Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Wolf - Reinstatement of Protections for the Gray Wolf in the Western Great Lakes and Northern Rocky Mountains | FWSR6ES2008008; 9222011130000; C6 |
Reinstates the listing of the Western Great Lakes and Northern Rocky Mountains gray wolf populations in accordance with court orders. |
Administrative | ||
| In re MARRIAGE OF Kimberly K. Enders and Michael A. BAKER | 48 N.E.3d 1277 (Ill. App. Ct., 2015) |
In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights. |
Case | ||
| Swanson v. Tackling | 335 Ga. App. 810 (2016) | 2016 WL 718465 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) | This is an interlocutory appeal by the dog owners (the Swansons) in a personal injury lawsuit for a dog bite. The court in this case overruled the lower court’s ruling that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement after defendant’s dog bit a child but the dog had never shown a propensity to injure anyone prior to the incident. Plaintiff was suing defendant after defendant’s dog bit plaintiff’s child on the arm and head. Plaintiff argued that defendant is responsible for the injuries caused by the dog because the defendant neglected to properly restrain the dog. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of defendant, stating that there was no evidence that was presented to indicate that defendant could have or should have known that the dog would act in this way towards the child. In order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to present evidence that the dog had acted in a similar way in the past. | Case | |
| NE - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 10) | Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1001 - 1020 | NE ST § 28-1001 to 1020 | This Nebraska statutory section comprises the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The cruelty provision provides that a person who abandons or cruelly neglects an animal is guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. Intentional animal cruelty results in a Class I misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class IV felony for any subsequent offense, unless such cruel mistreatment involves the knowing and intentional torture, repeated beating, or mutilation of the animal where such an act automatically results in a Class IV felony. Animal means any vertebrate member of the animal kingdom, but does not include an uncaptured wild creature (which appears to exclude otherwise heinous, intentional acts to wildlife). | Statute | |
| KY - Impound - Chapter 258. Animal Control and Protection. | KRS § 258.215 | KY ST § 258.215 | This Kentucky statute provides that peace officers, dog wardens, or animal control officers shall seize and impound any dog which does not bear a proper license tag or other legible identification which is found running at large. Interestingly, if an officer after diligent effort to do so, should fail to seize the dog, it is his or her duty to destroy the dog by any reasonable and humane means. The statute specifically exempts actively engaged hunting dogs from the "loose dog" prohibition. | Statute | |
| Justice for Animals, Inc. v. Lenoir County SPCA, Inc. | 168 N.C. App. 298, 607 S.E.2d 317 aff'd on other grounds, 360 N.C. 48, 619 S.E.2d 494 (2005) | 2005 WL 221226 (N.C. 2005) |
An animal control facility's practice of euthanizing feral cats without holding them for 72 hours was challenged by a non-profit organization. The animal control facility's method for determining if a cat is feral consisted only of poking the animal and gaging its reaction. The trial court dismissed the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. |
Case | |
| Pet Fair, Inc. v. Humane Society of Greater Miami | 583 So.2d 407 (Fl. 1991) | 16 Fla. L. Weekly D1986 (1991) |
The owner of allegedly neglected or mistreated domestic animals that were seized by police could not be required to pay for costs of animals' care after it was determined that owner was in fact able to adequately provide for the animals, and after the owner declined to re-possess the animals. The Humane Society can require an owner to pay it costs associated with caring for an animal if the owner re-claims the animal, but not if the animal is adopted out to a third party.
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Case | |
| IL - Restaurant - 5/11-20-14. Companion dogs; restaurants | 65 ILCS 5/11-20-14 | IL ST CH 65 § 5/11-20-14 | This law provides that a municipality with a population of 1,000,000 or more may, by ordinance, authorize the presence of companion dogs in outdoor areas of restaurants where food is served, if the ordinance provides for adequate controls to ensure compliance with other Illinois health laws. An ordinance enacted under this Section shall provide that: (i) no companion dog shall be present in the interior of any restaurant or in any area where food is prepared; and (ii) the restaurant shall have the right to refuse to serve the owner of a companion dog if the owner fails to exercise reasonable control over the companion dog or the companion dog is otherwise behaving in a manner that compromises or threatens to compromise the health or safety of any person present in the restaurant. Under this law, "companion dog" means a dog other than one who is assisting a person with disability. | Statute | |
| US - Assistance animals, housing - Service Animals and Assistance Animals for People with Disabilities in Housing and HUD-Funded Programs | FHEO Notice: FHEO-2013-01 | This notice explains certain obligations of housing providers under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) with respect to animals that provide assistance to individuals with disabilities. The Department of Justice's (DOT) amendments to its regulations' for Titles II and III of the ADA limit the definition of "service animal” under the ADA to include only dogs, and further define "service animal" to exclude emotional support animals. This definition, however, does not limit housing providers' obligations to make reasonable accommodations for assistance animals under the FHAct or Section 504. Persons with disabilities may request a reasonable accommodation for any assistance animal, including an emotional support animal, under both the FHAct and Section 504. | Administrative | ||
| MN - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 31. Food. Slaughter of Livestock | M.S.A. § 31.59 - 31.592 | MN ST § 31.59 - 31.592 | This section comprises Minnesota's humane slaughter laws. The law requires humane slaughter of livestock, defined as any method of slaughtering livestock which normally causes animals to be rendered insensible to pain by a single blow of a mechanical instrument or shot of a firearm or by chemical, or other means that are rapid and effective; or by methods of preparation necessary to Halal ritual slaughter, Jewish ritual slaughter and of slaughtering required by the ritual of the Islamic or Jewish faith. "Livestock" under this act is limited to cattle, horses, swine, sheep and goats. | Statute |