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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WI - Ordinances - 59.54. Public protection and safety | W. S. A. 59.54 | WI ST 59.54 | This Wisconsin statute provides that a local board may enact ordinances regulating the keeping, apprehension, impounding and destruction of dogs outside the corporate limits of any city or village, but such ordinances shall not conflict with ss. 174.01 and 174.042, and such ordinances may not apply in any town that has enacted an ordinance under s. 60.23(30). | Statute |
| UK - Dangerous Dogs - Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 | 1991 CHAPTER 65 |
An Act to prohibit persons from having in their possession or custody dogs belonging to types bred for fighting; to impose restrictions in respect of such dogs pending the coming into force of the prohibition; to enable restrictions to be imposed in relation to other types of dog which present a serious danger to the public; to make further provision for securing that dogs are kept under proper control; and for connected purposes. |
Statute | |
| DR. ELLEN LEVINE et al., Plaintiffs, v. MIKE JOHANNS, Defendants | This action challenges the exclusion of chickens, turkeys, and other birds from the protections of the federal Humane Slaughter Act (HSA). The Levine plaintiffs’ complaint challenges a USDA Notice issued on September 28, 2005, titled “Treatment of Live Poultry Before Slaughter.” The Notice states that there is no federal statute governing the humane slaughter of poultry, but recommends that the poultry industry adopt voluntary measures to improve slaughter practices. Plaintiffs all contend that by excluding these animals from the protections of the Act exposes them to greater risk of food-borne illness. The inhumane methods of slaughtering the birds have been linked in scientific studies to greater incidence of food-borne pathogens in the meat. In their complaint, Plaintiffs request an order finding the act of excluding poultry from the HSA is arbitrary and capricious, and enjoining the USDA from excluding poultry species from the HSA. In its order regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that plaintiffs credibly alleged that they face an imminent exposure to heightened risk that they will become ill from consuming inhumanely slaughtered animals. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss the consumer claims was denied. | Pleading | ||
| NV - Housing - 116.318. Right of units’ owners to keep pet | N. R. S. 116.318 | NV ST 116.318 | This Nevada law enacted in 2019 states that the executive board of an association shall not and the governing documents of that association must not prohibit a unit's owner from keeping at least one pet within such physical portion of the common-interest community as that owner has a right to occupy and use exclusively. | Statute |
| Animal Law Index Volume 1 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 1 (1995)ARTICLESTIME FOR A SHARPER LEGAL FOCUS |
Policy | ||
| Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co. | 50 F.3d 781 (C.A.9 (Or.),1995) | 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,706 (1995) |
In this case, an environmental group filed a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) seeking an injunction to prevent modification of the habitat of a pair of spotted owls by defendant-logging company. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon entered summary judgment for the logging company. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court found the issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly interpreted the ESA to foreclose citizen suits that only allege a future injury to a protected species. The Court held that the ESA's language, purpose, and structure authorize citizens to seek an injunction against an imminent threat of harm to a protected species. The proposed clear-cutting logging activity was imminent and reasonably certain to injure the owl pair by significantly impairing their essential behavioral patterns.
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Case |
| UT - Wolves - Chapter 29. Wolf Management Act | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-15-101 - 202 (formerly cited as U.C.A. 1953 § 23-29-101 - 102; § 23-29-201 - 202) | UT ST § 23A-15-101 - 202 (formerly cited as UT ST § 23-29-101 - 202) | Under the Utah Wolf Management Act, the division shall manage wolves to prevent the establishment of a viable pack in all areas of the state where the wolf is not listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act until the wolf is completely delisted under the act and removed from federal control in the entire state. | Statute |
| AU - Livestock - Australian Meat and Live-stock Industry Act 1997 | Act No. 206 of 1997 |
The purpose of this Act is to control meat and live-stock exports both within and outside Australia. 'Live-stock' includes cattle, calves, sheep, lambs and goats, however this definition is not exhaustive and may include other animals if prescribed. The Act covers export licences, quotas and enforcement. It also outlines the role of industry bodies and policies. |
Statute | |
| KS - Dodge City - Breed - §§ 2-401 - 2-410 PIT BULL DOGS | DODGE CITY, KS., CITY CODE §§ 2-401 - 2-410 (2004) |
In Dodge City, Kansas, it is illegal to own, keep, harbor, or possess a pit bull dog, with an exception for dogs registered with the city of Dodge City, whose owners obtain a permit and comply with certain standards. Such requirements include keeping the dog confined, and if outside of a pen, the use of a leash and a special collar, microchipping, "Beware of Dog" signs, and $100,000 liability insurance, and identification photographs. Violations may result in the seizure, impoundment, and/or removal of a dog from the city. A violation may incur a fine of $2,500 and/or imprisonment of up to one year.
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Local Ordinance | |
| Cisneros v. Petland, Inc. | 972 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2020) | Plaintiff Cisneros purchased a Shih Tzu puppy named "Giant" from Petland Kennesaw, a Kennesaw, Georgia franchise of Petland, Inc. She received a certificate of "veterinary inspection" and a limited health guarantee at the time of purchase. Several days later, problems arose with the puppy and she brought the dog back to the Petland affiliated veterinarian who prescribed antibiotics without making a diagnosis. Shortly thereafter, an emergency pet visit revealed the dog suffered from parvovirus. Cisneros called Petland who told her to take the dog back to the Petland vet if she wanted a refund. She did so and the dog died several days later. Because the State of Georgia requires reporting of parvovirus, Cisneros received a report after the dog died, but she learned the dog's organs had been removed (an uncommon post mortem practice). As a result, plaintiff alleged that actions were the intended result of a nationwide conspiracy involving Petland and its affiliates to sell unhealthy puppies from "puppy mills" where health conditions are rubber stamped by a network of "preferred veterinarians" and buyers are deceived by sales documents that distract from the fraud. Plaintiff broadly asserted three claims: (1) a violation of the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); (2) a conspiracy to violate the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); and (3) with respect to a Georgia subclass of persons who purchased a cat or dog from a Petland franchise in Georgia from July 2013 to the present, a violation of Georgia's state RICO statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4. The district court dismissed Cisneros's federal causes of action for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). After applying the six-fold test for a private plaintiff suing under the civil provisions of RICO, this Court found chiefly that Cisneros has alleged no facts that plausibly support the inference that the defendants were collectively trying to make money in pet sales by fraud, which is a common purpose sufficient to find a RICO enterprise. Cisneros was required to allege not just that Petland Kennesaw had a fraudulent purpose, but that it was a common purpose, formed in collaboration with Petland, PAWSitive, and the preferred veterinarians. In the end, Cisneros has alleged only that Petland operates a franchise business like any other franchisor. Even assuming that Cisneros has adequately pled fraud on the part of Petland Kennesaw, she has not alleged that its predicate acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. The action was affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. | Case |