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Displaying 21 - 30 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Chimpanzees - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for Chimpanzee and Pygmy Chimpanzee | 1990 WL 325467 (F.R.) | 50 CFR Part 17 RIN 1018-AB23 |
The Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) reclassifies wild populations of the chimpanzee and all populations of the pygmy chimpanzee from threatened to endangered status. Both species have declined through such problems as massive habitat destruction, excessive hunting and capture by people, and lack of effective national and international controls. This rule will enhance the protection of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, for these species. Captive populations of the chimpanzee will continue to be classified as threatened, and individuals of that species in the United States will continue to be covered by a special regulation allowing activities otherwise prohibited. |
Administrative | |
| CA - Circus - § 25989.1. Notice to animal control services agency of performances to be conducted | West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25989.1 | CA HLTH & S § 25989.1 | This California section provides that any traveling circus or carnival must notify entity that provides animal control services for a city, county, or city and county in which the traveling circus or carnival intends to perform of its intent to perform within that jurisdiction at least 14 days prior to the first performance in that city, county, or city and county. Violation results in a fine of $500 - 2,000 for a first violation, and $1,500 - 5,000 for any subsequent violation. | Statute | |
| New York Penal Law 1866: Chapter 682: Section 2 | N.Y. Rev. Stat. 682.2 (1866) | Chapter 682 from New York Penal Law of 1866 covers cruelty to animals. Section 2 from this chapter describes the offense entitled neglect of disabled animals. The law states the penalty for leaving a disabled or diseased animal to die on any state or city land. | Statute | ||
| Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin | 740 F.Supp. 1400 (W.D.Wis. 1990) |
Action was brought to determine Indian tribe members' rights related to off-reservation hunting of white-tailed deer, fisher and other furbearing animals, and small game within the area of the state ceded to the United States by the plaintiff tribes. The Court held that Indians and non-Indians were each entitled to one half of game harvest within each harvesting area rather than as a whole territory to accommodate the longer Indian hunting season. With regard to hunting on private land in the ceded area, the Court held that plaintiffs' members have no more rights than non-Indian hunters to hunt or to trap on private lands, as tribal members who are hunting or trapping on private lands are still subject to state hunting and trapping regulations. The Court also held that the state could properly prohibit Indians from hunting deer during the summer and at night due to the safety risk to humans. |
Case | ||
| C., M. M. M. s/ Denuncia Maltrato Animal; seguidos contra E. P. S., D.N.I. N° X- Causa Tita | Fallo 481/2021 | This court decision has two important aspects, where the judge recognizes families as multispecies, and non-human animals as sentient beings and subjects of rights. The facts of this case arose from a fatal encounter between the police officer and "Tita," a Pitbull-mix family dog, in March 2020 in the Province of Chubut in Argentina. "Tita" attacked an on-duty police officer, and, when Tita was walking away, the officer shot her in front of her family. The injury was so severe that Tita had to ultimately be put down. The judge, in this case, found that Tita was a non-human person and a daughter to her human family, as she and other companion animals had adapted so well to the family life, that it had turned the family into a multispecies one. Therefore, the loss of Tita was an irreparable one. The judge further stated that in today's world animals are not "things," they are sentient beings and they have the right that their life is respected. The holding of the court was also based on the case of Sandra, the orangutan, and the Universal declaration of animal rights. The police officer was sentenced to one year of suspended imprisonment, professional disqualification for two years, and to pay the attorney and court fees for the crimes of abuse of authority and damages. However, he was acquitted of the animal cruelty charges. Update: In September 2022, the Chubut's criminal chamber of the Superior Court of Justice (the highest tribunal in the province) heard the case on appeal. The court affirmed the verdict of the Trelew’s criminal chamber that set aside the guilty verdict entered against the police officer. The highest tribunal found that, at the incident, Tita was unleashed and unmuzzled. Also, she was aggressive toward the officer, barking and charging at him before he shot her. The tribunal concluded that the officer found himself in imminent danger, which justified his actions, and therefore, he was not guilty as he acted to defend himself. The tribunal found that Sandra's case and the Universal declaration of animal rights did not apply to Tita's case because there were circumstances in which it is necessary to end the life of an animal, and Sandra’s case was brought up as a habeas corpus on behalf of a hominid primate. The recognition of “subject of rights” was granted to Sandra based on the genetic similarity of her species to humans, which is 97%, as opposed to canines’ which is only 75%. It is important to note that the tribunal did not say anything in regard to the status of Tita as a member of her multispecies family. | Case | ||
