|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|AL - Impound - Destruction of impounded dogs and cats||Ala. Code 1975 § 3-7A-8||AL ST 3-7A-8||This Alabama statute provides that all dogs, cats, and ferrets which have been impounded for lack of rabies immunization, after due notice has been given to the owner as provided in Section 3-7A-7, may be humanely destroyed and disposed of when not redeemed by the owner within seven days. The owner may redeem the animal before destruction by paying the associated costs of vaccination (if no proof of prior vaccination) and impoundment.||Statute|
|Lunon v. Botsford||--- F.3d ----, 2019 WL 7198501 (8th Cir. Dec. 27, 2019)||Lunon had a German Shephard as a breed dog, named Bibi, which had gotten loose and was turned into the local animal shelter. The animal control officer failed to scan the dog for a microchip. After five days at the animal shelter, Bibi was sterilized and adopted out. Lunon was able to recover his dog through a replevin action, however, Lunon claimed that his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process was violated when Bibi was spayed and adopted out without providing pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity for Lunon to be heard. Lunon filed suit against the animal control officer, two directors of the animal shelter in Pulaski County, the city of North Little Rock, Pulaski County, the Pulaski County Animal Shelter, and the North Little Rock Animal Shelter. The defendants removed the case to federal court and sought summary judgment. The district court did not grant summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The Court found that the animal control officer picking up Bibi and delivering her to the animal shelter did not deprive Lunon of a protected property interest. There is no constitutional duty for an animal control officer to scan a stray dog for a microchip. Therefore, the animal control officer was not liable. The public officials that participated in this action were all protected under governmental immunity because Lunon failed to demonstrate that each individual defendant violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court ultimately reversed the order of the district court and remanded with directions to enter judgment dismissing those claims with prejudice.||Case|
|American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus||317 F.3d 334 (C.A.D.C.,2003)||55 ERC 1904, 354 U.S.App.D.C. 432||
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, the Fund for Animals, and Thomas Rider sued Ringling Bros. and its owner, Feld Entertainment, Inc., claiming that Asian elephants are an endangered species and that the circus mistreated its elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. The only question was whether, as the district court ruled in dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs (including a former elephant handler) lack standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the former elephant handler demonstrated present or imminent injury and established redressability where the elephant handler alleged enough to show that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits.
|LA - Disaster Planning - State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan||State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan||Louisiana's Emergency Operations Plan addresses pets and service animals in several places. The parish office of homeland security and emergency preparedness must make an EOP that includes "temporary sheltering of service animals and household pets in times of emergency or disaster." Additionally, under Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6, the "Louisiana Department of Agriculture & Forestry (LDAF) will provide for the safety and well-being of household pets and service animals during evacuations and sheltering." Finally, under ESF #11, the plan "outlines how LDAF will initiate a state response to an emergency or disaster affecting agriculture, food, household pets . . ." and indicates that "the LDAF Emergency Programs Director will work with animal planning authorities in each parish to arrange for the humane evacuation, transport, and temporary sheltering of service animals and household pets that need assistance."||Administrative|
|Winkler v. Colorado Dept. of Health||564 P.2d 107 (Colo. 1977)||193 Colo. 170 (1977)||
In 1974, the Colorado Department of Health adopted certain regulations, the conceded effect of which is to prohibit importation of pets for resale from states whose licensing laws and regulations for commercial pet dealers are not as stringent as those of Colorado. The regulations exempt from this prohibition persons who import pets not for resale and exclusively for breeding purposes or for personal use. After the regulations were upheld by the Denver district court, the plaintiffs, who are commercial pet importers, brought this appeal. The court found these arguments to be unpersuasive and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
|CA - Animal Defined - § 599b. Words and phrases; imputation of knowledge to corporation||West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 599b||CA PENAL § 599b||This statute defines words, such as "animal," as they are used in Title 14, the Malicious Mischief section, of the California Penal Code. Title 14 is where all of the California Penal Code sections pertaining to animal cruelty are found.||Statute|
|CUIDADO DE LOS ANIMALES||207 Animal Protection Law||
New comprehensive Animal Welfare Law for Spain - in spanish only.
|Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr.||322 Fed.Appx. 814 (C.A.11)||Slip Copy, 2009 WL 922661 (C.A.11)||
Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions. The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules.
|U.S. v. Mackie||681 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1982)||
Defendants challenge their eagle convictions under the MBTA, alleging that they should have been charged under the more specific BGEPA. Court holds the government may elect to proceed under either statute; nothing in the language or legislative history proscribes prosecution under the more general MBTA. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
|US - AWA - 1970 Public Law 91-579||1970 PL 91-579||
There were four areas of significant change to the AWA in the 1970 amendments: (1) the definition of "animal" was expanded to include warm-blooded animals generally, (2) more human entities were brought under the regulatory provisions of the Act: animal exhibitors (i.e., circuses, zoos and roadside shows), and wholesale pet dealers, (3) the lab door of research facilities was opened more, requiring that certain humane standards be maintained at all times, (4) the Secretary's enforcement powers were strengthened and protection for government inspectors was provided from individuals who interfered with enforcement actions under the Act.