Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gray v. RSPCA | [2013] EWHC 500 (Admin) | Mr Gray appealed against the police seizure of 115 horses from his horse trading premises, pursuant to section 18 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Gray had been convicted of numerous counts of cruelty, specifically under sections 4 and 9 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Mr Gray argued that an offence under sections 4 and 9 required either actual knowledge or a form of constructive knowledge that the animal was showing signs of unnecessary suffering, and that negligence was not sufficient. It was held that the plain effect of section 4(1) of the Act is to impose criminal liability for unnecessary suffering caused to an animal either by an act or omission which the person responsible knew would, or was likely to, cause unnecessary suffering, or by a negligent act or omission. Further, it was held that section 9(1) of the Act sets a purely objective standard of care which a person responsible for an animal is required to provide. | Case | ||
| Animal Law Index Volume 20, Part 1 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 20, Issue 1 (Fall 2013)
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Policy | |||
| RI - Exotic Pets - Chapter 18. Importation of Wild Animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-18-1 to 15 | RI ST § 4-18-1 to 15 | This chapter of Rhode Island laws proclaims that its intent is to provide safeguards for the protection of persons in the state from disease hazards associated with imported wild animals. Under the chapter, no person shall import into, receive, or possess in this state without first obtaining a permit from the department, animals of the following orders, families, and genera: primates, carnivores, amphibia, reptilia, canidae, and insecta. Personal pets under a special permit are exempted from the importation permit requirement. A permit may be granted by the department to import a wild animal as a personal pet, if a written affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury is completed at the time of entry at the site of first arrival. This chapter also requires that certain species undergo quarantine for specified periods of time. Any person who violates any provisions of this chapter shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and the loss of any specimen referred to in this chapter. | Statute | |
| NC - Rabies - § 130A-195. Destroying stray or feral animals in quarantine districts | N.C.G.S.A. § 130A-195 | NC ST § 130A-195 | This North Carolina statute provides that when quarantine has been declared and dogs and cats continue to run uncontrolled in the area, any peace officer or Animal Control Officer shall have the right, after reasonable effort has been made to apprehend the animals, to destroy the uncontrolled dogs and cats and properly dispose of their bodies. | Statute | |
| Hoffa v. Bimes | 954 A.2d 1241 (Pa.Super.,2008) | 2008 PA Super 181; 2008 WL 3126320 |
This case arises from the treatment of plaintiff's horse by the defendant-veterinarian. This appeal arises from plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in granting a compulsory non-suit in favor of defendant finding that the Veterinary Immunity Act bars claims against veterinarians except those based upon gross negligence. This court agreed with the lower court that defendant was confronted with an emergency medical condition such as to fall under the protections of the Act. Further, this court held that the trial court committed no error in concluding that plaintiff's consent was not required before the veterinarian performed the abdominal tap because that procedure was rendered under an 'emergency situation.' |
Case | |
| Miles ex rel. Miles v. Rich | 347 S.W.3d 477 (Mo.App. E.D., 2011) | 2011 WL 1564030 (Mo.App. E.D.) |
In this Missouri case, the plaintiff filed an action against defendant dog owner for damages after defendant's dog bit the plaintiff's child. Defendant dog owner then filed a third-party petition against the Humane Society of Missouri from which defendant had adopted the dog, seeking contribution under a theory of common law negligence. Defendant appeals the lower court's dismissal, specifically contending that the Humane Society breached 1) its duty to prevent the adoption of the dog by doing tests it knew would have identified the dog's dangerous propensity to bite ; and 2) its duty to fully inform defendant of the risks of keeping a dog who has bitten in the past. The appellate court found that the Humane Society did not own, possess, harbor or control the dog when it bit Ms. Miles; thus, it had no duty under common law negligence principles to prevent the harm. |
Case | |
| Canada - New Brunswick Provincial Dog Regulations - N.B. Reg. 84-85 | Agency Citation |
In this province the main legislation governing dog husbandry and the penalties for dog misbehaviour or running at large are in the form of regulations pursuant to the provincial Municipalities Act. |
Administrative | ||
| Historical Materials |
The Animal Legal & Historical Center contains a collection of historical materials related to animal law. Most notable, is a copy of the introduction from William Nelson’s book, The Laws Concerning Game, published in 1753. The book itself reviews game laws in England from 1066 to the 1700s. |
Basic page | |||
| Pacific Ranger, LLC v. Pritzker | 211 F. Supp. 3d 196 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 5676276 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2016) | Pacific Ranger, LLC, a deep-sea commercial fishing vessel, filed suit arguing that a decision made by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) should be set aside by the court. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) filed an action against Pacific Ranger for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) after the vessel set its fishing net on whales during five tuna-fishing expeditions. After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Pacific Ranger had violated the MMPA and was liable for $127,000 in civil penalties. Pacific Ranger argued that these penalties should be set aside because the MMPA was unconstitutionally vague about what was considered an “incidental” taking and the ALJ’s findings could not be supported by substantial evidence. Ultimately, the court reviewed the arguments made by Pacific Ranger and found them to be without merit. First, the court determined that the MMPA was not vague with regard to incidental takings. The court held that incidental takings under the MMPA were restricted to takings that occurred without any knowledge and that this provision needed to be read narrowly in order to give effect to Congress’ intent that maintaining the “healthy populations of marine animals comes first.” The court found that because Pacific Ranger had knowledge that whales were in the area at the time that they were fishing, the taking that occurred could not be considered incidental. Lastly, the court reviewed Pacific Ranger’s argument that the ALJ’s decision could not be supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected this argument, pointing to expert testimony that said that there was no possible way for the Pacific Ranger not to have seen that whales were in the area at the time the takings occurred. As a result, the court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. | Case | |
| OH - Nongame - Chapter 1533. Hunting; Fishing. Special Hunting Area; Nongame Birds; Scientific Permits. | R.C. § 1533.06 - 1533.09 | OH ST § 1533.06 - 1533.09 | This Ohio statute prohibits the injuring, killing, pursuing, possessing, or exposing to commerce of all nongame birds. The statute further prohibits the killing or possession at any time of bald or golden eagles, except for the educational or zoological possession by government affiliated agencies. Notably, each possession or taking of a bird or bird part constitutes a separate offense. | Statute |