Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Colombia - Marine mammals - LEY 557, 2000, International Program of Dolphin Conservation | LEY 557, 2000 | Through Ley 557, Congress approves and adopts the international Dolphin Conservation Program signed in Washington D.C. This program covers all the area in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and was ratified by Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, European Union, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States, and Venezuela. The main goal of this program is to reduce dolphin mortality in the Eastern Pacific due to the tuna purse-seine fishery. | Statute | |
| Price v. State | 911 N.E.2d 716 (Ind.App.,2009) | 2009 WL 2579365 |
In this Indiana case, appellant-defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor Cruelty to an Animal for beating his 8 month-old dog with a belt. Price contended that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the statute's exemption of “reasonable” training and discipline can be interpreted to have different meanings. The court held that a person of ordinary intelligence would also know that these actions are not “reasonable” acts of discipline or training. Affirmed. |
Case |
| MS - Licenses - Chapter 5. Health, Safety and Public Welfare. In General | Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-50 | MS ST § 19-5-50 | This Mississippi statute provides that the governing authorities of any county bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and having within its boundaries two cities having in excess of forty thousand (40,000) population each and any county with a population in excess of two hundred thousand (200,000) shall have the power to prevent or regulate the running at large of animals of all kinds, and to cause such as may be running at large to be impounded and sold to discharge the costs. These governing bodies are also given the authority to regulate and tax dogs generally. | Statute |
| ID - Wildlife - Chapter 7. Captive Wildlife | I.C. § 36-701 to 716 | ID ST § 36-701 to 716 | This section comprises Idaho's captive wildlife provisions. Under the law, no person shall engage in any propagation or hold in captivity any species of big game animal found wild in this state, unless the person has been issued a license or permit by the director. All other species of mammals, birds or reptiles that are found in the wild in this state and are not species of special concern or threatened and endangered species, may be held in captivity without permit so long as the possessor retains proof that such wildlife was lawfully obtained. The laws concerning commercial wildlife farms are also included in this section. Additionally, there is also a section on the transition of wolves from federal to state management (36-715). | Statute |
| People v. Flores | 216 Cal. App. 4th 251, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 648 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.), review denied (Aug. 21, 2013) | 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4775; 2013 WL 1944000 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.) |
Defendant Flores appeals his conviction under Penal Code section 399 for allowing a " mischievous animal" owned by him to cause serious injury to another person. In this case, defendant's pit bull dog, "Blue,"attacked defendant's almost 90-year old neighbor on his own property causing deep injuries to his leg. Blue had been previously involved in three other incidents where he either tried to attack other dogs or acted aggressively toward other humans. As a result of these incidents, Sonoma County officials issued defendant a issued a potentially dangerous animal warning. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he acted without ordinary care in keeping his dog and that the victim-neighbor did not suffer a serious injury as defined by statute. The court found both of these arguments without merit. While defendant suggested that he acted with "ordinary care" by keeping the dog tethered and chained outside on the day of the incident, the court found the evidence showed Blue had broken free in the past and had "massive strength." Further, even though the potentially dangerous dog designation by the county did not mandate that Blue be kept inside or in a secure enclosure, the ordinance language provides this requirement. Leaving a dog with a history of unprovoked attacks chained next to a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood supported the jury's conclusion that defendant did not act as reasonably careful person would in the same situation. As to the serious bodily injury claim, the court noted that although the law does not define the term, there was substantial medical evidence to support the jury's determination. Affirmed. |
Case |
| Chile - Research animals - Ley No. 21.646 (2024) | Ley No. 21.646, 2024 | This law modifies the sanitary code and Law 20380 (animal protection law) to prohibit animal testing in Chile and the sale, trade, importation, and introduction of products that have been tested on animals into the country. | Statute | |
