|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|Animal Law Index Volume 18, Part 2||
Animal Law Review Volume 18, Issue 2 (Spring 2012)
|PA - Humane Slaughter - Slaughter and Processing of Domestic Animals||3 Pa.C.S.A. § 2361 - 2362||PS ST 3 Pa.C.S.A. § 2361 - 2362||These laws comprise Pennsylvania's humane slaughter provisions. The section begins with the enabling statute that grants authority to the relevant state agency. It then declares that humane methods shall be used in the handling of domestic animals for slaughter and in the actual bleeding and slaughter of domestic animals except in the cases of slaughter for ritual purposes or individual (e.g., non-commercial) consumption. The law itself does not proscribe penalties for non-compliance (but such may be listed in departmental regulations).||Statute|
|MT - Trusts - Chapter 2. Upc--Intestacy, Wills, and Donative Transfers.||MCA 72-2-1017||MT ST 72-2-1017||This Montana statute states that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid (but for no longer than 21 years, even if the trust provides for a longer term). The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the transferor's intent. Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument, no portion of the principal or income may be converted to the use of the trustee or to any use other than for the trust's purposes or for the benefit of a covered animal and a court may reduce the amount of the property transferred if it determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use.||Statute|
|State v. Griffin||684 P.2d 32 (Or. 1984)||69 Or.App. 199 (1984)||
Appeal of a conviction in district court for cruelty to animals. Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals after having been found to have recklessly caused and allowed his dog to kill two cats, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that forfeiture of defendant's dog was an impermissible condition of probation.
|Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes||823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn.,2012)||2012 WL 6601313 (Minn.,2012)||
A city ordered a dog to be destroyed after three separate biting incidents. Upon the owner’s appeal of the city’s determinations, the appeals court reversed the city’s decision to destroy the dog because the city had not allowed the owner an opportunity to challenge the “potentially dangerous” determination. The appeals court (800 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.App.,2011) held the city had therefore violated the owner’s procedural due process rights. Upon review by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, the court held that the owner’s procedural due process rights were not violated because the “potentially dangerous” determination did not deprive the owner of a property interest and because the city satisfied the basic requirements of procedural due process. Additionally, the court found that the dangerous dog and the destruction determinations were not arbitrary or capricious. The court therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upheld the city's “dangerous dog” determination, and affirmed the city's order of destruction.
|VT - Primates - Rule 300. Animal Welfare Regulations.||VT ADC 2-4-300:1.1 - .88||Vt. Admin. Code 2-4-300:1.1 to 3.88||These Vermont regulations provide animal welfare standards for all licensees, including recordkeeping requirements, holding periods, and inspection provisions. Subpart D then outlines the specifications for the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of nonhuman primates. Facility requirements, feeding, watering, veterinary care, and transportation requirements are described, among other things.||Administrative|
|Giardiello v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C.||261 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D. Mass. 2017)||2017 WL 3610478 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2017)||This case dealt with a condo owner and his son who lived in a condo and relied on a service dog for treatment of PTSD. The Plaintiffs filed suit against the condo trust, Board of Trustees, Board members, and others, alleging violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by not allowing the Plaintiffs to keep the dog in their condo unit. The father attempted to communicate with the Trustees about a reasonable accommodation for the service dog, but was met with silence from the Trustees. After the dog had already moved into the condo, the Board sent correspondence stating that fines would be assessed if the dog was not removed after a certain date. After complications with securing the requisite medical info, the dog was ultimately allowed to say, but fines had accrued. The Court held that 1) plaintiffs stated claim that defendants violated FHA; 2) owner was an aggrieved person under the FHA, and thus owner had standing to bring claim; 3) district court would decline to dismiss claim on exhaustion grounds; and 4) under Massachusetts law, claims against attorney and law firm were barred by the litigation privilege. Thus, the court the Court denied the Board and Trust's motion to dismiss and granted Attorney Gaines and the Law Firm's motion to dismiss.||Case|
|NY - Hunting - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws||McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-1904||McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-1904||This New York statute provides that no person who owns, operates or manages a facility that harbors non-native big game mammals shall knowingly permit the taking on such premises by any person who pays a fee to take a live non-native big game mammal by any of the following means: the shooting or spearing of a non-native big game mammal that is tied or hobbled; the shooting or spearing of a non-native big game mammal that is staked or attached to any object; the shooting or spearing of a non-native big game mammal that is confined in a box, pen, cage or similar container of ten or less contiguous acres from which there is no means for such mammal to escape, among other things.||Statute|
|MI - Habitat Protection - Wilderness, Wild, and Natural Areas (Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act)||M.C.L.A. 324.35101 - 35111||MI ST 324.35101 - 35111||These sections define, identify, and set guidelines for the protection of wilderness, wild, and/or natural areas.||Statute|
|Hammer v. American Kennel Club||304 A.D.2d 74 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2003)||758 N.Y.S.2d 276, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 11491 (2003)||
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions.