Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| James v. RSPCA | EWHC 1642 | Defendant was charged with unnecessary suffering towards three horses found in terrible conditions. It was held that where a protected animal is found in distress, a veterinarian's certificate need not be in writing for a constable or inspector to exercise powers under Section 18 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (namely seizure and detention). Oral certification of suffering will suffice in certain circumstances, for example where the protected animal requires urgent treatment and there is not sufficient time to produce a written certificate. | Case | |
| MD - Prince George's County - Breed - § 3-185.01 Pit Bull Terriers. | PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., §§ 3-101, 3-116.01, 3-185.01 (1997) |
Prince George's County, Maryland prohibits owning or keeping a Pit Bull Terrier with exceptions. If the person owned the dog prior to November 1, 1996, then s/he may continue to keep it if s/he complies with certain conditions, such as registering it with the Administrator of Animal Control and keeping an ID tag on the dog and keeping the dog inside or on a secure leash. Show dogs are allowed into the county on a temporary basis. Dogs that have been trained for security, search and rescue, or for police or fire services are exempt. A violation of this ordinance may result in a fine of up to $1,000 or be sentenced to up to 6 months in prison. In addition, if a Pit Bull injures or kills a person or a domestic animal without provocation, then it will be destroyed. |
Local Ordinance | |
| HI - Shark fins; prohibited - Chapter 188. Fishing Rights and Regulations. | H R S § 188-40.7 | HI ST § 188-40.7 | Hawaii passed this law in 2010 prohibiting the sale, trade, or distribution of shark fins. Prior to July 1, 2011, any restaurant holding a valid certificate, permit, or license issued by the department of health may possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute shark fins possessed by that restaurant as of July 1, 2010 which are prepared for consumption. Any person violating this section or any rule adopted pursuant to this section incurs an administrative fine of not less than $5,000 and not more than $15,000 for first offense. The fine then increases to $15,000 - $35,000 for a second offense, and $35,000 - 50,000 or imprisonment for up to 1 year, or both, for a third or subsequent offense. | Statute |
| GALBREATH v. THE STATE | 213 Ga. App. 80 (1994) |
The police found marijuana seedlings and plants in various stages of growth around the homes of defendant and co-defendant. The court upheld the trial court's determination that the items were admissible within the "plain view" exception to the requirement of a search warrant. The court concluded that the police were not trespassers when they walked around to the back of co-defendant's house to determine whether anyone was home after receiving no response at the front door. |
Case | |
| Flanders v. Goodfellow | --- N.E.3d ----, 2025 WL 1127772 (N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025) | 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 02261, No. 29, 2025 WL 1127772 (N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025) | This landmark decision fundamentally reshapes New York's dog bite jurisprudence by overturning Bard v. Jahnke and reinstating negligence as a viable cause of action for injuries caused by domestic animals. The Court held that Bard's strict liability framework, which required proof of an owner's actual or constructive knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities, created an unfair exception to ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable in practice. Recognizing that most jurisdictions permit negligence claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 509 and 518, the Court established a dual-path system: plaintiffs may now pursue either strict liability (if vicious propensities are shown) or traditional negligence claims against animal owners. The decision also reversed summary judgment on plaintiff's strict liability claim, finding triable issues regarding whether defendants should have known of their dog's aggressive tendencies based on postal workers' affidavits describing the animal's repeated violent window-banging behavior. The Court's disposition reversed the Appellate Division's order and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety, reinstating both causes of action. | Case |
| Whaling in the Antarctic | Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), 2010 Judgment. | In June 2010, Australia commenced proceedings against Japan at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging that Japan has continued an extensive whaling program in breach of its obligations as a signatory to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). At issue was the moratorium on commercial whaling agreed upon in the 1980s. According to Australia, though Japan claimed to be killing whales purely for scientific reasons, the true purpose of the program was commercial. Japan did not deny that it was killing whales in the Antarctic, but claimed instead that because the ICRW grants each nation state the right to issue licenses for scientific whaling as it sees fit, Japan’s whaling program was legal. The ICJ ruled that Japan's Antarctic whaling program was not actually for scientific whaling and must end. | Case | |
| Wallen v. City of Mobile | --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 3803749 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2018) | Wallen appeals her convictions for six counts of violating Mobile, Alabama's public nuisance ordinances. The nuisance convictions stem from an anonymous complaint about multiple barking dogs at Wallen's property. After receiving the tip in March of 2016, an animal control officer drove to the residence, parked across the street, and, as he sat in his car, heard dogs bark continuously for approximately ten minutes. That same day, a local realtor went to house that was for sale behind Wallen's property and heard an "overwhelming" noise of dogs barking continuously for 30-45 minutes. For almost a year, officers received complaints about noise coming from Wallen's house. In May of 2017, Wallen entered a plea of not guilty for multiple charges of violating the public nuisance ordinance in Mobile Circuit Court. She also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Mobile City Code was unconstitutionally vague. Her motion was later denied, and a jury trial was held where Wallen was found guilty of six counts of violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance. On appeal, Wallen first argues that the public nuisance ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulates without reference to time, place, and manner. However, the court found that Wallen did not establish how the overbreadth doctrine applied to her case and how the ordinance was unconstitutional. As to her next vagueness challenge, Wallen contended that the ordinance had no objective standards to determine whether a dog's barking is disturbing or unreasonable. This court disagreed, finding the statute defines what are "disturbing noises" (which specifically states barking), and other courts previously established that the term "habit" in a dog-barking statute is not vague. Finally, the found that Wallen's last general argument, that the code is unconstitutional as applied to her, did not satisfy court rules with respect to issues presented and support with authority on appeal. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. | Case | |
| MO - Dog Ordinances - Chapter 77. Third Class Cities. | V.A.M.S. 77.510 | MO ST 77.510 | This Missouri statute provides that a city council may tax, restrain and prohibit the running at large of dogs, and provide for their destruction when at large contrary to ordinance, and impose penalties on the owners or keepers thereof. | Statute |
| In re Marriage of Piskalns | Unpublished Disposition, 344 Mont. 555, 186 P.3d 877 (Table) (2008) | 2008 WL 2441361 | The parties both appealed from the district court’s orders distributing the marital estate upon the parties’ divorce. Kara Pilskalns claimed that the court erred when it granted ownership of Maggie, the couple’s dog, to Andrew Pilskalns. This court affirms the decision, declining to use the best interest of the child standard for the distribution of pets as they are marital property. | Case |
| Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. | 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) | 59 ERC 1110, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,068, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7152, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9715 |
This is a record review case in which the Appellants, an assortment of environmental organizations, challenge six biological opinions (BiOps) issued by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The BiOps in question allowed for timber harvests in specified Northwest forests and also authorized incidental "takes" of the Northern spotted owl, a threatened species under the ESA. With regard to appellants' challenge of the jeopardy analysis under the ESA, the court concluded that the jeopardy analysis conducted by the FWS in the six BiOps at issue in this case was permissible and within the agency's discretion. However, the critical habitat analysis in the six BiOps was fatally flawed because it relied on an unlawful regulatory definition of "adverse modification." The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case to the district court to grant summary judgment to the Petitioners on the critical habitat inquiry. |
Case |