Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| City of Sausalito v. O'Neill | 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) | 386 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) |
A City sought to prevent the National Park Service from implementing a development plan in a nearby recreational area claiming the Park service had violated various environmental statutes. The trial court held the City did not have standing to assert most of its claims and lost on the merits of the remaining claims. The Court of Appeals held the City did have standing to assert all of its claims, but lost on the merits of all its claims except those under the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. |
Case | |||||||
| US - Whales - Proposed Threatened Status for Southern Resident Killer Whales | FR Doc. 04-27929 |
We, the NMFS, have completed an update on the status review of Southern Resident killer whales (Orcinus orca) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Based on the review of the best available scientific and commercial information, including new data, published papers, and workshop reports available since the review in 2002, we are proposing to list the Southern Resident killer whales as threatened because these killer whales constitute a distinct population segment (DPS) under the ESA and are likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of their range. We are not proposing to designate critical habitat at this time, but are requesting public comments on the issues pertaining to this proposed rule. |
Administrative | ||||||||
| Com. v. Kneller | 971 A.2d 495 (Pa.Super.,2009) | 2009 WL 215322 (Pa.Super.), 2009 PA Super 18 | Defendant appealed a conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after Defendant provided a gun and instructed her boyfriend to shoot and kill their dog after the dog allegedly bit Defendant’s child. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction, finding the relevant animal cruelty statute to be ambiguous, thus requiring the reversal under the rule of lenity. Concurring and dissenting opinions were filed, in which both agreed that the statute is unambiguous as to whether a dog owner may destroy his or her dog by use of a firearm when that dog has attacked another person, but disagreed as to whether sufficient evidence was offered to show that the dog in fact attacked another person. (See Supreme Court order - Com. v. Kneller, 978 A.2d 716, 2009 WL 5154265 (Pa.,2009)). | Case | |||||||
| Constitutional Law of Human Rights and its Guarantees of Mexico City | Ley Constitucional de Derechos Humanos y sus Garantías de la Ciudad de México | This 2019 law is a secondary law that regulates the application of the constitutional mandate that the Mexico City government guarantees the fulfillment of the more than fifty fundamental rights established in the Constitution. This law addresses the issue of animal protection, specifically in Article 95. Article 95 states that animal protection shall be guaranteed in the broadest way to provide a livable city and seek people's fulfillment of the right to a healthy environment. | Statute | ||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 7 Núm 2 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| Rowlette v. Paul | 466 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 1995) | 219 Ga.App. 597 (Ga. 1995) | This Georgia case involved a dog bite to a person who went to went to the Pauls' house in order to verify and update information for the Oglethorpe County Tax Assessor's Office. The court held that in the absence of any evidence showing that the owners of a dog had knowledge, prior to a mauling incident, that their dog had ever bitten another human being, the owners of the dog were not liable to the victim even though the dog's presence on the premises where the incident occurred was in violation of the county leash law. In order to support an action for damages under OCGA § 51-2-7, it is necessary to show that the dog was vicious or dangerous and that the owner had knowledge of this fact. | Case | |||||||
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert | This complaint launches the first legal challenge to any ag-gag law in the United States. In it, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Amy Meyer, and others argue that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-112 is unconstitutionally overbroad, constitutes content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, is preempted by the federal False Claims Act, and violates animal protection groups’ equal protection and due process. | Pleading | |||||||||
| Liotta v. Segur | Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 728829 (Conn.Super.), 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 621 (Conn.Super.,2004) |
In this unreported Connecticut case, a dog owner sued a groomer for negligent infliction of emotional distress, alleging that the groomer negligently handled her very large dog when he removed it from her vehicle with “excessive force.” This resulted in a leg fracture, that, after lengthy and expensive care, ultimately resulted in the dog's euthanization. The court held that plaintiff failed to adequately plead a case for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but said in dicta that the results might be different for a pet owner who proves intentional infliction of emotional distress. Motion for summary judgment as against plaintiff's count two is granted. |
Case | ||||||||
| Johnson v. Douglas | 734 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Mem) (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2001) | 289 A.D.2d 202 (2001) |
Plaintiff appealed an order denying her claim to emotional distress damages presumably for the death of her dog. The court held that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent killing of a dog. |
Case | |||||||
| Daniels v. Drake | 195 N.E.3d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), transfer denied, 208 N.E.3d 1250 (Ind. 2023) | Plaintiff Damon Daniels appeals from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Drakes. The incident stems from an unprovoked dog bite at defendants' home. The Drakes live on a large, rural property in Indiana with no neighbors. The Drakes own five dogs including "Max," a large Great Dane. Max would roam the property unrestrained. Daniels is a FedEx driver. In September of 2020, Daniels entered the property to deliver a package. Upon approaching the residence, Daniels honked his horn a couple times to get the attention of Lisa Drake. Daniels, who was still inside the vehicle, asked Lisa if Max was "okay," to which Lisa indicated a "thumbs up." However, after walking toward Lisa with the package, Max barked once and then bit Daniels in the abdomen. Daniels sustained puncture wounds, a one-centimeter laceration, swelling and a hematoma from the bite. Approximately two months later, Daniels filed the instant complaint seeking damages related to the dog bite. The Drakes filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that they did not have actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities prior to the bite. In response, Daniels contended that Great Danes have a "natural propensity" to be territorial, which is exacerbated by isolation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal here, the court explained that Indiana law states that knowledge of a dog's dangerous or vicious tendencies may not be inferred from a first-time, unprovoked bite, but that knowledge may be inferred where evidence shows that the particular breed to which the owner's dog belongs is known to exhibit such tendencies." While the court observed that the Drakes presented evidence of a lack of actual knowledge of Max's vicious propensities, the expert who testified on Great Dane behavior presented evidence that Great Danes might behave with "territorial aggressive tendencies" in a given situation. The Drakes argued on appeal (for the first time) that this evidence by a canine behavioral expert was "immaterial" and cannot be used to show what lay people would know about Great Danes. The court was unpersuaded by the Drakes' novel argument, and this created a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, this court reversed the order granting summary judgment for the Drakes and remanded the case for further proceedings. | Case |