| State v. Hershey | 515 P.3d 899 (2022) | 370 Or. 200 (Or., 2022) | Defendant's animals (22 dogs, three horses, and seven chickens) were impounded in 2017 after he was charged with second-degree animal neglect. The district attorney asked the court for immediate forfeiture of the animals or for defendant to post a bond for care within 72 hours of a hearing on the matter. In response, defendant filed a motion for jury trial. The lower court denied defendant's motion and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling. Here, the Oregon Supreme court considers whether a special statutory proceeding brought under ORS 167.347 provides a right to a jury trial in accordance with Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court first looked at the nature of the relief in the statute insofar as whether such relief is equitable or legal. The Court found the purpose of the statute is mainly to provide unjust enrichment of the owner when the owner does not pay for the costs of their animals' care. As such, the court found the relief was equitable in nature. This was supported by examining the legislative history, which revealed the law was enacted in the wake of one county incurring approximately $100,000 in a large animal abuse case. In addition, the Court found the instant statute similar in nature to laws related to costs care of institutionalized humans in the early 20th Century. Those proceedings to enforce payment of the legal obligation to care for someone under government care were determined not to require jury trials. The court rejected defendant's reliance on two cases dealing with in rem civil forfeiture in a criminal proceeding as the purpose of those actions are to impose consequences for past conduct rather than prevent inequitable shifting of costs of care. The purpose of ORS 167.347 is to equitably share costs between the county and the defendant and to protect against unjust enrichment of defendant. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of the circuit court were affirmed. | Case |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert | Slip Copy 2017 WL 2912423 (D. Utah July 7, 2017) | This case deals with the constitutionality of Utah's "ag gag" law, enacted in 2012. The law criminalizes lying to obtain access to an agricultural operation and the subsequent recording or filming once inside. According to statements made enactment, it is directed at undercover operations that investigate farm animal abuse. Plaintiffs assert that the law violates their First Amendment rights. On review of motions, the court first looked at whether the First Amendment applies to this type of "lying." Because a recent U.S. Supreme Court case makes lying that causes "cognizable legal harm" outside the protection of the First Amendment, the court examined the type of lying at issue in the Utah law. Ultimately, the court found that lying to gain access to these agricultural facilities does not in itself cause a legally cognizable harm. Thus, "absent an additional showing of harm, under either interpretation, at least some of the lies criminalized by the Act retain First Amendment protection." With regard to First Amendment protections for the act of recording once at an agricultural operation and whether a strict scrutiny standard applies, the court looked to other circuits that found the act of making speech (i.e., recording/filming) is protected. The State countered with the fact that such recording occurs on private property, but the court found the government cannot place criminal restrictions on speech simply because it occurs on private property. The court noted that the property owner can indeed remove the person from the property and sue for any damages resulting from the trespass, which is different than prosecution by the state to curtail speech. Finally, after finding that the act impinges protected speech, the court then analyzed whether it withstood a strict scrutiny review. The State proffered government interests that include concerns over worker protection and disease outbreak. However, the court noted nothing in the legislative history on these claims or any actual incidents that supported these asserted government interests. The court found the Act did not survive strict scrutiny as it was not narrowly tailored and instead was directed at the content of the speech (the act of recording a facility). The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and the State's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. | Case | |
| AU - Wildlife - Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (Western Australia) | Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 |
The Act covers the protection of fauna, the taking of protected species, licence requirements and possible opportunities, the authority of wildlife officers, crown lands. The Department of Environment and Conservation is the primary agency responsible for conserving this biodiversity. This Act provides for the conservation and protection of wildlife. |
Statute | |
| ME - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | 7 M. R. S. A. § 3971 - 4042; 17 M. R. S. A. § 1011 - 1046 | ME ST Tit. 7 § 3971 - 4042; ME ST Tit. 17 § 1011 - 1046 | These Maine statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The first section of laws occurs under Title 7, Agriculture and Animals. Under these laws, a person commits animal cruelty if he or she kills the animal of another person; kills an animal by an inhumane method; injures, overworks, tortures, torments, abandons or cruelly beats or intentionally mutilates an animal; gives drugs to an animal with an intent to harm the animal; gives poison or alcohol to an animal; or exposes a poison with intent that it be taken by an animal. The neglect component of the statute provides that a person commits cruelty if he or she deprives an animal that the person owns or possesses of necessary sustenance, necessary medical attention, proper shelter, protection from the weather or humanely clean conditions. These acts are then cross-referenced under the criminal provisions of Title 17, which describes the penalties under § 1031. Animal fighting is a class D crime under this section. | Statute |