Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Spay, neuter - Chapter 4. Spay-Neuter Requirement for Animal Care Facilities | IC 15-20-4-1 - 5 | IN ST 15-20-4-1 - 5 | This Indiana chapter added in 2016 concerns the spay-neuter requirements for animal care facilities. Beginning July 1, 2021, except as provided in this chapter, a companion animal shall be spayed or neutered before adoption from an animal care facility. | Statute |
| WI - Hewitt - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance | HEWITT, WI., ORDINANCE NO. 18.01 § 5 |
In Hewitt, Wisconsin, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess a pitbull dog, with exceptions for dogs registered by the date the ordinance became effective. Such dogs may be kept subject to certain conditions, such as keeping the dog properly confined, using a leash and muzzle, posting "Beware of Dog" signs, and keeping $50,000 liability insurance. |
Local Ordinance | |
| RSPCA v. Stojcevski | 2002 WL 228890, 134 A Crim R 441 | 2002 SASC 39 |
Appeal against the order of the Magistrate dismissing a complaint - prevention of cruelty to animals - respondent charged with ill treating an animal in that failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate any pain suffered by the animal who had a fractured leg bone contrary to sec 13(1) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985. Dismissal was upheld and court found that defendant did not understand dog was in pain and had and was going to take reasonable steps. |
Case |
| Hoesch v. Broward County | 53 So.3d 1177 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 2011) | 2011 WL 408882 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
A Broward County, Florida ordinance defines a dangerous dog as “any dog that . . . [h]as killed or caused the death of a domestic animal in one incident.” Plaintiff Brian Hoesch’s dog escaped from Hoesch’s backyard and attacked and killed a neighbor’s cat. Prior to this incident, the dog had never been declared “dangerous” by any governmental authority. Hoesch requested a hearing after Broward’s animal control division notified Hoesch of its intent to destroy his dog. After a judgment in favor of Broward County, Hoesch contends that both county ordinances conflict with state law, section 767.11(1)(b), which defines a “dangerous dog” as any dog that “[h]as more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal . . . .” The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, concluded “that Broward County ordinance sections 4-2(k)(2) and 4-12(j)(2) are null and void insofar as they conflict with state law.” |
Case |
| U.S. v. Wahchumwah | 704 F.3d 606 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) | 2012 WL 5951624 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) |
After a government agent recorded a sale of eagle parts using a concealed audio visual device, the agent obtained a warrant and arrested the defendant for violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Upon appeal, the defendant challenged his jury conviction arguing two Constitutional violations, a Federal Rules of Evidence violation, and multiplicitous counts. The appeals court affirmed the jury conviction on all claims except the multiplicitous counts claim; this conviction was reversed. This opinion was Amended and Superseded on Denial of Rehearing by U.S. v. Wahchumwah , 710 F.3d 862 (9th Cir., 2012). |
Case |
| TX - Equine Activity Liability - Chapter 87. Liability Arising from Equine Activities or Livestock Shows. | V. T. C. A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 87.001 - 005 | TX CIV PRAC & REM § 87.001 - 005 | This Texas section provides that all persons, including a farm animal activity sponsor, farm animal professional, farm owner or lessee, livestock producer, livestock show participant, or livestock show sponsor, are not liable for property damage or damages arising from the personal injury or death of a participant in a farm animal activity or livestock show if the property damage, injury, or death results from the dangers or conditions that are an inherent risk of a farm animal, a farm animal activity, the showing of an animal on a competitive basis in a livestock show, or the raising or handling of livestock on a farm. The statute also requires the visible displaying of "clearly readable" warning signs that alert participants to the limitation of liability by law. | Statute |
| Peru - Wildlife - LEY 9147, 1949 | LEY 9147, 1949 | This law declares government protection over all the wild species of animals that are within the national territory. It also prohibits the hunting of vicuña, chinchilla and guanacu species. | Statute | |
| Hill v. Coggins | 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1003 (2018) | 2017 WL 3471259 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) | In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. | Case |
| AK - Unalaska - Title 12: Animal Control (Chapter: 12.04: Animal Control) | Unalaska Code of Ordinances §§ 12.04.020, 12.04.150, 12.04.160 | Under this Unalaska, Alaska ordinance, a person who owns a seeing-eye dog, a hearing aid dog, or other aid dog is exempt from the license fees. Furthermore, this ordinance exempts such dogs from provisions that prohibit animals from entering certain places as long as the owner carries proper documentation certified by a recognized aid dog institution. | Local Ordinance | |
| Texas Attorney General Opinion No. JC-0048 | Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. JC-0048 |
Texas Attorney General Opinion regarding the issue of whether city ordinances are preempted by statutes that govern the treatment of animals. Specifically, the opinion discusses pigeon shoots. The opinion emphasizes that organized pigeon shoots are prohibited under Texas cruelty laws but that present wildlife laws allow the killing of feral pigeons. |
Case |