|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|Gonzalez v. South Texas Veterinary Associates, Inc.||2013 WL 6729873 (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2013), review denied (May 16, 2014)||Not Reported in S.W.3d||Plaintiff acquired an indoor/outdoor cat with an unknown medical and vaccination history. Plaintiff took cat to defendant for treatment and the cat received a vaccination. The cat soon developed a golf-ball-sized mass that contained a quarter-sized ulceration which was draining “matter” on the cat's right rear leg. When plaintiff returned the cat to the defendant, defendant diagnosed the cat with an infection, prescribed an antibiotic for treatment, and instructed Gonzalez to return if the cat's symptoms did not improve. When the cat's symptoms did not improve, plaintiff took the cat to another veterinarian who diagnosed the cat with vaccine-associated sarcoma. The cat had to be eventually euthanized. Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that defendant failed to: (1) inform her of vaccine-associated sarcoma risk; (2) adhere to feline vaccination protocols; and (3) properly diagnose vaccine-associated sarcoma in the cat, which resulted in the loss of her life. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred by granting defendant's no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment. After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences, the court concluded that the plaintiff brought forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence establishing the relevant standard of care to prove her malpractice claims. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting the no-evidence summary judgment. On the traditional summary judgment claim, the court held that that the defendant's evidence did not conclusively prove that a veterinarian complied with the applicable standard of care in light of another veterinarian's report to the contrary. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting defendant's traditional motion for summary judgment. The case was reversed and remanded.||Case|
|AZ - Ordinances - Article 2. Board of Trustees Government After Disincorporation.||A. R. S. § 9-219 (repealed 2017)||AZ ST § 9-219||This Arizona statute provides that the board of trustees of a city may p ass ordinances not inconsistent or in conflict with the laws of this state. More specifically, this statute provides that the board may restrain , under penalties, the running at large of cattle or other animals, and provide rules for impounding them, and provide for taxing dogs and penalties for the nonpayment of such taxes, or the killing of dogs running at large in the corporate limits. However, before exercising these powers, the board shall cause a resolution of intention to be recorded in minutes and then published in some daily or weekly newspaper at least two||Statute|
|KS - Initiatives - Amendment 1, Right to Hunt and Fish (2016)||Amendment 1||Amendment 1 is a legislatively referred constitutional amendment in the 2016 general election. The explanatory statement on the ballot says, "This amendment is to preserve constitutionally the right of the public to hunt, fish and trap wildlife subject to reasonable laws and regulations. The right of the public to hunt, fish and trap shall not modify any provision of common law or statutes relating to trespass, eminent domain or any other private property rights." A "yes" vote would constitutionally preserve the right of the public to hunt, fish and trap wildlife that has traditionally been taken by hunters, trappers and anglers. A "no" vote would provide for no constitutional right of the public to hunt, fish and trap wildlife. It would maintain existing state laws and rules and regulations governing hunting, fishing and trapping wildlife.||Statute|
|Mark, Stoner, Setter and Pearson v Henshaw||(1998) 155 ALR 118||(1998) 85 FCR 555;  FCA 556||
The four appellants, members of Animal Liberation, entered premises containing battery hens without permission. This was done allegedly on concern as to the treatment of those battery hens and the appellants claimed this constituted a reasonable excuse. After a second appeal, the convictions were upheld and it was found that the appellants did not have a reasonable excuse for trespass.
|CO - Exotic - Article 81. Hybrid Animals||C. R. S. A. § 35-81-101 to 102||CO ST § 35-81-101 to 102||
This Colorado statute authorized the commissioner of the department of agriculture to appoint and convene an advisory group to study the behavior of hybrid canids (wolf hybrids) and felines, including a review of any incidents involving property damage and personal injury caused by such animals. The department was to present its findings and proposals for legislation in January of 1998.
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|UK - Cruelty - Protection against Cruel Tethering Act 1988||1988 c.31||
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. The Protection against Cruel Tethering Act 1988 is an act to protect horses, asses and mules against cruel tethering. This means in such conditions or such a manner to cause that animal unnecessary suffering.
|CT - Exotic - Sec. 26-55-6. Importation, possession or liberation of wild birds, mammals, reptiles, amphibians and invertebrates||CT ADC § 26-55-6||Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 26-55-6||
This new Connecticut regulation (effective March 1, 2012) places restrictions on who may import or possess certain categories of wild animals in the state. The regulation puts wild animals into one of four categories: Category One, Two, Three, or Four Wild Animals. With regard to Great Apes, a member within the family Hominidae (including, but not limited to, gorilla, chimpanzee and orangutan) is a Category One Animal. No person, except a municipal park, zoo, public nonprofit aquarium, nature center,museum, exhibitor licensed or registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, laboratory registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, or research facility registered with the United States Department of Agriculture, shall import or possess any Category One Wild Animal.
|Animal Legal and Historical Center Web site||
On this site you will find a comprehensive repository of information about animal law, including: over 1200 full text cases (US, historical, and UK), over 1400 US statutes, over 60 topics and comprehensive explanations, legal articles on a variety of animal topics and an international collection.
|Posnien v. Rogers||533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975)||
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the defendant's negligence in the diagnosis and the treatment of plaintiff's brood mare, which resulted in the mare's infertility. Plaintiff was required to show that Dr. Rogers did not exercise the care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by skilled veterinarians doing the same type of work in the community, and that the failure to exercise the required skill and care was the cause of the injury. Experts testified at trial that the care exercised by Dr. Rogers met the standard of care of veterinarians practicing in the area, and had they been treating the mare, the treatment would not have differed substantially from that of Dr. Rogers. The Supreme Court held that the record is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that the care of Dr. Rogers did not meet the standard of care of other practitioners practicing in the community.