Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WA - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 16.50. Humane Slaughter of Livestock. | West's RCWA 16.50.100 - 900 | WA ST 16.50.100 - 900 | The Washington humane slaughter laws begin with a statement that it is declared to be the policy of the state of Washington to require that the slaughter of all livestock, and the handling of livestock in connection with slaughter, shall be carried out only by humane methods. Humane methods are defined are those methods whereby the animal is rendered insensible to pain by mechanical, electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast or cut; or methods in accordance with the ritual requirements of any religious faith whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain. "Livestock" is limited under the statute to cattle, calves, sheep, swine, horses, mules and goats. Note that the director may, by administrative order, exempt a person from compliance with this chapter for a period of not to exceed six months if he finds that an earlier compliance would cause such person undue hardship. Violation of the act constitutes a misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars or confinement in the county jail for not more than ninety days. | Statute |
| AK - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | AS § 03.55.100 - 190; AS § 11.61.140 - 145 | AK ST § 03.55.100 - 190; AK ST § 11.61.140 - 145 | This section comprises Alaska's anti-cruelty and animal fighting laws, which were amended in 2010. A person commits cruelty to animals if the person: knowingly inflicts severe and prolonged physical pain or suffering on an animal; with criminal negligence, fails to care for an animal and, as a result, causes the death of the animal or causes severe physical pain or prolonged suffering to the animal; kills or injures an animal by the use of a decompression chamber; intentionally kills or injures a pet or livestock by the use of poison; knowingly kills or injures an animal with the intent to intimidate, threaten, or terrorize another person; or knowingly engages in sexual conduct with an animal, films such activity, induces such activity, or intentionally permits this to occur on premises under the person's control. The court may also prohibit or limit the defendant's ownership, possession, or custody of animals for up to 10 years for convictions under this section. | Statute |
| Theis v. Yuba County Sheriff's Department | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 3006261 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2019) | The Plaintiffs allege that their cat, named Pizza, was unlawfully euthanized at Yuba County Animal Care Services shelter in Olivehurst, California on or about February 9, 2018. Pizza went missing on or about February 9, 2018 and Plaintiffs found out later that same day that a neighbor had found the cat and brought it to the Yuba County animal shelter. The Plaintiffs attempted to contact the shelter, but it had already closed for the evening. The next morning around 9:30 a.m., the Plaintiffs arrived at the shelter and learned that Pizza had been euthanized as early as 5:00 p.m. the night before. Defendant Barnhill, the shelter’s supervising officer, informed the Plaintiff’s that Pizza had been injured, however, the neighbor who brought the cat to the shelter without knowing it was the Plaintiffs’ described Pizza as looking healthy. The Plaintiffs contend that Pizza’s euthanization falls within an ongoing pattern and practice of abuse and failure to follow state and federal law. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on October 1, 2018. The Defendants removed the case to federal court. Plaintiff’s asserted four claims in their First Amended Complaint: (1) the failure to perform mandatory duties in violation of California Government Code section 815.6, (2) petition for a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, (3) violation of the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, (4) negligence under California common law. The Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and alleged that the Plaintiff’s did not plead facts sufficient to show that Barnhill engaged in unlawful conduct or to establish a substantive or procedural due process violation. The Court, however, granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint as to the section 1983 claim. The Court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, which were the Plaintiff’s first, second, and fourth claims since the Plaintiff’s had conceded that their federal claim by requesting to amend their complaint. As a result, the Court reviewed remaining claims to determine whether they may be included in any amended complaint or whether leave to amend would be futile. The Court determined that granting Plaintiff’s leave to file a second amended complaint would not be futile on all of their claims except for the petition for writ of mandate claim. California’s Civil Procedure Code section 1085 does not apply to federal courts and, therefore, the Plaintiff’s leave to amend this claim would be futile. Ultimately, the Court ordered Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights be dismissed with leave to amend, the Plaintiff’s state law claims in their first, second, and fourth causes of action be dismissed with leave to amend to the extent consistent with the order, and denied the Defendant's motions to strike Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim. Plaintiffs were required to file a second amended complaint within 21 days of the date the order was filed if they wished to amend their complaint. | Case | |
