|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|MI - Foxes - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act.||M.C.L.A. 324.43101 - 43104||MI ST 324.43101 - 43104||These sections lay out the regulations and prohibited acts with regard to foxes in captivity.||Statute|
|GA - Endangered - Article 5. Protection of Endangered Wildlife||Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-130 to 133||GA ST §§ 27-3-130 to 133||These statutes provide for the definition of "protected" species and outline the duties of the board responsible for enforcing Georgia's endangered species law. Included in the Board's duties are inventorying and designating listed species and promulgating regulations. Violation of these regulations results in a misdemeanor.||Statute|
|Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor (2015)||The attached document is the Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief in the case of Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor, Michigan for the protection of natural resources. Plaintiff Sally Daniels challenged the City of Ann Arbor's current "deer cull" of 100 deer from public parks and nature areas in the City by marksmen from APHIS. Plaintiff contends that this cull of deer, a natural resource held in the public trust, violates state law (the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) and the DNR's Wildlife Conservation Order (WCO)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that there has been no showing under NREPA that the deer have caused damage to horticultural or agricultural crops under either act contrary to state law. Plaintiff also states that the methods used - firearms with silencers, deer baiting, and the shooting of deer from vehicles - also violate the NREPA and/or WCO.||Pleading|
|KY - Wildlife, Bounty - Chapter 150. Fish and Wildlife Resources.||KRS § 150.425||KY ST § 150.425||This Kentucky law provides that, upon a resolution of the fiscal court that finds that beavers pose a threat to farmland, trees, or other property, the fiscal court may request a bounty on beaver. Each beaver tail presented to any conservation officer nets $10 (possibly offset by $1 for the cost of administering the bounty program).||Statute|
|CT - Assistance Animals - Connecticut Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws||C. G. S. A. § 13b-119; § 46a-42; § 46a-44; § 46a-64; § 53-330a; § 22-345; § 22-364b; § 14-300; § 17a-22ee||CT ST § 13b-119; § 46a-42; § 46a-44; § 46a-64; § 53-330a; § 22-345; § 22-364b; § 14-300; § 17a-22ee||
The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws.
|Carrasquillo v. Carlson||880 A.2d 904 (Conn.App., 2005)||90 Conn.App. 705; 2005 WL 1983613 (Conn.App.)||
A Connecticut motorist brought a negligence action against a dog owner, seeking to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained when he took evasive action to avoid hitting dog. The Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, granted the dog owner's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that the record was adequate for appellate review; the dog owner exercised reasonable control while walking dog; the statute allowing imposition of fine or imprisonment or both on owner of dog that interferes with motor vehicle did not apply; and the dog owner demonstrated that motorist would be unable to cure legal defects in complaint even if permitted to replead.
|TN - Wildlife, possession - Chapter 1660-01-18. Rules and Regulations of Live Wildlife||TN ADC 1660-01-18-.01 to .06||Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1660-01-18-.01 to .06||These Tennessee regulations outline the requirements for importation and possession of captive wildlife. The species of wildlife for each class of wildlife are described. Facilities for Class I wildlife are provided, which include specific requirements for Class I Felidae or Ursidae. The Class I qualification test requirements are also stated.||Administrative|
|RI - Disaster Planning - Emergency Support Function 11||ESF 11||
The State of Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency is tasked with the coordination of emergency response and plans. Emergency Support Function 11, "Provides the coordination of local resources in response to pet, farm, and wild animal care needs before, during, and following a significant natural disaster or man-made event. Responsible for the protection and recovery of natural and cultural resources and historic properties. Identifies, obtains, and transports food and water supplies to impacted areas in the aftermath of a disaster or emergency" according to that agency.
|Bassani v. Sutton||Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1734857 (E.D.Wash.)||
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in 2008 claiming money damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988,and alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2004, plaintiffs two dogs were seized by Yakima County Animal Control after responding to a citizen's report that he had been menaced by dogs as he ran past plaintiff's house. Before the court here are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. In granting the motions, the court held that the doctrine of res judicata did warrant a grant of summary judgment as defendants' failure to release plaintiff's dog. Further, the animal control officer was entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably relied on the deputy prosecuting attorney's advice. Finally, there was no evidence of a pattern of behavior on the part of Yakima County sufficient to be a "moving force" behind a constitutional violation.
|Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley||49 Misc. 3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)||2015 WL 4612340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2015)||Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding.||Case|