|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman||490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007)||07 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6427||
Plaintiffs, who include the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), the Animal Welfare Institute ("AWI"), and three individuals, challenged the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to comply with the federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). The district court granted USDA's motion to dismiss, to which the ALDF timely appealed. Over a vigorous dissent, an appeals court panel reversed the district court's decision. After a sua sponte call, however, a majority of active judges voted to rehear the case en banc. Yet, before the rehearing occurred, the parties had reached a settlement and had agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice provided that the panel's opinion and judgment were vacated. The majority of the en banc panel agreed to vacate the panel's opinion and judgment with prejudice, but Judge Thomas filed the dissenting opinion.
|Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman||469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir.(Cal.), 2006)||2006 WL 3375347 (9th Cir.(Cal.)), 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10, 733||
Plaintiffs, who include the Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), the Animal Welfare Institute ("AWI"), and three individuals, challenged the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to comply with the federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). Plaintiffs challenge the decision not to adopt the Draft Policy under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") as arbitrary and capricious. The district court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' suit because it determined that the USDA's decision did not constitute reviewable final agency action. This court disagreed, finding that at least one of the plaintiffs has standing under Article III of the Constitution. Further, the court concluded that the district court has authority under the APA to review the USDA's decision not to adopt the Draft Policy. Opinion Vacated on Rehearing en Banc by Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman , 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir., 2007).
|Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 18||
Direito Animal Comparado/Comparative Animal Law
|Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 15||
Doutrina Internacional/International Pappers
1. ENSINANDO ÉTICA PÓS-HUMANISTA NA FACULDADE DE DIREITO: As dimensões de raça, cultura e gênero na resistência estudantil
|In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation-MDL No.1993 United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.||720 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013)||2013 WL 2991027 (D.C. Cir. 2013)||
Hunters and hunting organizations sued the Secretary of Interior, the Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Service itself after the Service listed the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and barred the importation of polar bear trophies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). On appeal, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the defendants' motion of summary judgment.
|Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management||50 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., 2006),||2006 WL 2940764 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.), 43 Cal.App.4th 1360||Plaintiff, Lila Chee, a resident and owner of a condominium unit, appealed from a judgment entered in favor of all defendants on her complaint seeking damages for personal injuries she suffered when a dog belonging to Olga Kiymaz, a tenant of another unit in the same complex, jumped on Chee. In affirming the lower court's award of summary judgment, this court held that the landlord had no duty in absence of landlord's actual knowledge of dog's dangerous propensities. Further, the landlord was not liable to owner for nuisance. Finally, the condominium covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R's) did not impose vicarious liability on landlord.||Case|
|PA - Veterinary Issues - Rules of Professional Conduct||49 PA ADC § 31.21||49 Pa. Code § 31.21||The State Board of Veterinary Medicine is empowered under section 5(2) of the act (63 P. S. § 485.5(2)) to adopt rules and regulations of professional conduct appropriate to establish and maintain a high standard of integrity, skill and practice in the profession of veterinary medicine. In accordance with this authority, the Board has determined that the following rules are necessary in the public interest to protect the public against unprofessional conduct on the part of veterinarians.||Administrative|
|AK - Initiatives - Ballot Measure 3 (bear baiting or feeding)||2004 Ballot Measure 3||This Alaska ballot measure was defeated in the November 2004 election. It would have made it illegal for a person to bait or intentionally feed a bear for purposes of hunting, viewing, or photographing the bear. A person who violated this proposed law would have been guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to one-year imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000. It failed with only 43.3% of the vote.||Statute|
|CA - Horse - § 21759. Caution in passing animals||West's Ann. Cal. Vehicle Code § 21759||CA VEHICLE § 21759||This California law provides that the driver of any vehicle that approaches a horse drawn vehicle, any ridden animal, or livestock must exercise proper control of his vehicle and shall reduce speed or stop as may appear necessary to avoid frightening the animal and to insure safety of the person in charge of the animal.||Statute|
|Ocean Mammal Inst. v. Gates||Slip Copy, 2008 WL 2185180 (D.Hawai'i)||
Plaintiffs sued the Navy over the use of sonar; the Plaintiffs feared that the sonar would kill whales and other marine life. This case dealt with the required production of documents the Defendant claimed were privileged and or work product material. The Court found that the Defendant must hand over the material to the Plaintiffs because the documents were not in fact privileged.