|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|RI - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws||Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-1 - 44; § 4-13.1 - 15; § 4-19-1 - 21||RI ST § 4-13-1 - 44; § 4-13.1 - 15; § 4-19-1 - 22||These statutes comprise Rhode Island's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, which are specified by county or town, vicious dog laws, and euthanasia provisions.||Statute|
|State v. Wilson||464 So.2d 667 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1985)||10 Fla. L. Weekly 602 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1985)||
In this Florida case, the state appeals a county court order that granted appellee's motion to dismiss two counts of an information and which also declared a state statute to be unconstitutional. Defendant-appellee was arrested for having approximately seventy-seven poodles in cages in the back of a van without food, water and sufficient air. In her motion to dismiss, defendant-appellee alleged that the phrases “sufficient quantity of good and wholesome food and water” and “[k]eeps any animals in any enclosure without wholesome exercise and change of air” as contained in sections 828.13(2)(a) and (b) were void for vagueness. In reversing the lower court, this court held that the prohibitions against depriving an animal of sufficient food, water, air and exercise, when measured by common understanding and practice, are not unconstitutionally vague.
|United States v. Carrano||340 F.Supp.3d 388 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018)||2018 WL 6314123 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018)||Defendant Thomas Carrano was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. In 2016, Carrano, who was president of the United Gamefowl Breeders Association (“NYUGBA”), became the subject of an investigation by NYPD officers, ASPCA agents, and USDA agents for suspected cockfighting activities. In that investigation, these officers eventually searched Carrano's property and seized extensive animal fighting paraphernalia, some of which was covered in chicken blood. Defendant was indicted on a single count of conspiring to violate the AWA and was subsequently convicted by jury. In this appeal, defendant contends that the government failed to prove he joined a conspiracy to violate the AWA and failed to prove the interstate commerce requirement for the conspiracy. Defendant argues that the "substantial evidence against him, including the training videos, the vitamin supplements, the gaffs and postizas, and the dubbed birds" are consistent with showing chickens at a poultry show, rather than cockfighting. The court noted that the jury made permissible inferences as to the evidence that were consistent with cockfighting, and that a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that judgment. In addition, Facebook and text messages from defendant evidence the furtherance of a conspiracy. While defendant contends that the government failed to prove that he actually engaged in cockfighting during the relevant time period, the court stated that the conspiracy charge only required sufficient evidence showing defendant agreed to deal in chickens for a fight through interstate commerce. The court also found defendant's argument as to a defect in the superseding indictment was waived and meritless. Even considering the substance of the argument, the court found proof that defendant's conduct impacted interstate commerce. The court also held that defendant failed to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal or in the alternative a new trial was denied.||Case|
|AR - Lien - § 18-48-212. Sale proceeds and payments||A.C.A. § 18-48-212||AR ST § 18-48-212||All sales of livestock at public auction shall be for cash. The proceeds of the sale, after payments underlying debts, if any, shall, if the owners are absent or unknown, be deposited with the treasurer of the county where the sale takes place. These net proceeds shall be paid to the persons entitled to them when they properly establish ownership in, or lien upon, the livestock, either by claim of title or by claim of valid lien.||Statute|
|UT - Impound - (Repealed) § 77-24-1.5. Safekeeping by officer pending disposition--Records required||U.C.A. 1953 § 77-24-1.5 (§§ 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013)||Sections 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013 (Formerly: this Utah statute, amended in 2011, states that each peace officer shall hold all "property" in safe custody until it is received into evidence or disposed of as provided in this chapter. He or she must also maintain a record that identifies it. Note that the provisions related to specifically to animal impoundment/euthanasia were removed.)||Statute|
|American Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals, v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus||502 F.Supp.2d 103 (D.D.C., 2007)||2007 WL 2398517 (D.D.C.)||Plaintiffs-ASPCA filed suit against Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus and Feld Entertainment, Inc, under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that FEI routinely beats elephants, chains them for long periods of time, hits them with sharp bull hooks, breaks baby elephants with force to make them submissive, and forcibly removes baby elephants from their mothers before they are weaned. This conduct, plaintiffs contend, violates the "take" provision of the ESA. In the court's opinion regarding defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court held that the pre-Act exemption does not insulate defendant from claims of taking under the ESA. However, the court found that the captive-bred wildlife (CBW) permit held by defendant does not allow for challenge under a citizen-suit provision.||Case|
