Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Importation - Chapter 2. Of Other and Miscellaneous Offenses (653o - 653r) | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 653o - 653r | CA PENAL § 653o - 653r | These California laws relate to the importation of certain animals parts for commercial purposes. Under the law, it is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any polar bear, leopard, ocelot, tiger, cheetah, jaguar, sable antelope, wolf (Canis lupus), zebra, whale, cobra, python, sea turtle, colobus monkey, kangaroo, vicuna, sea otter, free-roaming feral horse, dolphin or porpoise (Delphinidae), Spanish lynx, or elephant. It is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any crocodile or alligator. Commencing January 1, 2022, it is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of an iguana, skink, caiman, hippopotamus, or a Teju, Ring, or Nile lizard. Section 653p makes it unlawful to posses with the intent to sell any part or dead body of any species on the federal endangered species list or species covered under the MMPA. Section 653q makes it illegal to import for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any seal. | Statute |
| EU - Farming - Council Directive concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes | 98/58/EC; Official Journal L 221 , 08/08/1998 P. 0023 - 0027 |
This Directive applies to animals (including fish, reptiles and amphibians) reared or kept for the production of food, wool, skin or fur or for other farming purposes. It does not apply to wild animals, animals intended for use in sporting or cultural events (shows), experimental or laboratory animals or invertebrate animals. The Member States must adopt provisions to ensure that the owners or keepers of animals look after the welfare of their animals and see that they are not caused any unnecessary pain, suffering or injury. |
Statute | |
| Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin | 740 F.Supp. 1400 (W.D.Wis. 1990) |
Action was brought to determine Indian tribe members' rights related to off-reservation hunting of white-tailed deer, fisher and other furbearing animals, and small game within the area of the state ceded to the United States by the plaintiff tribes. The Court held that Indians and non-Indians were each entitled to one half of game harvest within each harvesting area rather than as a whole territory to accommodate the longer Indian hunting season. With regard to hunting on private land in the ceded area, the Court held that plaintiffs' members have no more rights than non-Indian hunters to hunt or to trap on private lands, as tribal members who are hunting or trapping on private lands are still subject to state hunting and trapping regulations. The Court also held that the state could properly prohibit Indians from hunting deer during the summer and at night due to the safety risk to humans. |
Case | |
| Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. U.S. | 697 F.Supp.2d 1324 (S.D.Fla., 2010) | 2010 WL 1037962 (S.D.Fla.) |
This case examines the requirements surrounding the issuance of an Incidental Take Statement (ITS), a statement that authorizes harm to an endangered species, but that must include a trigger for reviewing the decision (known as “re-consultation”) at the point when there is a risk of jeopardizing the species. The trigger must be a numerical trigger describing the “take” (e.g., the capturing or killing of members of an endangered species) in terms of specific population data unless it is impractical to do so. Specifically, this case explores whether the Army Corps of Engineers and FTS were able to use an ecological surrogate in place of a numerical trigger in an ITS that was promulgated in the process of conservation work in the Everglades. This conservation work involved manipulating water levels in the Everglades and impacted the viability of three species protected under the Endangered Species Act (the Cape Sable seaside sparrow, the Everglade snail kite, and the wood stork), as well as the well-being of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians. |
Case |
| People v. Brinkley | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2019 WL 3226728 (N.Y. App. Div. July 18, 2019) | Defendant was convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals. The Defendant appealed the judgment. Defendant and his nephew had purchased a puppy and continually used negative reinforcement, such as paddling or popping the dog on the rear end with an open hand, for unwanted behavior. On one occasion, when the dog was approximately 15 months old, the Defendant’s nephew found that the dog had defecated in the apartment. The nephew attempted to paddle the dog and the dog bit the nephew’s thumb as a result. When the Defendant had returned home, the nephew explained to him what had happened. The Defendant proceeded to remove the dog from his crate, put the dog’s face by the nephew’s injured thumb, and told him he was a bad dog. The dog then bit off a portion of the Defendant’s thumb. The Defendant attempted to herd the dog onto the back porch, but the dog became aggressive and continued to bite him. As a result, the Defendant repeatedly kicked the dog and used a metal hammer to beat the dog into submission. The dog later died due to his injuries. The Defendant argued that he had a justifiable purpose for causing the dog serious physical injury. The Defendant testified that he was in shock from the injury to his thumb and that he was trying to protect himself and his nephew. However, other evidence contradicted the Defendant's testimony. The dog was in a crate when the Defendant got home, and the Defendant could have left him there rather than take the dog out to discipline him. The Defendant was at least partially at fault for creating the situation that led him to react in such a violent manner. The Court reviewed several of the Defendant’s contentions and found them all to be without merit. The judgment was ultimately affirmed. | Case | |
| AFADA habeas corpus Cecilia | EXPTE. NRO. P-72.254/15 | “Abogados y Funcionarios de defensa Animal” (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Cecilia, a 30 year old chimpanzee that lived in the Mendoza Zoo alleging that the chimpanzee had been illegitimately and arbitrarily deprived of her right to ambulatory freedom and right to have a dignified life on the part of authorities of the Zoo of the City of Mendoza, Argentina. The court granted habeas corpus to Cecilia, ruling that Cecilia was a living being with rights and instructing defendants to immediately free her and to relocate her to the Great Ape Project Sanctuary in Brazil. Until this moment, only humans illegally detained had been granted this writ. | Case | |
| AZ - Endangered, nongame - Illegal Taking or Wounding of Wildlife | A. R. S. § 17-268, § 17-296, § 17-298, § 17-298.01, § 17-314, § 17-402 - 407 | AZ ST § 17-268, § 17-296, § 17-298, § 17-298.01, § 17-314, § 17-401 | Arizona assesses a monetary civil penalty for the possession or taking of listed species of wildlife and endangered/nongame wildlife (including eagles). This fine goes to the state wildlife theft prevention fund and is in addition to any other fine or penalty assessed by law. | Statute |
| Connecticut General Statutes: Chapter 338: Section 6619 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6619 (1918) | Section 6619 of Chapter 338 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers information, procedure and bail. Specifically, the statute states the circumstances for reach a search warrant will be issued. | Statute | |
| San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose | 402 F.3d 962 (C.A.9 (Cal.),2005) | 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2853, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3920 |
In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants-Appellants, seven San Jose City Police Officers and Deputy Sheriff Linderman, appeal from an order of the district court denying in part their motions for qualified immunity. This action arises out of the simultaneous execution of search warrants at the residences of members of the Hells Angels, and at the Hells Angels clubhouse on January 21, 1998. While executing search warrants at two plaintiffs' residences, the officers shot a total of three dogs. This court held that the shooting of the dogs at the Vieira and Souza residences was an unreasonable seizure, and an unreasonable execution of the search warrants, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Exigent circumstances did not exist at either residence, as the officers had a week to consider the options and tactics available for an encounter with the dogs. The unlawfulness of the officers' conduct would have been apparent to a reasonable officer at the time the officers planned for serving the search warrants. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Tomono | 143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1998) |
Kei Tomono pleaded guilty to violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B), and the federal anti-smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, in connection with his illegal importation of reptiles. At sentencing, the district court granted a three-level downward departure for what it termed "cultural differences." The court held that "cultural differences" were not significant enough to remove this case from the body of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so as to allow for downward departure. |
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