| Anays Rodriguez-Porras, Plaintiff v. Miami-Dade Animal Services, Miami-Dade Police Department, Miami-Dade County, Defendants |
This Miami-Dade County, Florida case concerns the unauthorized euthanization of the plaintiff's dog, "Cowboy." Cowboy was a beloved family pet who was fitted with an identification microchip in case he was ever lost. In August of 2005, Cowboy got loose after being frightened by a storm and picked up by an animal shelter officer. The plaintiff was inaccurately informed that no dog matching Cowboy's description was at the shelter (records from the shelter showed he was actually picked up the same day he escaped from his home). Five days later, she was informed that Cowboy was at the shelter. After telling the shelter she would be there the next day to pick up Cowboy (since the shelter was closing and would not wait for her to arrive), the shelter euthanized the dog despite assurances to plaintiff that he would be kept safe. Plaintiff sued animal control, the county, and police department for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, wrongful disposition of a body, and negligence. |
Pleading | ||
| Pometti, Hugo c/ Provincia de Mendoza s/ acción de amparo | Id SAIJ: FA17190000 | This is an action of protection or "accion de amparo” filed by Hugo Edgardo Pometti against the Province of Mendoza in The Court of Associated Judicial Management No. 2 of Mendoza. The Petitioner sought to stop the transfer of the chimpanzee Cecilia to the sanctuary located in Brazil and to keep her in the Zoo of Mendoza in order to preserve the natural and cultural heritage and the biological diversity. The petitioner also requested a precautionary action to not transfer the chimpanzee until decision on the the action of amparo was issued. | Case | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton | 239 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, twelve conservation organizations and one individual involved in Lynx conservation efforts, challenge a final decision by the USFWS declaring the Lynx in the contiguous United States to be a "threatened," rather than "endangered," species under the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that the designation of the Lynx as threatened is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Service has violated the ESA by failing to designate "critical habitat" for the Lynx as required by that statute. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the FWS's conclusion that, "[c]ollectively, the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies do not constitute a significant portion of the range of the DPS," (three of the Lynx's four regions) were collectively not a significant portion of its range was counterintuitive and contrary to the plain meaning of the ESA phrase "significant portion of its range." With regard to the FWS's failure to designate critical habitat, the excessive delays experienced by the FWS ran completely counter to the mandate of the ESA and were without proper justification. |
Case | |
| TX - Domestic Violence - § 85.021-.022 Protective Orders | V.T.C.A., Family Code § 85.021 -.022 | TX FAMILY § 85.021 - 022 | In a protective order in Texas, the court may prohibit a party from removing a pet, companion animal, or assistance animal, as defined by Section 121.002, Human Resources Code, from the possession of a person named in the order. Furthermore, in a protective order, the court may prohibit the person found to have committed family violence from harming, threatening, or interfering with the care, custody, or control of a pet, companion animal, or assistance animal that is possessed by or is in the actual or constructive care of a person protected by an order or by a member of the family or household of a person protected by an order. | Statute |
| Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr. | 322 Fed.Appx. 814 (C.A.11) | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 922661 (C.A.11) |
Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions. The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules. |
Case |
| Canada - Alberta - Service Dogs Act | S.A. 2007, c. S-7.5 | This Alberta, Canada law provides that no person shall deny to any person the accommodation, services or facilities available in any place to which the public is customarily admitted, or discriminate against any person for the reason that the person is a disabled person accompanied by a service dog or a certified dog-trainer accompanied by a dog in training. The law goes into effect January of 2009. | Statute | |
| England - Farming - The Use of Closed Circuit Television in Slaughterhouses (England) Regulations 2018 | 2018 No. 556 | These Regulations introduce requirements on operators of slaughterhouses in England to install and operate a closed circuit television (CCTV) system in all areas where live animals are present. CCTV footage and associated data must be retained for a period of 90 days. Inspectors are given powers to require compliance with these Regulations. This includes powers of inspection and seizure where an inspector has entered premises for the purposes of executing and enforcing the 2015 Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations, and powers to issue enforcement notices. | Statute |