Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New Hampshire Revised Statutes 1843: Offences Against Chastity, Decency and Morality | N.H. Rev. Stat. ch. 219 § 12 (1843) | Section 12 of Chapter 219 from New Hampshire Revised Statutes of 1843 covers cruelty to animals. Specifically, the statutes states what qualifies as cruelty to animals and the punishment for it. | Statute | ||
| NE - Disaster - Nebraska Emergency Operations Plan | 2014 SEOP | The Nebraska Emergency Management Agency creates the State Emergency Operations Plan (SEOP). According to the NEMA website, "[t]his State Emergency Operations Plan establishes the policies, plans, guidelines and procedures that will allow all our emergency resources to function effectively, as a team, when disaster strikes. In content and in format, the Plan is consistent with the current nationwide concept embodied in the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) in that the Plan provides for performing specific functions across the full spectrum of hazards. Most tasks and capabilities apply across a broad range of hazards. By treating them in that manner we show an integrated approach to disaster management. Unique aspects of certain hazards are addressed separately, where necessary. Therefore, this is truly a multi-hazard functional plan." | Administrative | ||
| Henry v. Zurich American Ins. Co. | 2012-888 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 107 So. 3d 874 | 107 So.3d 874 (La.App. 3 Cir., 2013) | This case concerns whether a veterinarian committed malpractice during the performance of a minor surgical procedure on a racing horse that led to the death of that horse. The owners of that racing horse filed suit against the veterinarian, veterinary clinic, and insurer of the clinic, seeking damages for the death of the racing horse. The trial court held in favor of the defendants, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the court found no error in the trial court's reasoning when issuing the judgment in favor of defendants, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. | Case | |
| State v. Abdi-Issa | 504 P.3d 223 (2022) | 199 Wash.2d 163 (Wash., 2022) | The Washington Supreme Court examined whether the trial court correctly considered whether animal cruelty may be designated as a crime of domestic violence. The incident stems from an evening after defendant insisted on taking his girlfriend's dog, a small Chihuahua and Dachshund mix, for a walk. The girlfriend testified that defendant had a history of disliking the dog and had previously threatened to kill both her and her dog. On that evening, two witnesses heard "a sound of great distress" and saw defendant making "brutal stabbing" motions toward the dog and then saw him kick the dog so hard that she flew into the air. After the witnesses called the police, the witnesses found the dog, still alive, in the bushes. Officers then transported the dog to a veterinary clinic where the dog subsequently died. One of the two witnesses had a panic attack at the scene and testified later that she continued to have panic attacks thereafter with flashbacks of the experience. Defendant was charged with first degree animal cruelty with a domestic violence designation and also two sentencing aggravators. The jury found defendant guilty of animal cruelty. The jury also found that Abdi-Issa and Fairbanks were in a domestic relationship prior to the crime, which allowed for a domestic violence designation. The jury returned mixed verdicts on the sentencing aggravators, finding that the crime involved a destructive and foreseeable impact on persons other than the victim, but they did not find that it manifested deliberate cruelty or intimidation of the victim. The court then imposed the maximum 12-month sentence for the crime of animal cruelty and an additional 6-month sentence for the aggravator. On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the domestic violence designation and the impact on others sentence aggravator. On appeal here, the Supreme Court found that animal cruelty could be designated a crime of domestic violence. The statute defining domestic violence has a non-exhaustive list of what crimes can constitute domestic violence. While animal cruelty is not listed, the court found that testimony of defendant's prior controlling behavior coupled with research showing how abusers use violence toward their victims' pets to manipulate and terrorize victims was sufficient. As to the sentencing aggravator, the court found that defendant's actions had a destructive and foreseeable impact on the witnesses who saw the animal cruelty. Thus, under these facts, the Court ruled that animal cruelty can be designated a crime of domestic violence and that the jury was properly instructed that it could find the impact on others sentencing aggravator. The judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. | Case | |
| Katsaris v. Cook | 225 Cal.Rptr. 531 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., 1986) |
Plaintiff's neighbor, a livestock rancher, shot plaintiff's sheepdogs after they escaped and trespassed on his property. As a matter of first impression, the court construed the California Food and Agricultural Code provision that allows one to kill a dog that enters an enclosed or unenclosed livestock confinement area with threat of civil or criminal penalty. The court affirmed defendant's motion with regard to the code provision, finding it gave them a privilege to kill the trespassing dogs. Further, the court found defendants owed no duty to plaintiff thereby denying the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of negligence in supervising the ranchhand who killed the dogs. With regard to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, plaintiffs cite the manner in which the dogs were killed and then dumped in a ditch and the fact defendant denied knowing the fate of the dogs. Relying on the "extreme and outrageous conduct" test, the court held that the defendant's conduct did not fall within the statutory privilege and remanded the issue to the trial court for consideration. |
Case | ||
| Friedli v. Kerr | 2001 WL 177184 (Tenn. 2001) |
This case involves two passengers who were injured when the horse-drawn carriage that they were riding in turned over after the horse was startled and the driver lost control of the horse. The trial court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the defendant’s carriage business was not immune from liability to its passengers under Tennessee’s equine liability statute. There were three reasons for this decision: 1) the defendant is not an “equine activity sponsor,” 2) his business is not an “equine activity,” and 3) the plaintiffs were not “participants” engaging in an “equine activity” when they were injured. |
Case | ||
| Animal Legal Defense Fund; Animal Welfare Institute; Valerie Buchanan; Jane Garrison; Nancy Megna, plaintiffs-appellants v. Ann | In this federal action, plaintiffs (ALDF, the AWI, and three individuals) challenged the USDA's decision not to adopt a Draft Policy that would have provided guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other regulated entities in how to ensure the psychological well-being of on-human primates in order to comply with the Animal Welfare Act. While the district court found that the USDA's decision did not constitute a reviewable final agency decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the lower court did indeed have authority under the Administrative Procedures Act to review the agency's decision not to create a policy. On June 4, 2007, the Court vacated the previous opinion and dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Two judges wrote separate opinions, concurring and dissenting in part. | Pleading | |||
| VA - Liens - § 43–32 Lien of keeper of livery stable, marina, etc. | Va. Code Ann. § 43-32 | VA Code Ann. § 43-32 | Every keeper of a livery stable, hangar, tie-down, or marina, and every person pasturing or keeping any horses or other animals, boats, aircrafts, or harness, will have a lien for the amount that would be due for towing, storage, recovery, keeping, supporting, and care. The lien will be removed once the amount is paid. | Statute | |
| Ammon v. Welty | 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.,2002) |
In this Kentucky case, the plaintiffs brought an action against the county dog warden for shooting their dog. Before the statutorily imposed 7-day waiting limit had expired, the warden euthanized the dog by shooting him in the head. The Court of Appeals held that while a family dog can be beloved by a family, loss of the pet does not support an action for loss of consortium. Further, the dog warden was not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress because his actions did not rise to the outrageous level where the dog was not shot in the presence of the family and there was no evidence that Brewer intended to inflict emotional harm. |
Case | ||
| AZ - Microchip - 44-8021. Dog or cat possession; microchip scan; owner notification; definition | A. R. S. § 44-8021 | AZ ST § 44-8021 | This Arizona law from 2022 requires an animal shelter to thoroughly scan for the presence of a microchip in the dog or cat and make a reasonable effort to contact the owner after taking possession of a dog or cat. | Statute |