Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Chenault | 227 Cal. App. 4th 1503, review filed (Aug. 25, 2014) | 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal.App.Dist.4, 2014), review filed (Aug. 25, 2014) | Darrell Chenault was convicted on 13 counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age and sentenced to 75 years to life in prison. On appeal he contended that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a support dog to be present during the testimony of two child witnesses without individualized showings of necessity, and that the presence of the dog was inherently prejudicial and violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against him. The appellate court concluded that a trial court has authority under Evidence Code section 765 to allow the presence of a therapy or support dog during a witness’s testimony.” The court did “not believe that the presence of a support dog is inherently more prejudicial than the presence of a support person,” citing the New York case of Tohom. Chinault argued that “individualized showings of necessity” should have been required for F. and C. before the support dog could be present in the courtroom. The appellate court concluded however that “a case-specific finding that an individual witness needs the presence of a support dog is not required by the federal Constitution,” for which Tohom was again cited. Based on the court's review of the record, the appellate court concluded that the trial court made implicit findings that the presence of Asta, the support dog, would assist or enable F. and C. to testify completely and truthfully without undue harassment or embarrassment. The court also took measures to reduce any possible prejudice to Chenault by setting forth logistics for the entry, positioning, and departure of the support dog, along with F. and C., during jury recesses so the dog was as unobtrusive and least disruptive as reasonably possible. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| US - Marine Mammals - Feeding Populations of Marine Mammals in the Wild | 1991 WL 301955 (F.R.) | Docket No. 900807-1050 |
NMFS is issuing a final rule that amends the definition of "take" under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to include feeding marine mammals in the wild, and adds a new definition of "feeding." As a result, feeding dolphins, porpoise, whales, seals and sea lions in the wild will be prohibited unless the feeding is incidental to another activity such as the routine discard of fish bycatch or discharges from processing plants or vessels. |
Administrative | |
| FL - Rehabilitation, wildlife - 68A-9.006. Wildlife Rehabilitation Permit. | 68 FL ADC 68A-9.006 | Rule 68A-9.006, F.A.C. | This Florida regulation sets forth the requirements to obtain a permit for wildlife rehabilitation. | Administrative | |
| US - AWA - 1966 Public Law 89-544 | 1966 PL 89-544 |
As stated in Senate Report No. 1280 there were three main purposes for the proposed law in 1966: (1) to protect the owners of pet dogs and cats from the theft of their pets; (2) to prevent the use or sale of stolen dogs or cats for purposes of research or experimentation; and (3) to establish humane standards for the treatment of dogs, cats, and certain other animals by animal dealers and research facilities. |
Statute | ||
| Bogart v. Chapell | 396 F.3d 548 (4th Cir., 2005) |
A woman was housing hundreds of animals in her residential home, the animals were seized and more than two hundred of them were euthanized. The woman brought a section 1983 claim against the county sheriff's department and human society. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed holding no viable due process claim existed arising from the euthanization. |
Case | ||
| Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman | 101 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.,2000) |
In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA. |
Case | ||
| CO - Restaurant - 25-4-1615. Pet dogs in retail food establishments | C.R.S.A. § 25-4-1615 | CO ST § 25-4-1615 | This 2020 Colorado law allows a person to have a pet dog in an outdoor dining area of a retail food establishment if several conditions are met (including, but not limited to, the presence of a separate entrance for the dogs and their owners, requiring owners to keep dogs on leashes or in pet carriers, and not allowing the dogs on furniture or fixtures). The law allows a retail food establishment to elect not to allow dogs in its outdoor dining area. In addition, the governing body of a city, county, or city and county may prohibit the presence of pet dogs in outdoor dining areas of retail food establishments located within the governing body's jurisdiction | Statute | |
| MA - Disaster Planning - Massachusetts Emergency Animal Annex | Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) | The Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) is an all hazards plan developed to address the natural and man-caused hazards that threaten Massachusetts. The CEMP and ESF Annexes describes the system that will be used in Massachusetts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from an emergency or disaster. It also identifies and assigns specific areas of responsibility for coordinating resources to support the response to an emergency or disaster. The Massachusetts Emergency Support Function 11 (MAESF-11) Agriculture, Animals and Natural Resources provides a framework for coordination and cooperation across state agencies and other organizations regarding the control and support of animal sheltering, search, rescue, recovery, and reunification needs and activities before, during, and after a disaster, or emergency. | Administrative | ||
| MX - Bird - Parrot Ban in Spanish (DECREE by which article 60 2 to the General Law of Wildlife) | artículo 60 Bis 2 a la Ley General de Vida Silvestre |
(Text of law in Spanish). The ban prohibits the capture, export and import of 22 Mexican parrot species. The ban on imports was needed because most species are shared with Central and South American countries and many were being imported and used as cover up for illegal trade. The ban was approved by Congress last April by consensus and it was originally drafted after a presentation of a 2007 report, "The Illegal Parrot Trade in Mexico: A Comprehensive Assessment." The report revealed for the first time the volume of the illegal trade of parrots within Mexico. An estimated 65,000 -78,500 wild parrots and macaws are captured illegally each year, with more than 75 percent of the birds dying before ever reaching a purchaser. The measure was passed in late October of 2008. |
Statute | ||
| Jaeger v. Cellco Partnership | Slip Copy, 2010 WL 965730 (D.Conn.,2010) |
The Connecticut Siting Council granted Cellco Partnership a Certificate allowing the company to build a cell tower in Falls Village, Connecticut. Dina Jaeger brought suit against Cellco and the Council to prevent the building of the cell tower. In her complaint, Jaeger cited the harmful effects of radio frequency emissions (RF emissions), and alleged violations of the International Migratory Bird Treaty, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), the Telecommunications Act (TCA), and the 10 th and 14 th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants moved to dismiss Jaeger's claims on various grounds, including that the Council was preempted from considering the environmental effects of RF emissions under the TCA. The Court found in favor of the Defendants, holding that the TCA preempts local and state regulation of cell towers solely on the basis of RF emissions. |
Case |