|Louisiana v. Caillet, Jr.||518 So. 2d 1062 (La. App. 1987)||Twenty- six people where charged with dog fighting in violation of La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.5 for paying a fee to be spectators at a dog fight. They filed a motion to quash, urging that the indictments failed to charge a punishable offense; they were denied the motion. Thereafter, 11 defendants applied for supervisory writs, the appellate court granted the motion to quash, holding that § 14:102.5 did not proscribe paying a fee to be a spectator at a dog fight.||Case|
|KY - Restaurant, animals - 902 KAR 45:005. Kentucky food code||902 KY ADC 45:005||902 Ky. Admin. Regs. 45:005||This Kentucky regulation provides an exception for dogs in outdoor dining areas to the Kentucky food code. A dog may be allowed in the outdoor dining area if that area is not fully enclosed and there is a separate entrance to the outdoor dining area. Employees must prevent the dog from coming into contact with any food, dishes, utensils, linens, and other food service items. If the employee comes into contact with the patron dog, that employee must wash hands before returning to work. A sanitizing kit for dog messes must be made available in the area. Signage must be posted at entrances to the outdoor dining area explaining that dogs may be allowed, but they must are not allowed on seats or tables or must not be served from human food or water receptacles. Also, dogs must be kept on a leash and under control of an adult at all times. The food establishment may refuse to serve the patron with a dog if he or she fails to exercise reasonable control over the dog or the dog is behaving in a manner that comprises the health and safety of others.||Administrative|
|Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus||Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus||This decision was decided on an appeal of the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of an orangutan named Sandra after it was denied in its first instance. Pablo Buompadre, President of the Association of Officials and Attorneys for the Rights of Animals (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus against the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the City Zoological Garden of Buenos Aires on behalf of the hybrid of two different orangutan species, Sandra. AFADA sought the immediate release and relocation of Sandra to the primate sanctuary of Sorocaba, in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. AFADA argued that Sandra had been deprived illegitimately and arbitrarily of her freedom by the authorities of the zoo, and that her mental and physical health was at the time deeply deteriorated, with imminent risk of death. For the first time, basic legal rights were granted to an animal. In this case, Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation ruled that animals are holders of basic rights. The Court stated that “from a dynamic and non-static legal interpretation, it is necessary to recognize [Sandra] an orangutan as a subject of rights, as non-human subjects (animals) are holders of rights, so it imposes her protection."||Case|
|N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y.||850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017)||
In 2015, New York City enacted a group of laws aimed at dealing with problems associated with the companion animal business in the city by regulating the sale of dogs and cats in pet shops. On the day the laws were to go into effect, the New York Pet Welfare Association (NYPWA) filed suit challenging two of the laws. The first law, the “Sourcing Law,” required that pet shops sell only animals acquired from breeders holding a Class A license issued under the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The second law law, the “Spay/Neuter Law,” required that pet shops sterilize each animal before releasing it to a consumer. NYPWA argued that the Sourcing Law violated the “dormant” Commerce Clause and is preempted by the AWA, and that the Spay/Neuter Law is preempted by New York law. The district court dismissed NYPWA’s complaint and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. First, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Sourcing Law did not violate the Commerce Clause because it did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The 2nd Circuit found that the Sourcing Law may make it difficult for certain out of state breeders to sell to city shops, but so long as breeders from other states are allowed to sell in the city, then it is not considered to be discriminatory. Also, the 2nd Circuit found that NYPWA was unable to show that any incidental burden that the Sourcing Law placed on out of state breeders was excessive and therefore the law passed under the Pike Balancing test. Lastly, the 2nd Circuit determined that the Spay/Neuter Law was not preempted by New York Law because NYPWA failed to identify a single New York statute or case that suggests that the new law would be preempted in any way. As a result, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.