Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Native American - RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act) | 42 USC 2000bb-1 | RFRA provides that the government may not substantially burden an individual's free exercise of religion unless it is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and it is done through the least restrictive means. | Statute | |
| Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Bryson | 924 F.Supp.2d 1228 (D.Or., 2013) | 2013 WL 595092 (D.Or., 2013) |
In order to manage sea lion predation of salmonids at the Bonneville Dam, the NMFS decided to authorize agencies from Washington, Oregon, and Idaho to lethally remove sea lions that were not protected by the ESA when efforts to deter their feeding on salmonids failed. The Humane Society of the United States, Wild Fish Conservancy, Bethanie O'Driscoll, and Andrea Kozil disagreed and sued the NMFS; the agencies of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho intervened. Finding that the NMFS’s authorizations did not conflict with the MMPA’s protection of Stella Sea Lions, that the NMFS complied with the National Environmental Protection Act, and that the NMFS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it issued the authorizations, the district court granted the NMFS’s and the state agencies’ cross motion for summary judgment. The case was therefore dismissed. |
Case |
| TN - Dog, dangerous, felon - § 39-17-1363. Violent felony conviction; custody or control of dogs; application | T. C. A. § 39-17-1363 | TN ST § 39-17-1363 | Under this Tennessee law, it is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence. Additionally, it is an offense for any convicted violent felon to own or have custody of a dog that is not microchipped or spayed/neutered. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010. | Statute |
| McMahon v. Craig | 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2009) | 2009 WL 2344763 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.), 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9809, 2009 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,331 |
In this California case, the plaintiff appealed a demurrer granted by the trial court on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and portions of her complaint struck that sought damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship. The case stems from defendant-veterinarian's care of plaintiff's Maltese dog after surgery. Defendant also lied to plaintiff and falsified records concerning the treatment of the dog. On appeal of the trial court demurrer, this court held that an owner cannot recover emotional distress damages for alleged veterinary malpractice. The court found that it would be incongruous to impose a duty on a veterinarian to avoid causing emotional distress to the owner of the animal being treated, while not imposing such a duty on a doctor to the parents of a child receiving treatment. |
Case |
| WA - Vehicle - 46.61.660. Carrying persons or animals on outside part of vehicle | West's RCWA 46.61.660 | WA ST 46.61.660 | This Washington law states that it is illegal to transport any living animal on the running board, fenders, hood, or other outside part of any vehicle unless suitable harness, cage or enclosure is provided that protects the animal from being thrown. | Statute |
| NJ - Dog Bite - Chapter 19. Dogs, Taxation and Liability for Injuries Caused by | N. J. S. A. 4:19-16 | NJ ST 4:19-16 | This New Jersey statute provides that the owner of any dog that bites a person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. | Statute |
| CA - Fighting Animals - § 597b. Fighting animals or cockfighting; prohibition; penalties; aiding and abetting | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597b | CA PENAL § 597b | This statute forbids anyone from causing a fight between any animal or creature for amusement or gain, or allowing an animal fight to take place on her premises. It also makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to be present at an animal fight. | Statute |
| Canada - Canada Federal Statutes. Criminal Code. Part VIII -- Offences Against the Person and Reputation. Criminal Negligence. | R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 219 - 221 | The statutory definition of criminal negligence involves doing any act or omitting to do a legal duty that shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons. In alleged criminal cases, it is the State rather than the attack victim who lays the charges. | Statute | |
| Giaconia v. Delaware County Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4442632 (E.D.Pa.) |
Plaintiff brought various claims against Defendants after Plaintiff’s cat was euthanized prior to the standard 72 hour waiting period. On Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania found that Defendants were not acting under color of law. Because any and all claims for which the Court had original jurisdiction were being dismissed, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State law claims. |
Case | |
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium | 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2299, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 517, 2018 WL 385682 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) | PETA, an animal rights organization, brought this action in July 2015 to enjoin the Miami Seaquarium. The injunction would force the marine park to relinquish possession of a killer whale, Lolita, by releasing her to a sea pen. The grounds for this injunction is an alleged violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act by the marine park when they confined the killer whale in such conditions that the confinement amounted to a taking of the endangered species of animal. PETA specifically alleged that the marine park took Lolita by harming and harassing her, citing thirteen different injuries that were directly caused by her confinement quarters. When Lolita’s species was recognized as an endangered species by the Act, it specifically excluded captive members of the species. Just two months prior to filing suit, PETA had successfully lobbied to have that exclusion removed from the listing, enabling the suit itself. The district court held for summary judgment in favor of the marine park, saying that to have taken an animal would require a grave threat or potential for a grave threat to the animal’s survival, and PETA did not provide evidence of conduct that met that standard. In this appeal, the court affirms the district court’s summary judgment, but disagrees with their standard for a taking of an animal. After lengthy analysis of the statutory language, this court lowers the standard to posing a threat of serious harm to the animal, rather than death of the animal. However, this court also holds that PETA did not prove that the Seaquarium’s confinement of Lolita met this standard either. Affirmed. | Case |