Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Robinson v. City of Bluefield | 764 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. Oct. 2, 2014) | 234 W. Va. 209, 2014 WL 5032602 (W. Va. Oct. 2, 2014) | An Animal Control Officer responded to a complaint about two dogs at defendant's residence. While investigating the complaint at defendant's residence, the animal control officer was attacked by one of defendant's dogs. The officer sought medical treatment following the incident. The City of Bluefield subsequently brought charges against defendant in its municipal court, charging her with having a dangerous animal in violation of city ordinances. The municipal court ordered the dog killed. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Mercer County affirmed the municipal court's decision. Defendant then appealed the Circuit Court's decision arguing that that Circuit Court erred in concluding that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of her dog. After review, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia agreed with defendant and found that under the plain language of W.Va.Code § 19–20–20, the City of Bluefield was required to set forth satisfactory proof that defendant’s dog was “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons” before a circuit court or a magistrate, not a municipal court. The court therefore found that ordinance was void to the extent that it allowed a municipal court to order the destruction of the dog. The circuit court's order affirming the municipal court's order to kill Ms. Robinson's dog was therefore reversed. Justice Loughry dissents. | Case |
| GA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Ga. Code Ann., § 4-8-1 - 45; Ga. Code Ann., § 4-14-1 - 4-15-1; Ga. Code Ann., § 26-2-160; Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-16 - 18; § 27-3-49; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-11-107 - 107.1; Ga. Code Ann., § 50-3-88 | GA ST § 4-8-1 to 45; GA ST § 4-14-1 to 4-15-1; GA ST § 27-3-16 to 18; § 27-3-49; GA ST § 16-11-107 - 107.1; GA ST § 50-3-88 | These Georgia statutes comprise the state's dog laws and the "Responsible Dog Ownership Law." Among the provisions of the Responsible Dog Ownership Law include a requirement for registration of dangerous dogs as well as the necessity of such owner to carry at least $50,000 in liability insurance. Owners of these dogs who do not comply with these and other provisions may have their dogs confiscated and destroyed. Any person who violates this article is guilty of a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| The Ecology Center v. Russell | 361 F.Supp.2d 1310 (D.Utah,2005) |
The instant case is a Petition for Review of Agency Action, brought by The Ecology Center and The Aquarius Escalante Foundation (Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs seek review of a Record of Decision (ROD) issued by the Acting Forest Supervisor of the Dixie National Forest (the DNF), an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture. The decision in question is the final approval by the DNF of the Griffin Springs Resource Management Project, (the Project) in which the DNF approved a plan to allow logging in the Griffin Springs area of the DNF. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the implementation of the plan, claiming that the ROD violates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Of particular concern, is the effect upon the northern goshawk. |
Case | |
| Dirty cages where FUCEP housed night monkey | Slideshow Images | |||
| CO - Slaughter - Decreto 1500 de 2007 | Decreto 1500 de 2007 | Decreto 1500, 2007, establishes the technical regulations that create the standards for inspection, supervision, and control in the meat production chain. This decree focuses on the sanitary and health aspects involved in the slaughter phase of livestock. However, there are some provisions that directly or indirectly address animal welfare. Some of these provisions include raising animals in facilities that pose a minimum risk for animal production and welfare. Primary production farms must implement good practices in animal feeding and animal welfare. Transportation vehicles must have adequate physical separation mechanisms to prevent overcrowding, crowding, and animal aggression during transport. In addition, vehicles must have adequate conditions for animal welfare, biosecurity, biocontainment, and sanitary management. Article 31 Num 3 establishes that animals must be slaughtered by non-cruel methods, which ensure that they are rendered unconscious before being slaughtered. The National Institute for Food and Drug Supervision -INVIMA- is the authority in charge of establishing and overseeing compliance with slaughter methods. | Statute | |
| Ladnier v. Hester | 98 So.3d 1074 (Miss.App., 2011) | 2011 WL 5027176 (Miss.App.) |
Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part, and 3) motorist produced no circumstantial evidence that would imply negligence, such as a dilapidated fence. This judgment was Reversed by Ladnier v. Hester, 98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012). |
Case |
| Australia - Kangaroos - Shooting for Non-Commerical Purposes | The National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies for Non-commercial Purposes sets an achievable standard of humane conduct and is the minimum required of persons shooting kangaroos and wallabies for reasons other than commercial utilisation of kangaroo products (skins and meat). This Code has been produced to ensure that all persons intending to shoot free-living kangaroos or wallabies for non-commercial purposes undertake the shooting so that the animal is killed in a way that minimises pain and suffering. | Statute | ||
| Fabrikant v. French | 722 F.Supp.2d 249 (N.D.N.Y., 2010) | 2010 WL 2774043 (N.D.N.Y.) |
Plaintiff Jody Fabrikant, who had recently placed an advertisement for the adoption of puppies, was in possession of fifteen animals, including fourteen dogs and one cat. Reacting to several complaints regarding the animals’ treatment, defendants, the Ulster County SPCA and employees, executed a search warrant resulting in Fabrikant's arrest and seizure of thirteen of her fifteen animals. Plaintiff subsequently asserted that her federal constitutional rights were violated during the course of her criminal prosecution for animal cruelty. With respect to all four federal claims, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment since the existence of probable cause (e.g., video recordings and photographs of the condition of the plaintiff’s home) insulated the defendants from liability for their decisions to seize Plaintiff's animals. |
Case |
| People v. Schneider | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) |
Defendant's dogs escaped from Defendant's yard and attacked and killed a six-year-old boy. The trial court convicted Defendant of owning a mischievous animal that causes death and involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's conviction for owning a mischievous animal that causes death due to erroneous jury instructions. |
Case |
| Caswell v. People | 536 P.3d 323 (Colo., 2023) | 2023 CO 50 (Colo., 2023) | This case concerns several charges of animal cruelty against petitioner Caswell. A welfare check was conducted by a deputy at the Lincoln County Sheriff’s office in response to a report on Ms. Caswell. After two welfare checks were conducted, the deputies executed a search warrant at the Caswell residence, resulting in the seizure of sixty animals. These animals lacked sufficient food or water, were kept in enclosed spaces filled with feces and urine, and many of the animals were underweight or had untreated medical problems. Respondent, the People of the State of Colorado, charged Ms. Caswell with forty-three class six counts of cruelty to animals, which were charged as felonies because Ms. Caswell had prior convictions of misdemeanor animal cruelty on her record. The jury found Caswell guilty of all forty-three counts and sentenced her to eight years of probation, forty-three days in jail, and forty-seven days of in-home detention. An appeal followed and the holding was affirmed. Petitioner filed for certiorari and the Supreme Court of Colorado granted. Here, petitioner argues that the use of her prior convictions for animal cruelty to enhance her charges to felonies violates the Sixth Amendment and article II of the Colorado Constitution. The court first considered whether the legislature meant to make the statutory provision used to enhance Caswell’s sentence as an element versus a sentence enhancer. The court here listed five factors to consider whether a fact is an element or sentencing factor: (1) the statute's language and structure, (2) tradition, (3) the risk of unfairness, (4) the severity of the sentence, and (5) the statute's legislative history. Four of these five factors signaled a legislative intent to designate it a sentence enhancer, so the court concluded that the legislature intended to designate the fact of prior convictions as a sentence enhancer rather than an element. The court also concluded that the sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment or article II of the Colorado Constitution, and affirmed the holding of the lower court. | Case |