Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Service animals - Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities | 2008 WL 2413721 (F.R.) | CRT Docket No. 106; AG Order No. 2968-2008 |
The Department of Justice (Department) is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in order to: Adopt enforceable accessibility standards under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) that are "consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board" (Access Board); and perform periodic reviews of any rule judged to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and a regulatory assessment of the costs and benefits of any significant regulatory action as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).
|
Administrative | |
| MS - Jackson - Chapter 18 Animals (Article 1: In General) | Code of Ordinances, City of Jackson, Mississippi §§ 18-1, 18-3, 18-4, 18-11, 18-21 |
In Jackson, Mississippi, an animal that damages public or private property is considered a public nuisance and it is the duty the animal's owner to prevent his or her animal from becoming a public nuisance. Additionally, in these ordinances, an animal control officer is authorized to discharge a firearm as the sole effective means for controlling a public nuisance. These ordinances also prohibit any person except a licensed veterinarian from cropping a dog's ears and also provide penalties for any person violating this chapter. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Roos v. Loeser | 183 P. 204 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) | 41 Cal.App. 782 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) |
This is an action for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of the killing of her dog, of the variety known as Pomeranian, by an Airedale belonging to the defendant. In 1919, a California court determined damages to be limited to the veterinary expenses connected with the injury to the animal. In the opinion, the court lovingly discusses the value of the animal. Notwithstanding these words of praise for the small animal, the court decided that the value was limited to the fair market value and related expenses. |
Case | |
| Zelenka v. Pratte | 912 N.W.2d 723 (Neb. 2018) | 300 Neb. 100 (2018) | Pratte and Zelenka were in a relationship up until their separation in 2015. Zelenka moved out of the residence that they had shared, however, he was unable to retrieve several items of personal property one of which was a French bulldog named Pavlov. Zelenka filed a complaint against Pratte alleging conversion. Zelenka contended that Pavlov was given to him as a birthday gift from Pratte. The district court ordered Pratte to return Pavlov to Zelenka and the rest of the personal property to remain with Pratte. Pratte appealed and Zelenka cross-appealed. The Supreme Court of Nebraska found that although the parties styled their complaint as one for conversion, the parties tried the action as one for replevin and treated the case in all respects as if replevin had been raised in the pleadings, therefore, the Court treated the action as one in which replevin had been raised in the pleadings. The Court ultimately found the following: Zelenka met his burden of proving that Pavlov was a gift from Pratte; Pratte failed to meet his burden of proving that the Niche leather couch, Niche lamps, and French bulldog lamp were gifts from Zelenka; and that those three items should be returned to Zelenka. As for the other items of personal property, the Court found that there was no basis to set aside the district court’s finding that Zelenka failed to meet his burden of proving ownership. The Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. | Case | |
| UT - Ag gag - § 76-6-112. Agricultural operation interference--Penalties | U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-112 | UT ST § 76-6-112 | This Utah law creates the crime of "agricultural operation interference ." A person commits agricultural operation interference if he or she records an image or sound from an agricultural operation by leaving a recording device without consent, obtains access to an agricultural operation under false pretenses, applies for employment with the intent to record, or without consent intentionally records the operation while committing criminal trespass. | Statute | |
| Dyess v. Caraway | 190 So.2d (666 La.App., 1966) |
Plaintiff claimed damages for the death of five pedigreed Norwegian Elkhound puppies resulting from the negligence of defendant, Hugh L. Caraway, a duly licensed veterinarian. Specifically, defendant allegedly failed to make proper diagnostic tests, failed to give proper treatment for coccidia from which the puppy died, although the defendant had professional knowledge that the puppy was suffering from that disease, and failed to exercise the standard of care required by the average prudent veterinarian in the community. The court first noted the difficulty in diagnosing distemper. It also found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in applicable in the instant case, primarily for the reason that the instant case involves a question of diagnosis and treatment of a professional nature which in itself requires judgment. |
Case | ||
| Volosen v. State | 192 S.W.3d 597(Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2006) | 2006 WL 349713 (Tx. 2006) |
