Results

Displaying 71 - 80 of 6138
Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
MI - Hunting and Fishing Licenses - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. M.C.L.A. 324.43501 - 43531b MI ST 324.43501 - 43531b These sections describe the required licenses for each type of game animal or aquatic species. Statute
GA - Cruelty - Chapter 11. Animal Protection Ga. Code Ann., § 4-11-1 to 18 GA ST § 4-11-1 to 4-11-18

The Georgia Animal Protection Act was passed in 2000 and provides for jail up to one year for general cruelty convictions and up to five years for an aggravated cruelty conviction.  The judge is also allowed to order psychological counseling.  The law also encompasses licensing provisions for kennels and impoundment provisions.

Statute
Pray v. Whiteskunk 801 N.W.2d 451 (S.D., 2011) 2011 S.D. 43; 2011 WL 3207821 (S.D.)

In this South Dakota case, the plaintiff suffered a broken knee after Defendant's Rottweiler brook loose from its owner and ran toward the street, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the dog owner and the city, specifically alleging the the city knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. On appeal of the granting of summary judgment for the city, this court found that plaintiff failed to establish that the action taken by the city caused the harm to Pray or exposed her to greater risks, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before the city took action. While this Court found that the city had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerousness, this alone is insufficient.

Case
MN - Dogs, license - 347.14. Unlicensed dogs M. S. A. § 347.14 MN ST § 347.14 This Minnesota statute, amended in 2006, provides that any person may seize, impound, or restrain any unlicensed dog which the person may find running at large. The fact that a dog is without a license attached to a collar shall be presumptive evidence that the dog is unlicensed. An officer is under a duty to seize and impound such animal. Statute
American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Andrus 608 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979)

The court stated that the Secretary’s decision to remove 3,500 to 7,000 wild horses in order to maintain the horse population at a permanent level might qualify as “major” federal action and thus require an EIS before removal could occur.    While the secretary has wide discretion under the WFRHBA, he has no discretion regarding compliance with NEPA.  The court also held that  the exercise of jurisdiction by two courts over public lands created no threat of conflicting decisions on range utilization, because the courts only determined whether the land use decision was an informed one.

Case
KY - Dog Laws (also includes cats & ferrets) - Kentucky Consolidated Dog Laws (License, Impound, Bite, etc.) KRS § 39F.040; KRS § 258.005 - 991; 150.390 KY ST § 258.005 - 991; 150.390 These Kentucky statutes comprise the state's Dog Laws, which were amended significantly in 2005. Included are all vaccination, licensing, animal control provisions, and the relevant dog bite statutes. Under Section 258.235, any person may kill or seize any dog which he sees in the act of pursuing or wounding any livestock, or wounding or killing poultry, or attacking human beings, whether or not such dog bears the license tag required by the provisions of this chapter. There shall be no liability on such person in damages or otherwise for killing, injuring from an attempt to kill, or for seizing the dog. That same section also comprises the state's new strict liability law for dog bites. Under Sec. 235(4), any owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a person, livestock, or other property shall be responsible for that damage. Statute
People v. Flores 216 Cal. App. 4th 251, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 648 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.), review denied (Aug. 21, 2013) 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4775; 2013 WL 1944000 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.)

Defendant Flores appeals his conviction under Penal Code section 399 for allowing a " mischievous animal" owned by him to cause serious injury to another person. In this case, defendant's pit bull dog, "Blue,"attacked defendant's almost 90-year old neighbor on his own property causing deep injuries to his leg. Blue had been previously involved in three other incidents where he either tried to attack other dogs or acted aggressively toward other humans. As a result of these incidents, Sonoma County officials issued defendant a issued a potentially dangerous animal warning. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he acted without ordinary care in keeping his dog and that the victim-neighbor did not suffer a serious injury as defined by statute. The court found both of these arguments without merit. While defendant suggested that he acted with "ordinary care" by keeping the dog tethered and chained outside on the day of the incident, the court found the evidence showed Blue had broken free in the past and had "massive strength." Further, even though the potentially dangerous dog designation by the county did not mandate that Blue be kept inside or in a secure enclosure, the ordinance language provides this requirement. Leaving a dog with a history of unprovoked attacks chained next to a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood supported the jury's conclusion that defendant did not act as reasonably careful person would in the same situation. As to the serious bodily injury claim, the court noted that although the law does not define the term, there was substantial medical evidence to support the jury's determination. Affirmed.

Case
CT - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws C. G. S. A. § 53-242 - 254; § 29-108a - 108i; § 53a-73a CT ST §§ 53-242 - 254; § 29-108a - 108i; § 53a-73a

This Connecticut section contains the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions.  Any person who overdrives, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, deprives of necessary sustenance, mutilates or cruelly beats or kills or unjustifiably injures any animal , or fails to give an animal in his or her custody proper care, among other things shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both; a subsequent offense is a Class D felony.  Any person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, wounds or kills an animal is also guilty of a Class D felony. Animal fighting is also prohibited under this section as a Class D felony.  Connecticut has a cruelty to poultry law that provides that any crate or other container used for the purpose of transporting, shipping or holding for sale any live poultry must be in a sanitary condition with sufficient ventilation and warmth to prevent unnecessary suffering.  Other provisions include laws against dyeing chicks and rabbits, docking horses' tails, and the use of animals, birds, or reptiles to solicit money.

Statute
Frank v. Animal Haven, Inc. 107 A.D.3d 574 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2013.) 967 N.Y.S.2d 370, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04711

Plaintiff was bitten by the dog that she adopted from Animal Haven, Inc. and sued that entity for personal injuries stemming from the bite. In affirming the decision to dismiss the complaint, this court noted that the adopting parties signed a contract a the time of adoption where they undertook a "lifetime commitment" for the responsible care of the dog. While the contract stipulated that Animal Haven had the right to have the dog returned if the plaintiff breached the contract, this did not reserve a right of ownership of the dog. Further, the contract also explicitly relieved Animal Haven of liability once the dog was in the possession of the adoptive parties.

Case
Blake v. County of Wyoming 46 N.Y.S.3d 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 2017 WL 459973 (N.Y. App. Div., 2017)

The City of Wyoming filed an appeal after the court dismissed the City’s motion for summary judgment. The initial law suit was filed by Cassandra Blake after she sustained injuries from a dog bite at the Wyoming County Animal Shelter. Blake was working at the shelter as a volunteer dog walker when the incident occurred. Blake filed suit against the City of Wyoming on the basis of strict liability. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision to deny the City’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the City did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals rejected Blake’s argument that the City did have knowledge because the shelter was aware that the dog had previously knocked over a four year old child. The Court of Appeals found that this behavior was not notice to the shelter that the dog had any propensity to bite. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.

Case

Pages