Family Court Act. Whether the animal was put down unnecessarily could be considered animal cruelty, but that inquiry would need to be determined in a criminal proceeding, and criminal charges were not filed. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff did not violate the order by euthanizing the family dog. | Case | |||||||
| CA - Horse - § 21759. Caution in passing animals | West's Ann. Cal. Vehicle Code § 21759 | CA VEHICLE § 21759 | This California law provides that the driver of any vehicle that approaches a horse drawn vehicle, any ridden animal, or livestock must exercise proper control of his vehicle and shall reduce speed or stop as may appear necessary to avoid frightening the animal and to insure safety of the person in charge of the animal. | Statute | ||||||
| IN - Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972 | Act. No. 52 of 1972 |
India's Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 is a comprehensive piece of legislation that regulates sanctuaries, national parks, and zoos among other protected locations. Its primary aim is to curb the illegal trade in wildlife and the derivative parts. |
Statute | |||||||
| WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar | 741 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C., 2010) | 2010 WL 3832061 (D.D.C.) |
Plaintiff, WildEarth Guardians, brought this action seeking judicial review of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s final agency actions pertaining to the Utah prairie dog. Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that the FWS erred in denying (1) their petition to reclassify the Utah prairie dog as an endangered species under the ESA and (2) their petition to initiate rulemaking to repeal a regulation allowing for the limited extermination (i.e., take) of Utah prairie dogs. With respect to Plaintiff’s challenge as to reclassification, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s motion for Summary Judgment should be granted on two grounds. However, the court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (and granted Defendant’s cross-motion) insofar as Plaintiff asserted that the FWS’ refusal to initiate rulemaking was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with the ESA. |
Case | ||||||
| U.S. v. Gonzales | 957 F.Supp. 1225 (D. N.M. 1997) |
Court held that defendant has standing to raise a facial challenge to the Indian eagle permit process where he declined to apply for a permit based on the intrusiveness of the questions. Defendant is a member of a highly secretive religious sect of his tribe. In the RFRA analysis, the court held that the permit application was not the least restrictive means of implementing the government's compelling interest where the permit required intrusive information about religious practices. For further discussion on Native American religious challenges to the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 1 Núm 2 |
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Policy |