|Sinclair v. Okata||874 F. Supp. 1051 (D.Alaska,1994)||
Defendants are able to present a genuine question of fact regarding whether they were on notice of their dog's vicious propensity given their characterization of the four prior biting incidents as "behavioral responses common to all dogs." Defendants' expert concluded that each time, Anchor's responses were "natural" or instinctive. Plaintiffs offer no evidence, through expert testimony or otherwise, to refute the opinion of defendants' expert.
|NE - Livestock - Article 23. Domesticated Cervine Animal Act||Neb. Rev. St. § 54-2301 to 54- 2324||NE ST § 54-2301 to 54- 2324||This set of laws comprises Nebraska's Domesticated Cervine Animal Act. Under the act, it is unlawful for any person to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter any domesticated cervine animal in this state unless such animal is individually identified and kept at a premises for which a domesticated cervine animal facility permit has been issued by the department. A municipal, state, or federal zoo, park, refuge, or wildlife area, a bona fide circus or animal exhibit, or any private, nonprofit zoological society is not required to obtain a permit in order to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter a domesticated cervine animal, but such facilities are still governed by the provisions of the act regarding the testing, control, and eradication of cervidae diseases including chronic wasting disease.||Statute|
|CA - Facility - § 868.4. Authorization for therapy or facility dogs to accompany certain witnesses in criminal||West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 868.4||This law, effective in 2018, allows either party in a criminal or juvenile hearing to ask the court for approval to bring a therapy or facility dog for a child witness in a court proceeding involving any serious felony or any other victim who is entitled to a support person. Before a therapy or facility dog may be used, the party seeking its use must file a motion with the court that includes: (1) the training or credentials of the therapy or facility dog; (2) the training of the therapy or facility dog handler; and (3) facts justifying that the presence of the therapy or facility dog may reduce anxiety or otherwise be helpful to the witness while testifying. The court may grant the motion unless it finds the use of the therapy or facility dog would cause undue prejudice or be unduly disruptive to the court. Appropriate measures must be taken to assure that the presence of the therapy or facility dog as unobtrusive and nondisruptive as possible.||Statute|
|Guardians v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service||2018 WL 1023104 (D. Mont. Feb. 22, 2018)||Plaintiffs sued the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and its related entities on the grounds that they failed to comply with environmental and regulatory procedures in the administration and implementation of a federal export program that allows certain animal pelts and parts to be exported from the United States pursuant to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”). Defendant-Intervenors intervened, and now seek to dismiss this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the Plaintiffs have not joined and cannot join as indispensable parties certain states and Native American tribes. The court held that because the states and tribes are not “required” under Rule 19(a), dismissal is not appropriate. Accordingly, the court ordered that that Defendant-Intervenors' motion be DENIED.||Case|
|Brown v. Muhlenberg Tp.||269 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2001)||
Pet owners were unreasonably deprived of their Fourth Amendment rights to their pet by police officer. Pennsylvania Court would recognize a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon the killing of a pet.
|WV - Impound - § 19-20-8. Impounding and disposition of dogs; costs and fees||W. Va. Code, § 19-20-8||WV ST § 19-20-8||This West Virginia statute provides that dogs seized and impounded as provided in this article shall be kept housed and fed in the county dog pound for five days after notice of seizure and impounding has been given or posted. Upon expiration this time period, all dogs which have not previously been redeemed by their owners shall be sold or humanely destroyed (this statute outlines what constitutes "humanely destroyed"). The owner may, at any time prior to the expiration of five days retrieve his or her dog by paying the requisite fees and satisfying any other provisions.||Statute|
|RI - Livestock, damage done by - Chapter 14. Damage by Animals||Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-14-1 to 20||RI ST § 4-14-1 to 20||This chapter deals with responsibilities and liability for livestock at large. No horse, bull, boar, ram, or goat shall be permitted to run at large and if the owner or keeper of these, for any reason suffers any animals to do so he or she shall upon conviction be fined not in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) and be liable in addition for all damages done by the animal while so at large. The chapter also specifies procedures for impounding animals found at large.||Statute|
|State v. Nix||283 P.3d 442 (Or.App., 2012)||2012 WL 3105223 (Or.App., 2012); 251 Or.App. 449 (2012)||
Upon receiving a tip that animals were being neglected, police entered a farm and discovered several emaciated animals, as well as many rotting animal carcasses. After a jury found the defendant guilty of 20 counts of second degree animal neglect, the district court, at the sentencing hearing, only issued a single conviction towards the defendant. The state appealed and argued the court should have imposed 20 separate convictions based on its interpretation of the word "victims" in ORS 161.067(2). The appeals court agreed. The case was remanded for entry of separate convictions on each guilty verdict.
|MN - Dangerous - Minnesota Dangerous Dog Definitions, Dog Bites, & Rabies Treatments||M. S. A. § 35.67 - 35.69; M.S.A. § 346.51; M.S.A. § 347.50||MN ST § 35.67 - 35.69; MN ST § 346.51; MN ST § 347.50||This Minnesota set of laws outlines the procedure for a town establishing a rabies proclamation and prevents the running at large of unmuzzled dogs in such localities. It also provides that an owner or custodian of a dog which does not have an appropriate antirabies vaccination and which bites or otherwise exposes a person to rabies virus may be penalized under section 346.53.& The statute also defines "dangerous dog" and "potentially dangerous dog."||Statute|
|Wallen v. City of Mobile||--- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 3803749 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2018)||Wallen appeals her convictions for six counts of violating Mobile, Alabama's public nuisance ordinances. The nuisance convictions stem from an anonymous complaint about multiple barking dogs at Wallen's property. After receiving the tip in March of 2016, an animal control officer drove to the residence, parked across the street, and, as he sat in his car, heard dogs bark continuously for approximately ten minutes. That same day, a local realtor went to house that was for sale behind Wallen's property and heard an "overwhelming" noise of dogs barking continuously for 30-45 minutes. For almost a year, officers received complaints about noise coming from Wallen's house. In May of 2017, Wallen entered a plea of not guilty for multiple charges of violating the public nuisance ordinance in Mobile Circuit Court. She also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Mobile City Code was unconstitutionally vague. Her motion was later denied, and a jury trial was held where Wallen was found guilty of six counts of violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance. On appeal, Wallen first argues that the public nuisance ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulates without reference to time, place, and manner. However, the court found that Wallen did not establish how the overbreadth doctrine applied to her case and how the ordinance was unconstitutional. As to her next vagueness challenge, Wallen contended that the ordinance had no objective standards to determine whether a dog's barking is disturbing or unreasonable. This court disagreed, finding the statute defines what are "disturbing noises" (which specifically states barking), and other courts previously established that the term "habit" in a dog-barking statute is not vague. Finally, the found that Wallen's last general argument, that the code is unconstitutional as applied to her, did not satisfy court rules with respect to issues presented and support with authority on appeal. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.||Case|