In this Texas case, the trial court found Appellant Mircea Volosen guilty of animal cruelty for killing a neighbor's dog. The sole issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden of presenting legally sufficient evidence that Volosen was "without legal authority" to kill the dog. By statute, a dog that "is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked ... fowls may be killed by ... any person witnessing the attack." The court found that no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was not attacking or had not recently attacked chickens in a pen in Volosen's yard; thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that Volosen killed the dog "without legal authority" as required to sustain a conviction for animal cruelty. Judgment Reversed by Volosen v. State , 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007). |
Case | |
| Humane Society of the United States v. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service | 2019 WL 2342949 (D.D.C. June 3, 2019) | The Humane Society submitted two Freedom of Information Act requests to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. One was for site-inspection reports and the other was for inspection records for specific animal dealers and exhibitors. The Service released nine pages of inspection records in full but redacted information from the other 127 pages citing FOIA exemptions 6 and 7 that deal with privacy concerns. The Humane Society alleged that the redactions were improper and both parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court found that the bulk of the Service’s redactions were improper under exemption 6 because the information did not implicate a licensee’s personal privacy interests. Exemption 6 was meant to protect individuals from public disclosure of intimate details of their lives. Details about a business’ compliance with regulations and statutes does not relate to intimate personal details. It only relates to business activities. Information about business judgments and relationships do not qualify for redaction. However, a substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de minimus privacy interest and the licensees and third-parties had more than a de minimus privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information. The licensees were also homestead businesses meaning that the location of their business also served as their residence. The Court weighed the privacy interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in the release of the records and ultimately found that although the licensees and third parties had a substantial privacy interest in their names, addresses, and contact information, they only had a de minimus privacy interest in the other information that they withheld from the reports. If no significant privacy interest is implicated, FOIA demands disclosure. The service was required to disclose all reasonably segregable portions of the records that do not include identifying information. The Court found the Humane Society’s argument unpersuasive that releasing the addresses of the licensees would serve the public interest. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and names of third-party veterinarians. Exemption 7 allows for agencies to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of those law enforcement records could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Humane Society argued that inspection reports are not compiled for law enforcement purposes because the existence of such a report does not, on its face, reveal that there is any particular enforcement or investigatory action occurring. The Court found that the inspection records relate to the Service’s responsibility to enforce the AWA and ensure that licensees are in compliance, therefore, there was a nexus between the reports and the Service’s law enforcement duties. The Court also conducted the same balancing test that they did with exemption 6 and held that the Service releasing information other than the licensees’ addresses and third parties’ names could not reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Service properly withheld the licensees’ addresses and contact information and despite the Service’s improper withholding of dates, inspection narratives, animal inventories, etc., the Court found that they had otherwise met their burden of releasing all reasonably segregable information. Both the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were granted in part and denied in part. | Case | ||
| WY - Dangerous - Article 1. In General. (Dangerous Dog Provisions) | W. S. 1977 § 11-31-105 to 108 | WY ST § 11-31-105 to 108 | This Wyoming statute provides that every person, firm, copartnership, corporation or company owning any dog, which to his knowledge has killed sheep or other livestock, shall exterminate and destroy the dog. In addition, the owner of any dog is liable for all damages that accrue to any person, firm or corporation by reason of the dog killing, wounding, worrying or chasing any sheep or other domestic animals belonging to the person, firm or corporation. | Statute | |
| SC - Ordinances - § 47-3-20. Local animal care and control ordinances authorized. | Code 1976 § 47-3-20 | SC ST § 47-3-20 | This South Carolina statute provides that the governing body of each county or municipality in this State may enact ordinances and promulgate regulations for the care and control of dogs, cats, and other animals and to prescribe penalties for violations. | Statute |