Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Preston | 300 N.W. 853 (Mich. 1941) | 299 Mich. 484 (Mich. 1941) |
Defendant was convicted of wilfully and maliciously killing three cows. The issue considered on review was: "Are the circumstances and testimony here, aliunde the confession of the respondent, sufficient to create such a probability that the death of the cattle in question was intentionally caused by human intervention and to justify the admission in evidence of the alleged confession of the respondent?" The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. |
Case | |
| Price v. State | 911 N.E.2d 716 (Ind.App.,2009) | 2009 WL 2579365 |
In this Indiana case, appellant-defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor Cruelty to an Animal for beating his 8 month-old dog with a belt. Price contended that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the statute's exemption of “reasonable” training and discipline can be interpreted to have different meanings. The court held that a person of ordinary intelligence would also know that these actions are not “reasonable” acts of discipline or training. Affirmed. |
Case | |
| Goodell v. Humboldt County | 575 N.W.29 486 (Iowa 1998) |
The issue of county versus local control over livestock regulations came to a head when the Iowa Supreme Court invalidated a series of ordinances that had been enacted by the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors to add additional regulations to the livestock industry and to address problems created by confined animal feeding operations in the county. The court ruled that the ordinances were inconsistent with state law and invalid under the doctrine of implied preemption. |
Case | ||
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, L.L.C. v. Department of Agriculture | 539 F.3d 492 (D.C.Cir., 2008) | 2008 WL 3980533 (C.A.D.C.) | Plaintiff, a supplier of beef products, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), after the USDA denied Plaintiff’s request to purchase Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing kits. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that the USDA has authority under the Virus Serum Toxin Act (VSTA) to regulate the use of biological products, the USDA’s interpretation of VSTA allowing the USDA to deny an import permit based on the product’s intended use was not inconsistent with the regulation and was therefore entitled to deference by the Court, the USDA’s interpretation of the word “treatment” as including diagnostic activities was entitled to deference, and that BSE testing is a diagnostic activity for purposes of VSTA. | Case | |
| People v. Hock | 919 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct., 2011) | 2011 WL 1225699 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.) |
Defendant was denied his motion to set aside convictions under New York animal cruelty statute. The Criminal Court, City of New York, held that the 90 day period for prosecuting a Class A misdemeanor had not been exceeded. It also held that the jury was properly instructed on the criminal statute that made it a misdemeanor to not provide an animal with a sufficient supply of good and wholesome air, food, shelter, or water. It would be contrary to the purpose of the law and not promote justice to require that all four necessities be withheld for a conviction. |
Case | |
| FL - Dogs - Florida Dog /Dangerous Dog Laws | West's F. S. A. § 509.233; § 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 | FL ST § 509.233; §§ 767.01 - 16; § 705.19; § 823.041; § 823.15 - 151; § 877.14 | These Florida statutes outline the state's dog provisions, which mainly cover dangerous dog/dog bite laws. The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owners' knowledge of such viciousness. However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the percentage that the bitten person's negligence contributed to the biting incident. If a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks or bites a person or a domestic animal without provocation, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The dog will be impounded for a period of ten days during which time the owner of the dog may request a hearing. | Statute | |
| Commonwealth v. Brown | Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Pa. Super. 519 (1917). | No. 16, Oct. T., 1916 |
The defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals for the use of acid on some horses' feet. The defendant appealed the descision because the lower court had found the Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence to be enough to submit the question of quilt to the jury. The Superior Court found that some of the evidence was improperly admitted by the lower court. Thus, the Superior Court reversed the judgement. |
Case | |
| US - CITES Regs - Taking, Possession, Transportation, Sale, Purchase, Barter, Exportation, and Importation of Wildlife and Plant | 50 C.F.R. § 23.1 to 92 |
These regulations describe the purpose of CITES, the criteria for listing in the appendices, and the requirements for importing or exporting protected animals or plants. |
Administrative | ||
| State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell | 167 S.W.3d 688 (Mo. 2005) |
After a judge granted two humane societies permission to dispose of nearly 120 severely emaciated and malnourished horses, the horses' owner, instead of posting a bond or security, filed for a writ of mandamus with the court of appeals. The appeals court issued a stop order and transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. Here, the horses’ owner argued two points, but the Missouri Supreme Court found that (1) the spoliation of evidence doctrine does not apply at this juncture and that (2) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, nor does the owner allege that the statute discriminates based upon classification or that the statute discriminates in its application so as to violate the equal protection clause. The stop order was therefore dissolved and the petition for the writ of mandamus was denied. |
Case | ||
| TX - Hunting - Subchapter F. Unlawful Controlled Killing of or Attempting to Injure Dangerous Wild Animals. | V. T. C. A., Parks & Wildlife Code § 62.101 - 107 | TX PARKS & WILD §§ 62.101 - 107 | This Texas statute provides that no person may kill or attempt to injure a dangerous wild animal that is in captivity in this state or released from captivity in this state for the purpose of being killed. | Statute |