Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Decreto 531, 1967 | 125338 | This Decreto ratifies The Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauty of the Americas, signed in Washington on October 12, 1940. | Statute | |
| Humane Society-Western Region v. Snohomish County | 2007 WL 2404619 (W.D. Wash) |
Plaintiff Humane Society Western Region (d/b/a "Happy Paws Farm") filed this lawsuit against Snohomish County alleging provisions of the county code regulating barking are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the state and federal constitutions, and that the SCC provision governing the temporary housing of animals in shelters violates its federal constitutional right to substantive due process. Plaintiff argued that the noise ordinances invite subjective evaluation resulting in arbitrary enforcement because the code contains no reference to identifiable levels of noise, only to noises that are repetitive. The absence of identifiable levels of noise, or decibel levels, does not render the noise ordinances unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this method is not easily understood by individuals of ordinary intelligence or that it fails to protect against arbitrary enforcement. This opinion was Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part by Humane Society Western Region v. Snohomish County, 357 Fed.Appx. 144 (9th Cir., 2009). |
Case | |
| State v. Lesoing-Dittoe | 693 N.W.2d 261 (Neb. 2005) | 269 Neb. 317 (2005) |
A married couple owned a pet dog that had a history of injuring other dogs. The married couple's dog injured a neighbors dog and, under a Nebraska Statute, was ordered to be destroyed. The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the decision holding the penalty was unreasonable. |
Case |
| Taylor v. Howren | 606 S.E.2d 74 (Ga.App., 2004) | 2004 WL 2283815, 270 Ga.App. 226 |
A family friend wanted to ride a horse and the horse owner told him it was rideable, despite knowing the horse was not fully trained yet. The family friend sued after being kicked in the eye, knocked unconscious and paralyzed by the horse. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for the horse owner on the basis that there was still a genuine issue of material fact as to the horse owner's immunity under the Equine Activities Act. |
Case |
| Wild Horse Observers Ass'n, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Bd. | 363 P.3d 1222 (N.M., 2015) | Certiorari Denied, Oct. 13, 2015, No. 35,504. | This case dealt with a determination made by the New Mexico Livestock Board that a group of undomesticated, unowned, free-roaming horses (the Placitas horses) were “livestock” and “estray” rather than wild horses under the Livestock Code. The Wild Horse Observers Association filed suit against the Board, but their claim was dismissed by the District Court. The Court of Appeals held that 1) the horses were not “livestock”, as they had never been domesticated and therefore could not be “estray”; 2) the Board had a statutory duty to test and relocate wild horses captured on public land; and 3) the Plaintiffs did state a claim that was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings | Case |
| Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey | 201 F.3d 680 (C.A.5 (Tex.),2000) | 45 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1370, 28 Media L. Rep. 1481 |
Cattle ranchers in Texas sued the
The Oprah Winfrey Show
and one of its guests for knowingly and falsely depicting American beef as unsafe in the wake of the British panic over “Mad Cow Disease.” The matter was removed from state court to federal court. The federal district court granted summary judgment as a matter of law on all claims presented except the business disparagement cause of action, which was eventually rejected by a jury. The court alternately held that no knowingly false statements were made by the appellees. This court affirmed on this latter ground only, finding that the guest's statement and the producers' editing of the show did not violate the Texas False Disparagement of Perishable Food Products Act.
|
Case |
| Whittier Terrace Associates v. Hampshire | 532 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1989) |
Defendant was a person with a psychiatric disability and living in public housing. Defendant claimed to have an emotional and psychological dependence on her cat. The court held that the housing authority discriminated against defendant under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to waive the no pets policy as a reasonable accommodation for the mental disability. The court noted that there must be a narrow exception "to the rigid application of a no-pet rule, involving no untoward collateral consequences," because the handicapped person could fully receive the benefits of the program if provided the accommodation. |
Case | |
| Mitchell v. Snider | 41 N.Y.S.3d 450 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2016) | 51 Misc. 3d 1229(A); 2016 WL 3191291 | This is a case of an unmarried, co-habitating couple that jointly bought a dog and now dispute who should have the dog after the relationship has terminated. Mitchell brought this replevin action against his girlfriend, Snider, to recover possession of Django, their black lab. This court recognized the traditional way to treat such a case is to consider which party has superior possessory right to the dog. However, modern courts have started to recognize a special category of property in pets and have used a 'best for all concerned' analysis to decide who gets the animal. In this case, the court grants judgment for Snider in part because she had been solely responsible for the dog's care for the previous 20 months. No money was awarded to Mitchell because the expenses he paid were an expression of the parties' mutual love and desire to care for the dog. | Case |
| Geer v. Connecticut | 16 S.Ct. 600 (1896) (overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322) | 161 U.S. 519 (1896) |
Defendant was charged with the possession of game birds, for the purpose of transporting them beyond the state, which birds had been lawfully killed within the state. The sole issue which the case presents is, was it lawful, under the constitution of the United States (section 8, art. 1) (the Commerce Clause), for the state of Connecticut to allow the killing of birds within the state during a designated open season, to allow such birds, when so killed, to be used, to be sold, and to be bought for use, within the state, and yet to forbid their transportation beyond the state? The Court held that, aside from the authority of the state, derived from the common ownership of game, and the trust for the benefit of its people which the state exercises in relation thereto, there is another view of the power of the state in regard to the property in game, which is equally conclusive. The right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the state of a police power to that end, which may be none the less efficiently called into play, because, by doing so, interstate commerce may be remotely and indirectly affected. This decision was later overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322. |
Case |
| Viilo v. Eyre | 547 F.3d 707 (C.A.7 (Wis.),2008) | 2008 WL 4694917 |
Virginia Viilo sued the City of Milwaukee and two of its police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after an officer shot and killed her dog 'Bubba.' The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and the defendants took an interlocutory appeal challenging this denial. The court found that defendants' interjection of factual disputes deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court further held that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to shoot and kill a companion dog that poses no imminent danger while the dog’s owner is present and trying to assert custody over her pet. |
Case |