| Blankenship v. Commonwealth | 838 S.E.2d 568 (2020) | 71 Va.App. 608 (Va.App., 2020) | Brandon Scott Blankenship showed up at Wally Andrews’ home although Blankenship had previously been ordered not to come onto Andrews’ property. Blankenship stood outside on Andrews’ property and continued to curse at Andrews and threaten to kill him. Andrews called law enforcement and when they arrived, Blankenship continued his cursing and yelling at the officers. Every time the officers attempted to arrest Blankenship he would ball up his fists and take a fighting stance towards the officers. At some point the officers released a police K-9 named Titan after Blankenship took off running. Blankenship kicked and punched Titan until he backed off. Titan ended up with a digestive injury in which he would not eat and seemed lethargic. Blankenship was indicted for three counts of assault and battery on a law enforcement officer, one count of assault on a law enforcement animal, one count of assault and battery, one count of obstruction of justice, and one count of animal cruelty. The Court struck one count of assault and battery on a law enforcement officer, the count of assault on a law enforcement animal, and the count of obstruction to justice. Blankenship was convicted of the remaining four counts and he appealed assigning error to the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. The Court found that Blankenship’s overt acts demonstrated that he intended to place the law enforcement officers in fear of bodily harm which in turn caused the officers to actually and reasonably fear bodily harm. The totality of the circumstances supported Blankenship’s conviction of assault and battery on both the law enforcement officers and Andrews. As for the animal cruelty conviction, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence from which the circuit court could find that Blankenship voluntarily acted with a consciousness that inhumane injury or pain would result from punching and kicking Titan. Blankenship had no right to resist the lawful arrest and his actions against Titan were not necessary, therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support Blankenship’s conviction for animal cruelty. The Court ultimately affirmed and remanded the case. | Case | |
| AZ - Initiatives - Proposition 109 (right to hunt and fish) | Proposition 109 (2010) | Proposition 109 would have amended the Arizona Constitution. It failed with only 43.5% voting "yes" for the measure. The proposition stated that: 1. Wildlife is held in trust for the citizens of this state, whom have a right to lawfully hunt, fish and harvest the wildlife. 2. The legislature has the exclusive authority to enact laws to regulate hunting, fishing and harvesting of wildlife. The legislature may grant rule making authority to a game and fish commission. No law or rule shall unreasonably restrict hunting, fishing or harvesting of wildlife or the use of traditional means and methods for those activities. Any law or rule shall have the purpose of wildlife conservation and management and preserving the future of hunting and fishing. 3. Lawful public hunting and fishing are the preferred means of managing and controlling wildlife. By its terms, nothing in Proposition 109 shall be construed to modify any law relating to trespass or property rights. | Statute | ||
| WI - Ordinances - 59.54. Public protection and safety | W. S. A. 59.54 | WI ST 59.54 | This Wisconsin statute provides that a local board may enact ordinances regulating the keeping, apprehension, impounding and destruction of dogs outside the corporate limits of any city or village, but such ordinances shall not conflict with ss. 174.01 and 174.042, and such ordinances may not apply in any town that has enacted an ordinance under s. 60.23(30). | Statute | |
| UK - Dangerous Dogs - Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 | 1991 CHAPTER 65 |
An Act to prohibit persons from having in their possession or custody dogs belonging to types bred for fighting; to impose restrictions in respect of such dogs pending the coming into force of the prohibition; to enable restrictions to be imposed in relation to other types of dog which present a serious danger to the public; to make further provision for securing that dogs are kept under proper control; and for connected purposes. |
Statute | ||
| DR. ELLEN LEVINE et al., Plaintiffs, v. MIKE JOHANNS, Defendants | This action challenges the exclusion of chickens, turkeys, and other birds from the protections of the federal Humane Slaughter Act (HSA). The Levine plaintiffs’ complaint challenges a USDA Notice issued on September 28, 2005, titled “Treatment of Live Poultry Before Slaughter.” The Notice states that there is no federal statute governing the humane slaughter of poultry, but recommends that the poultry industry adopt voluntary measures to improve slaughter practices. Plaintiffs all contend that by excluding these animals from the protections of the Act exposes them to greater risk of food-borne illness. The inhumane methods of slaughtering the birds have been linked in scientific studies to greater incidence of food-borne pathogens in the meat. In their complaint, Plaintiffs request an order finding the act of excluding poultry from the HSA is arbitrary and capricious, and enjoining the USDA from excluding poultry species from the HSA. In its order regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that plaintiffs credibly alleged that they face an imminent exposure to heightened risk that they will become ill from consuming inhumanely slaughtered animals. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss the consumer claims was denied. | Pleading |