|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|State v. Gruntz||273 P.3d 183 review denied (Or.App.,2012)||2012 WL 403248 Or. App. 11, 932; review denied, 352 Or. 76, 282 P.3d 1 (2012)||
Defendant moved to suppress evidence after being charged with multiple counts of animal neglect. The Court of Appeals held that the warrant affidavit permitted reasonable inference that neglect continued to exist at time of warrant application. The warrant affiant stated her observations four months prior to the warrant application that horses appeared to be malnourished and severely underweight.
|AFADA habeas corpus Cecilia||EXPTE. NRO. P-72.254/15||“Abogados y Funcionarios de defensa Animal” (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Cecilia, a 30 year old chimpanzee that lived in the Mendoza Zoo alleging that the chimpanzee had been illegitimately and arbitrarily deprived of her right to ambulatory freedom and right to have a dignified life on the part of authorities of the Zoo of the City of Mendoza, Argentina. The court granted habeas corpus to Cecilia, ruling that Cecilia was a living being with rights and instructing defendants to immediately free her and to relocate her to the Great Ape Project Sanctuary in Brazil. Until this moment, only humans illegally detained had been granted this writ.||Case|
|ME - Hunting - § 11215. Use of motorized vehicle to kill, injure, or molest wild animals or wild birds||12 M. R. S. A. § 11215||ME ST T. 12 § 11215||This Maine statute states that a person may not intentionally kill, injure or molest a wild animal or wild bird with a Motor vehicle, Motorboat, or Aircraft. A person who violates the statute commits a Class E crime.||Statute|
|NV - Trusts - Chapter 163. Trusts. Creation and Validity of Trusts. 163.0075. Validity of trust providing for care of one or mor||N. R. S. 163.0075||NV ST 163.0075||This Nevada statute allows for a trust created for the care of one or more animals that are alive at the time of the settlor's death (note the statute does not state "domestic" or "pet" animal). Such a trust terminates upon the death of all animals covered by the terms of the trust. It further provides that a settlor's expression of intent must be liberally construed in favor of the creation of such a trust.||Statute|
|Storms v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.||120 P.3d 126 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2005)||129 Wash.App. 820; 31 NDLR P 98 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2005)||
This Washington discrimination case was brought by a dog owner (Storms) with psychiatric conditions against a store and its managers who refused to allow her to stay in store with her alleged service dog. The dog was trained to put herself between Storms and other people so as to keep an open area around Storms and alleviate her anxiety (a symptom of her post-traumatic stress syndrome). The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against Fred Meyer for refusing to allow her to shop accompanied by her dog. Testimony showed that Brandy had been specifically trained to help Storms with her particular disability by placing herself in between Storms and others in a way that alleviated her anxiety, which was further corroborated by testimony that Brandy engaged in such behavior. Thus, evidence showed that the defendants' violated RCW 49.60.215 by not allowing Storms to do her own shopping within the store because she was accompanied by a service animal.
|CO - Exotic Pets and Wildlife - Chapter 11. Wildlife Parks and Unregulated Wildlife.||2 Colo. Code Regs. 406-11:1100 to 11:1116||2 CCR 406-11:1100 to 11:1116||(Per introduction to regulations). In this introduction to chapter 11 we outline possession requirements for live wildlife as found in Colorado wildlife law. There is growing interest in the private possession of live wildlife. At the same time there is considerable confusion over the laws regarding such private possession. Colorado wildlife law generally prohibits the importation, live possession, sale, barter, trade, or purchase of any species of wildlife native to Colorado (33-6-113(1), C.R.S.). In addition, these same laws restrict or prohibit the importation and possession of exotic (non-native) wildlife (33-6-109(4), C.R.S.); and non-commercial (pet) possession of regulated mammals has been prohibited by these regulations since 1983. The Wildlife Commission also maintains a prohibited species list in Chapter 0. The possession of these species is severely restricted.||Administrative|
|Gannon v. Conti||86 A.D.3d 704 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2011)||2011 WL 2637562 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2011); 926 N.Y.S.2d 739 (2011)||
In 2008, defendants' dog allegedly left their yard by passing through an underground "invisible" electrical fence system and bit the plaintiff who was sitting on her bike on the adjacent property. Plaintiff filed suit seeking damages for injury based on common-law negligence and strict liability. The lower court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the fact that they had no prior knowledge of the dog's alleged vicious propensities. On appeal, the court found that even defendants' own depositions raised an issue of fact as to notice of their dog's alleged vicious propensities. Specifically, one defendant admitted he used a "bite sleeve" obtained through his employment as a police officer to encourage the dog to bite and hold a perpetrator's arm. This evidence that the dog was encouraged to leap up and bite a human arm created a sufficient issue of fact for the jury despite defendants' claim that this was a "play activity" for the dog.
|Sentencia T-095, 2016||Sentencia T-095/16||In this decision, the court drew a line between the concept of animal welfare and the concept of animal rights. The court continues to see animal protection from a moral perspective when it states animals do not necessarily have rights, even though they should be treated with respect and should not be abused. The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary, created for the sole purpose of protection of fundamental rights) against ‘la Personería Local of Fontibón’, the local Mayor’s office of Fontibon, the District Secretary of Health, the Zoonosis Center and the Distril Secretary of the environment of Bogota. The Plaintiff argued that these governmental entities had violated his fundamental right to petition and the right to animal welfare of twenty five dogs, when the authorities ordered the confiscation the canines that were located in the District Ecological Park of the Wetland of Capellanía and who were cared for by volunteers. The Plaintiff argued that the Defendants did not respond to his request to provide funds to build a shelter and provide food and veterinary assistance of the dogs or funds to relocate them. The Plaintiff sought a response from governmental authorities on the petition and to provide the funds to save the animals, thereby avoiding the Zoonosis Center to assume their care, who would euthanize the sick animals that were not adopted after five days of being up for adoption. The lower court denied the protection of the fundamental right to petition, as it found that the authorities responded to the petition of the Plaintiff in a clear and timely matter by denying the request to fund the Plaintiff to relocate the dogs or build a shelter for them. In regards to the right to animal welfare, the lower court considered it was a legal rather than a constitutional issue, therefore the action of ‘tutela’ was not the appropriate mechanism as its purpose is to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights. The court held that there was a constitutional duty of animal protection that derives from the duty to protect the environment. However, this duty to guarantee the well-being of animals as sentient beings is not absolute and may be subject to exceptions. The court determines that the mandate to protect the environment, which includes sentient beings, does not translate into a right to animal welfare, and for that reason such duty is not enforceable through an action of tutela. The duty to protect animals presumes an obligation to care and prohibits maltreatment and cruelty against animals, unless these actions come from one of the limits stipulated in the constitution. The court affirmed the lower court decision to deny the protection to the right to petition and declared the inadmissibility of the action of tutela for the protection of animal welfare.||Case|
|MT - Dangerous - CHAPTER 23. DOMESTIC ANIMAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION.||MCA 7-23-2109||MT ST 7-23-2109||This Montana statute provides that the county governing body may regulate, restrain, control, kill, or quarantine any vicious dog, whether such dog is licensed or unlicensed, by the adoption of an ordinance which substantially complies with state dangerous dog laws.||Statute|
|Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n||03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006)||2006 WL 2009061 (Pa.Cmwlth.)||
A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order.