Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NV - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | N. R. S. 574.010 to 574.550; N.R.S. 202.487; N.R.S. 201.455 | NV ST 574.010 to 574.550; N.R.S. 202.487 | This comprehensive section comprises the Nevada anti-cruelty statutes. The section first empowers private prevention of cruelty to animals societies and outlines their powers and responsibilities, including the power to arrest. Under this section, "animal" does not include the human race, but includes every other living creature. Animal cruelty, as described in Section 574.100, prohibits the overdriving, overloading, torture, cruel beating or unjustifiable injuring, maiming, mutilation or killing of an animal, as well as the deprivation of necessary sustenance, food or drink. The first offense under this section is a misdemeanor with enhancement to a felony for a third or subsequent convictions. Animals fighting is also prohibited under the section, with enhanced sentences for subsequent convictions. Other specific crimes include mistreatment of dogs, abandonment of animals, poisoning (although the section does not prohibit the destruction of "noxious animals"), and basic requirements for the care of dogs and cats kept in kennels or sold by pounds or pet shops. | Statute |
| Storms v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. | 120 P.3d 126 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2005) | 129 Wash.App. 820; 31 NDLR P 98 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2005) |
This Washington discrimination case was brought by a dog owner (Storms) with psychiatric conditions against a store and its managers who refused to allow her to stay in store with her alleged service dog. The dog was trained to put herself between Storms and other people so as to keep an open area around Storms and alleviate her anxiety (a symptom of her post-traumatic stress syndrome). The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against Fred Meyer for refusing to allow her to shop accompanied by her dog. Testimony showed that Brandy had been specifically trained to help Storms with her particular disability by placing herself in between Storms and others in a way that alleviated her anxiety, which was further corroborated by testimony that Brandy engaged in such behavior. Thus, evidence showed that the defendants' violated RCW 49.60.215 by not allowing Storms to do her own shopping within the store because she was accompanied by a service animal. |
Case |
| SC - Exotic pets - Chapter 2. Large Wild Cats, Non-Native Bears and Great Apes | Code 1976 § 47-2-10 to 70 | This South Carolina chapter, effective January 1, 2018, makes it unlawful for a person to possess, keep, purchase, have custody or control of, breed, or sell within this State a large wild cat, non-native bear, or great ape, including transactions conducted via the Internet. A person in possession of such animal before January 1, 2018 who is the legal possessor of the animal may keep possession if he or she complies with seven conditions listed under Section 47-2-30. Authorities may confiscate large wild cats, non-native bears, or great apes held in violation of this chapter. Cities or counties may also adopt more restrictive ordinances than this chapter. A person who violates this chapter must be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 30 days for a first offense, and must be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than 90 days for a second offense. Exempted entities include certain non-profit animal protection organizations, university research labs holding Class R registration under the AWA, any person who possesses a valid USDA Class A, B, or C license in good standing, and circuses that are incorporated and hold a Class C license under the AWA that are temporarily in this State, among others. | Statute | |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-3. Prior ordinances preserved | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-3 | RI ST § 4-13-3 | This Rhode Island statute provides that nothing in the state laws concerning dogs shall be construed as to repeal any ordinance concerning dogs, which has been passed by any town or city council. | Statute |
| NC - Fur/Dealer Licenses - Chapter 113. Conservation and Development. | N.C.G.S.A. § 113-273 | NC ST § 113-273 | Defines "dealer" and all rules applicable to obtaining a dealer license. Defines "fur-dealer license" and "fur dealers" as those involved in the lawful buying and selling of wild animals or their skins, pelts, or fur. Defines "controlled hunting preserve operator licenses," "game bird propagation licenses," "furbearer propagation licenses" and "taxidermy licenses." | Statute |
| Schindler v. Mejias | 100 A.D.3d 1315 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 5950370 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 955 N.Y.S.2d 252 |
This appeal is an appeal of the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in a defamation action. Plaintiff, an attorney, brought an action against Hector L. Mejias Jr., an employee of defendant Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, claiming that Mejias falsely accused him of misrepresenting himself as the Ulster County District Attorney during a sworn deposition. The statement occurred during an incident at the SPCA where Plaintiff-Schindler was trying to pick up a dog owned by his client. The particular issue on appeal is whether the supreme court erred in determining that Mejias's supporting deposition constitutes libel per se. The court found that the alleged act was sufficiently egregious because such a claim would suggest professional misconduct on an attorney's part and invites both disciplinary action and damage to an attorney's professional reputation. Further, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing an absence of malice. The order was affirmed. |
Case |
| Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n | 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006) | 2006 WL 2009061 (Pa.Cmwlth.) |
A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order. |
Case |
| Carter v. Metro North Assocs. | 680 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) | 255 A.D.2d 251 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) | In this case, a tenant sued her landlord for injuries sustained when the tenant was bitten on the face by a pit bull owned by another tenant. The court held that before a pet owner, or the landlord of the building in which the pet lives, may be held strictly liable for an injury inflicted by the animal, the plaintiff must establish both (1) that the animal had vicious propensities and (2) that the defendant knew or should have known of the animal's propensities. In this case, there was no evidence that the pit bull had vicious propensities, nor did any of the evidence support a finding that the landlord had, or should have had, knowledge of any such propensities. The appellate court found the lower court erred when it took "judicial notice of the vicious nature of the breed as a whole." The court noted that there are alternate opinions and evidence that preclude taking judicial notice that pit bulls are inherently vicious as a breed. The trial court order was reversed, judgment for plaintiff vacated, and complaint dismissed. | Case |
| NY - Racing - § 220. Licenses for participants and employees at race meetings | McKinney's Racing, Pari Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 220 | NY RAC PARI-M § 220 | The state racing and wagering board issues licenses to owners, trainers, assistant trainers and jockeys, jockey agents, and stable employees for horse races, including steeplechases. | Statute |
| MI - Cruelty - 712A.18l. Juveniles, guilty of cruelty to animals or arson; court ordered psychiatric or psychological treatment | M. C. L. A. 712A.18l | MI ST 712A.18l | This statute provides that if a juvenile is found to be within the court's jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a violation of the Michigan penal code relating to either cruelty to animals or arson, the court shall order that the juvenile be evaluated to determine if he or she needs psychiatric or psychological treatment. If the court determines that psychiatric or psychological treatment is appropriate, the court may order that treatment in addition to any other treatments or penalties allowed by law. | Statute |