Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AR - Maumelle - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance § 10-133 | MAUMELLE, AR., CITY CODE §§ 10-133 - 10-134 |
In Maumelle, Arkansas, it is unlawful to own or keep a pit bull dog or an American Bulldog, with exceptions. For example, a banned breed may be brought into the city for the purpose of veterinary care, as long as the dog is secured and muzzled.
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Local Ordinance | ||
| Waters v. Powell | 232 P.3d 1086 (Utah Ct. App., 2010) | 655 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 2010 UT App 105, 2010 WL 1710797 (Utah Ct. App.) |
In this Utah case, defendant Powell took his dog to a kennel managed by plaintiff Waters to be boarded for a few days. Waters took the dog to a play area to be introduced to the other dogs where the dog bit Waters. Waters filed a complaint against Powell alleging that he was strictly liable for the injury the dog inflicted. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Waters was a "keeper" of the dog for purposes of the state's dog bite statute (sec. 18-1-1). Waters essentially conceded on appeal that if she is a keeper then she is precluded from asserting a strict liability claim against Powell. Thus, the district court's denial of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded with instructions that Powell's summary judgment motion be granted. |
Case | |
| KS - Racing - 74-8801 to 74-8842. Parimutuel Wagering | K. S. A. §§ 74-8801 to 74-8845 | KS ST §§ 74-8801 to 74-8845 | This statute creates the Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission. The Commission has the power to observe and inspect all racetracks and is responsible for promulgating regulations including regulations establishing what drugs and at what levels are allowable in the blood or urine of horses and greyhounds. The statute specifies age limits for horses and greyhounds to be able to race. Horses cannot compete until they reach 2 years of age. Greyhounds cannot compete in a race until they reach the age of 15 months. In order to construct or own a racetrack facility a license must be obtained from the Commission. | Statute | |
| Decision STL12651-2017 | Decision STL12651-2017 | The Labor Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice decided on an action of ‘tutela’ filed by la Fundación Botánica y Zoológica de Barranquilla, Fundazoo against the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, Luis Domingo Gómez Maldonado, Corpocaldas and others. The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants had violated their rights to due process and right to defense, as well as the principle of legality and contradiction, when the Defendant ordered the transfer of the spectacled bear ‘Chucho’ from the Barranquilla zoo to a natural reserve in Narino. Plaintiff sought to leave without effect Decision AHC4806 2017 that granted habeas corpus to ‘Chucho’, the spectacled bear, allowing the bear to stay at the Barranquilla Zoo, which according to Plaintiffs, is able to provide Chucho with all the requirements for his well being, including veterinary care, food, companionship and infrastructure. The Labor Chamber decided for the Plaintiff and left without effect the decision of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, arguing that the Civil Chamber had ruled based on norms that did not apply to the specific case, to a point that the effects of such application had resulted in an interpretation that completely deferred to what the legislative had intended. The Civil Chamber, the court said in its reasoning, wrongly applied the procedure of habeas corpus, which led to the violation of the due process of law of the Plaintiffs, as ‘Chucho’ has no legal capacity to be a party in a legal procedure. The labor chamber explained that from a constitutional view, the granting of habeas corpus for the protection of animals was not proper, as it is established to protect the right to freedom of persons, which is the basis for a society. For that reason, it can only be attributable to human beings that can be individualized. This rules out the other beings to use this mechanism, including legal persons, as it would erode the real essence of this legal mechanism, the court stated. Furthermore, the magister judge states that the legal treatment that has been given to animals corresponds to the sentients beings, which implies their protection, rather than persons. This means that humans have the responsibility to respect animals, but does not imply that animals can fight for their freedom through the mechanism of habeas corpus, in these cases the defense of animals cannot be resolved by giving them the status of persons, but rather through judicial mechanisms such as popular actions (for the protection of collective and diffuse rights and interests), or with preventive material apprehension | Case | ||
| US - AWA - Licensing and Inspection Requirements for Dealers of Dogs Intended for Hunting, Breeding, or Security Purposes | 2003 WL 1092620 (F.R.) | Docket No. 99-087-3 |
The update of the Definition of Dealer, in Section 1.1 of the Regulation is made to reflect the policy that only wholesale dealers of dogs intended for hunting, security purposes, and breeding, and not dealers of retail services, will be controlled by the regulation. Thus, there is only a minor change to the definition of dealer, in that it now explicitly excludes any retail outlets where dogs are sold for hunting, breeding or security purposes. |
Administrative | |
| PR - Domestic Violence - § 1678 Protection orders | PR ST T. 5 § 1678 |
This Puerto Rico law provides that, in all cases in which a person is accused of domestic violence or child abuse, the court shall, by petition of party, issue a protection order for the petitioner so that he/she be the sole custodian of the animal. The court shall order the accused to keep far away from the animal and prohibit contact of any kind. Violation is a fourth-degree felony. |
Statute | ||
| R. v. Baird | 1994 CarswellNWT 58 |
The defendant, George Baird, was charged on indictment that he caused bodily harm to Amelia Debogorski by criminal negligence stemming from his keeping of dangerous dogs. While the dogs self-evidently proved to be highly dangerous to the victim, there was little evidence of their prior dangerous intent simply because they ran at large. As a result, the court then found that there was reasonable doubt whether the danger was known and recognized by Mr. Baird prior to the attack. The court found that there insufficient proof to find that Baird acted with "wanton and reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.” The court also observed that while there may or may not have been civil negligence, this was not enough to sustain a conviction for criminal negligence. |
Case | ||
| MA - Pet Shop - Chapter 12.00: Licensing and Operation of Pet Shops. | Mass. Regs. Code tit. 330, § 12.01 - 12.09 | 330 CMR 12.01 to 12.10 | These Massachusetts regulations provide provisions regarding the licensing and operation of pet stores; the licensee's responsibility towards the animals within the pet store; the licensee's restrictions on animal sales; and the government's inspection of the pet store's premises, amongst other topics. | Administrative | |
| NY - Municipal power - Chapter 69. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 124 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 124 | This New York law provides that the commissioner is hereby authorized to (a) promulgate, after public hearing, such rules and regulations as are necessary to supplement and give full effect to the provisions of sections one hundred thirteen, one hundred fourteen and one hundred seventeen of this article; and (b) exercise all other powers and functions as are necessary to carry out the duties and purposes set forth in sections one hundred thirteen, one hundred fourteen and one hundred seventeen of this article. | Statute | |
| State v. Peterson | 174 Wash. App. 828, 301 P.3d 1060 review denied, 178 Wash. 2d 1021, 312 P.3d 650 (2013) | 2013 WL 2156837 (Wa. Ct. App.) |
In this case, defendant appeals six counts of first degree animal cruelty charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the statute she was convicted under, RCW 16.52.205(6), was unconstitutionally vague; that (2) starvation and dehydration were alternative means of committing first degree animal cruelty and that (3) there was no substantial evidence supporting the horses suffered from dehydration. The defendant also argued that the Snohomish Superior court had no authority to order her to reimburse the county for caring for her horses. The appeals court, however, held that RCW 16.52.205(6) was not unconstitutionally vague; that starvation and dehydration were alternative means to commit first degree animal cruelty, but there was substantial evidence to support the horses suffered from dehydration; and that the superior court had authority to order the defendant to pay restitution to the county. |
Case |