Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Barrett v. State | 220 N.Y. 423 (N.Y. 1917) |
This case concerns a New York law that protected beavers and their habitat in New York by stating that no one "shall molest or disturb any wild beaver or the dams, houses, homes or abiding places of same." The claimants owned land that endured considerable commercial destruction due to the beavers that were present. Claimants were initially awarded damages and alleged on appeal that the law represented an unconstitutional exercise of police power and, that, since the beavers were "owned" by the state at the time of the destruction, the state is liable for the damage. The Court disagreed, finding the ownership of wildlife is in the state in its sovereign capacity, for the benefit of all the people. As a result, the state was acting in its proper police power authority and is not liable for the damage that ensued from "liberating" the beaver. |
Case | |
| GA - Disaster Planning - Georgia Emergency Operations Plan | The Georgia Emergency Operations Plan contains several references to pets during state disasters. Specifically, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11 considers the need to plan for the "safety and well-being of household pets" and the coordination of "animal evacuation assistance." | Administrative | ||
| MX - Bird - Parrot Ban (DECREE by which article 60 2 to the General Law of Wildlife) | article 60 2 to the General Law of Wildlife |
The ban prohibits the capture, export and import of 22 Mexican parrot species. The ban on imports was needed because most species are shared with Central and South American countries and many were being imported and used as cover up for illegal trade. The ban was approved by Congress last April by consensus and it was originally drafted after a presentation of a 2007 report, "The Illegal Parrot Trade in Mexico: A Comprehensive Assessment." The report revealed for the first time the volume of the illegal trade of parrots within Mexico. An estimated 65,000 -78,500 wild parrots and macaws are captured illegally each year, with more than 75 percent of the birds dying before ever reaching a purchaser. The measure was passed in late October of 2008. |
Statute | |
| Commonwealth v. Craven | 572 Pa. 431 (Pa. S.C. 2003) | 572 Pa. 431 (Pa. S.C. 2003) |
Defendants who were charged with cruelty to animals and criminal conspiracy for their attendance at a dogfight as spectators challenged the constitutionality of the dogfighting statute. The trial court found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that since the statute only creates criminal liability for a person's conscious decision to attend a dogfight, it is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. |
Case |
| 32 Pit Bulldogs and Other Property v. County of Prentiss | 808 So.2d 971 (Miss. S.C. 2002) | 808 So.2d 971 (Miss. S.C. 2002) |
While a criminal trial regarding alleged dog-fighting was pending, the Circuit Court, Prentiss County, ordered the humane euthanization of 18 of 34 seized pit bulldogs. The alleged dog owner appealed. The Supreme Court held that allegations the dogs had been trained to fight, could not be rehabilitated as pets, and posed serious threat to other animals and people, related to the "physical condition" of the dogs, as statutory basis for humane euthanization. Affirmed.
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Case |
| Guenther v. Walnut Grove Hillside Condominium Regime No. 3, Inc. | 961 N.W.2d 825 (Neb., 2021) | 309 Neb. 655 (Neb., 2021) | Plaintiff Christine Guenther appeals her dismissal of her complaint for declaratory judgment against her condominium complex. Guenther contended that Walnut Grove refused to make a reasonable accommodation under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Nebraska Fair Housing Act (collectively FHA), by denying her request to secure her daughter's emotional support dogs through construction of a fence in a common area. In 2018, Guenther made a request to Walnut Grove to construct a fence through part of the common area behind her condominium so that her dogs can safely spend time outside. Guenther stated that she made this request because she witnessed (via sounds) her first emotional support animal killed by either another dog or a car shortly after she moved in. However, Walnut Grove denied Guenther's request, contending that it lacked the authority to divide or partition the "common elements" of the property. As a result, Guenther filed a complaint in the district court for Douglas County seeking a declaration that Walnut Grove refused a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. A trial was held and the lower court dismissed Guenther's complaint, holding that Guenther's daughter did not suffer from a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of her major life activities and that therefore, Guenther failed to show that N.G. is a handicapped person. Additionally, the court held that Guenther failed to prove that her requested accommodation is necessary to afford the daughter an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the home. On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court found the case boiled down to whether Guenther "carried her burden of proving her request to build a fence in Walnut Grove's common area (1) is reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford a handicapped person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." As to the factors, the court found that while it is undisputed that the daughter suffered from mental health disorders that were benefited by the interaction with the family dogs, there was insufficient proof that a fence was necessary. In fact, testimony revealed that the daughter freely enjoyed the use of the animals while at Walnut Grove. The fence was not a necessary part of Guenther's ability to use and enjoy the dwelling. Further, Guenther failed to prove that the alternatives proposed by Walnut Grove would not have been effective. Because Guenther failed to meet her burden to prove that construction of the fence is necessary, her claim for refusal of a reasonable accommodation under the FHA failed the judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| Deanna Wilson, the guardian of her beloved Avain companions v. PETCO Animal Supplies, INC. and DOES 1-10 | PETCO and plaintiff met for a settlement conference by order of the Superior Court before the Bar Association of the San Francisco Early Settlement Program. In this settlement, PETCO agreed to pay $7,000 for the dismissal of the suit and the plaintiff agreed to accept this sum with the knowledge that she will be barred from proceeding against PETCO for this incident in the future. PETCO also reaffirmed that is had discontinued selling the bird cage that was the subject of this action and that it will not reinstate this product in its stores with zinc levels that exceed the nationally accepted standard for avian toxicology. | Pleading | ||
| Pennsylvania Law of Session of 1860: Cruelty to Animals | 1860 Pa. Laws 46 | Section 46 of Pennsylvania Session Law from 1860 covers cruelty to animals. The section describes what is cruelty to animal and the punishment for it. | Statute | |
| Martin v. Columbia Greene Humane Society, Inc. | 793 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2005) | 2005 Slip Op. 02927 |
A dog breeder was required to abstain from selling dogs for three years or else criminal charges would be reinstated for failing to file health certificates for the dogs they sold or report deaths due to contagious diseases. The breeder brought claims for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with a business relation, and section 1983 violations. The trial court denied defendants motion to dismiss and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part holding the complaint failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution and the humane society volunteer was entitled to statutory immunity as an unpaid officer of a not-for-profit corporation. |
Case |
| Swido v. Lafayette Insurance Co. | 16 So.2d 399 (La.App. 3 Cir., 2005) | 2005 WL 2864698 (La.App. 3 Cir.), 2004-1674 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05) |
In this Louisiana case, a prospective horse buyer filed an action against the prior sellers and their insurer to recover for injuries when she attempted to ride a horse offered for sale by the initial buyer. At the time of the injury, the horse was under the custody of the original sellers who were paid an additional amount to have the horse trained. The Court of Appeal held that sale of horse was perfected when the first buyer paid the sale price, even though the first buyer paid an additional amount for the sellers to finish training the horse. On the negligence issue, the court found the "green-broke" horse did not present an unreasonable risk of harm when the potential buyer attempted to ride it bareback as to assign strict liability to the prior sellers who had custody of the horse. |
Case |