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Displaying 81 - 90 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TRACKING THE ADC: RANCHERS' BOON, TAXPAYERS' BURDEN, WILDLIFE'S BANE | 3 Animal L. 163 (1997) | Approximately thirty-five million dollars are spent each year by the Animal Damage Control division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to destroy predator animals that supposedly kill livestock. The methods by which the ADC kills these “predators” are appalling. Mr. Hoch argues that funding for this program is excessive, irresponsible, and raises serious ethical questions. He concludes that ADC activities should be terminated immediately. | Article | |
| TX - Hunting - Subchapter B. Seasons and Limits. § 64.011. Eagle. | V. T. C. A., Parks & Wildlife Code § 64.011 | TX PARKS & WILD § 64.011 | This section of the Texas code prohibits the killing of a golden or Mexican brown eagle except by permit (refers to the permit to kill wildlife that is threatening agricultural interests or public safety). | Statute |
| People v. Zimberg | 33 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1948) | 321 Mich. 655 (Mich. 1948) |
Defendants were charged with having in their possession in the city of Detroit with intent to sell pikeperch (yellow pickerel) that were undersized, contrary to a Michigan statute. In response to defendants' challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, the court noted that it is universally held in this country that wild game and fish belong to the state and are subject to its power to regulate and control; that an individual may acquire only such limited or qualified property interest therein as the state chooses to permit. Defendants also contended the statute violated equal protection. The court disagreed, finding the argument is without foundation in fact, as the statute makes no discrimination. |
Case |
| RI - Education - § 16-22-20. Animal dissection and vivisection--Right to refuse--Alternate learning project required | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 16-22-20 | RI ST § 16-22-20 | This Rhode Island law provides that parents or legal guardians of any student in a public or nonpublic primary or secondary school may refuse to allow their child to dissect or vivisect any vertebrate or invertebrate animal, or any part of a vertebrate or invertebrate animal. Students who refuse shall not be discriminated against for not participating in dissection and shall be offered an alternative method of learning the material. | Statute |
| WI - Fur - 100.35. Furs to be labeled | W. S. A. 100.35 | WI ST 100.35 | This law represents Wisconsin's fur labeling law. The law states that no person shall sell or offer or display for sale any coat, jacket or other garment made wholly or partially of fur without a label that states in English the species of fur or pelt used. This section does not apply to such garments displayed, offered, or sold at a price of less than $50. | Statute |
| PA - Cruelty - Chapter 37. Humane Society Police Officers. | 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | PA ST 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | These statutes enable and regulate Pennsylvania's grant of police powers to humane society agents. Topics within these statutes include the appointment, termination, powers granted to, and training of humane society police officers. | Statute |
| Nikolic v. Seidenberg | 610 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) |
When the pet owner adopted a dog, she signed a contract agreeing to have her dog spayed at the vet's facility and to return the dog to the vet if it was sick. For days after the surgery the dog was ill so the other vet performed exploratory surgery and repaired a cut in the dog's intestine. The pet owner filed an action to recover the medical expenses and the lower court granted the vet's motion to dismiss. The reviewing court held that the language in the contract was not sufficiently clear and explicit to exculpate the vet from negligence because the vet was not a party to the contract and thus not a direct beneficiary of the contract. |
Case | |
| CASO 02437-2013 JANE MARGARITA CÓSAR CAMACHO Y OTROS CONTRA RESOLUCION DE FOJAS 258 | CASO 02437-2013 | Plaintiff, a blind woman, brought a constitutional grievance against the decision issued by the Fifth Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima on January 15, 2013. This decision denied the action of protection after Defendants denied entry of Plaintiff's guide dog at their supermarkets. The Constitutional Tribunal ordered that the blind were allow to enter to the supermarkets with their guide dogs. | Case | |
| Hill v. Coggins | 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1003 (2018) | 2017 WL 3471259 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) | In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. | Case |
| UT - Hunting - § 23-20-29. Interference with hunting prohibited--Action to recover damages--Exceptions | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-321 - 322 (formerly U.C.A. 1953 § 23-20-29, 23-20-29.5) | UT ST § 23A-5-321 - 322 (formerly UT ST § 23-20-29, 23-20-29.5) | This section reflects Utah's hunter harassment provisions. A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who intentionally interferes with the right of a person, licensed and legally hunting, to take wildlife by driving, harassing, or intentionally disturbing any species of wildlife for the purpose of disrupting a legal hunt, trapping, or predator control. A person adversely affected, or the state, may bring a civil action for damages resulting from the violation or a seek a restraining order. This section does not apply to incidental interference with a hunt caused by lawful activities including, but not limited to, ranching, mining, and recreation. | Statute |