Results
Displaying 21 - 30 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NV - Research - 598.993. Prohibition on import, sale or offer for sale of cosmetic products tested on animals; exceptions; | N.R.S. 598.993 | N. R. S. 598.993, NV ST 598.993 | This Nevada law, enacted in 2020, states that a manufacturer shall not import for profit, sell or offer for sale in this State any cosmetic for which the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that animal testing was conducted or contracted by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer if the animal testing was conducted on or after January 1, 2020. Limited exceptions exist. A violation of this section constitutes a deceptive trade practice for the purposes of NRS 598.0903 to 598.0999, inclusive. | Statute |
| Federal Laws | Policy | |||
| Ley Constitucional de Derechos Humanos y sus Garantías de la Ciudad de México | Ley Constitucional de Derechos Humanos y sus Garantías de la Ciudad de México | This 2019 law is a secondary law that regulates the application of the constitutional mandate that the Mexico City government guarantees the fulfillment of the more than fifty fundamental rights established in the Constitution. This law addresses the issue of animal protection, specifically in Article 95. Article 95 states that animal protection shall be guaranteed in the broadest way to provide a livable city and seek people's fulfillment of the right to a healthy environment. Even though the focus of this article is human-centric and not the well-being of animals per se, it provides a list of eleven principles tailored around the protection of animals and their interests. | Statute | |
| Hines v. Quillivan | 982 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2020) | This case asks whether a veterinarian in Texas has a right to engage in telemedicine for a pet he has not physically examined. The plaintiff challenged Texas' physical-examination requirement that prohibits veterinarians from offering individualized advice to pet owners unless the vet previously examined the animal. Dr. Ronald Hines, a licensed veterinarian in Texas, stopped practicing in-person veterinary medicine in 2002 due to his age and other ailments. He then transitioned to a practice based remotely through the Internet. In 2012, the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) investigated Hines and found he had violated state law. The Board ordered him to cease providing veterinary advice electronically without first physically examining the animal. In 2013, Dr. Hines filed suit against the Board members claiming that the physical-examination requirement violated his First Amendment, equal-protection, and substantive-due-process rights. The district court then granted the motion to dismiss by the Board and the Court of Appeals found Hines failed to state a claim on appeal. Since that 2015 opinion, Texas revised its medical doctor laws, allowing them to engage in telemedicine, but did not do the same for veterinary practice laws. In addition to that change, a United States Supreme Court held that statements made by medical doctors could now be deemed "professional speech" (the "NIFLA" case). As a result of these changes, Hines brought the present suit arguing that the changes in Texas' telemedicine laws and the NIFLA case enabled him to pursue a new equal-protection claim and First Amendment claim. With regard to his protected speech claim, this Court found that subsequent caselaw does entitle Hines' claim to greater judicial scrutiny than his previous case allowed. Thus, remand to the district court to make the initial evaluation of whether Hines' conduct or speech is being regulated is required. On the equal-protection argument, the court found that Hines presents an argument slightly different than his previous one. In essence, Hines argued in the prior appeal that the he physical-examination requirement treated veterinarians engaging in telemedicine differently than other veterinarians. Here, Hines argues that changes to the medical doctor licensing laws treats medical doctors differently than veterinarians in the state with respect to telemedicine. Using a rational-basis review, the court held that it is rational to distinguish between human and animal medicine because of the differences in training, schooling, and overall practice of the professions. The court found the state's proffered reason that animals cannot communicate their symptoms as humans can ordinarily was a persuasive rational basis (although both Hines and the Dissent note that some humans like infants are unable to speak similar to animals and yet are allowed to be treated via telemedicine). The court found the services provided by both professions are not interchangeable and thus, the physical-examination requirement is not a protectionist measure for medical doctors. Ultimately, the court left it to the Texas legislature to expand any telemedicine changes to the veterinary practice code. The action was affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. | Case | |
| CT - Pet Trust - Chapter 802C. Trusts | C. G. S. A. § 45a-489a | CT ST § 45a-489a | Connecticut enacted its "pet trust" law in 2009. Under the law, a testamentary or inter vivos trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal or animals alive during the settlor's or testator's lifetime. The trust terminates when the last surviving animal named in the trust dies. The trust must designate a "trust protector" who acts on behalf of the animals named in the trust. | Statute |
| UK - Farming - UK General Welfare of Farmed Animals Regs. 2000 | Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 1870 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. The UK's general animal welfare legislation affecting any animal (including fish, reptiles or amphibians) bred or kept for the production of food, wool, skin or fur or for other farming purposes. |
Statute | |
| Gonzalez v. South Texas Veterinary Associates, Inc. | Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2013 WL 6729873 (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2013), review denied (May 16, 2014) | Plaintiff acquired an indoor/outdoor cat with an unknown medical and vaccination history. Plaintiff took cat to defendant for treatment and the cat received a vaccination. The cat soon developed a golf-ball-sized mass that contained a quarter-sized ulceration which was draining “matter” on the cat's right rear leg. When plaintiff returned the cat to the defendant, defendant diagnosed the cat with an infection, prescribed an antibiotic for treatment, and instructed Gonzalez to return if the cat's symptoms did not improve. When the cat's symptoms did not improve, plaintiff took the cat to another veterinarian who diagnosed the cat with vaccine-associated sarcoma. The cat had to be eventually euthanized. Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that defendant failed to: (1) inform her of vaccine-associated sarcoma risk; (2) adhere to feline vaccination protocols; and (3) properly diagnose vaccine-associated sarcoma in the cat, which resulted in the loss of her life. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred by granting defendant's no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment. After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences, the court concluded that the plaintiff brought forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence establishing the relevant standard of care to prove her malpractice claims. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting the no-evidence summary judgment. On the traditional summary judgment claim, the court held that that the defendant's evidence did not conclusively prove that a veterinarian complied with the applicable standard of care in light of another veterinarian's report to the contrary. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting defendant's traditional motion for summary judgment. The case was reversed and remanded. | Case | |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE HIMACHAL PRADESH PROHIBITION OF COW SLAUGHTER ACT, 1979 | 11 OF 1979 | The law, specific to the state of Himachal Pradesh, prohibits the slaughter of cows. No person may export cows for the purpose of slaughter. The law bans the sale of beef. Committing an offence under this Act may lead to imprisonment or fines. | Statute | |
| Black Hawk County v. Jacobsen (Unpublished) | 2002 WL 1429365 (Iowa App. 2002) (Not Reported in N.W. 2d) |
In this case, Donna Jacobsen appealed a district court order finding she had neglected fifty-six dogs in the course of her operation of a federal and state licensed kennel in Jesup. On appeal, Jacobsen contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because federal law (the Animal Welfare Act) preempts state regulations of federally licensed kennels. The court disagreed, finding the Act expressly contemplates state and local regulation of animals. Further, a plain reading of the Animal Welfare Act shows that Congress demonstrated no express or implied intent to preempt state or local government from regulating in this area. |
Case | |
| KS - Humane Slaughter - CHAPTER 47.LIVESTOCK AND DOMESTIC ANIMALS. | K. S. A. § 47-1401 to 1405 | KS ST § 47-1401 to 1405 | This Kansas section comprises the state's humane slaughter act. The act first begins with a statement of policy requiring the humane slaughter of all livestock. A humane method is defined as a method whereby the animal is rendered insensible to pain by mechanical, electrical, chemical, or other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut.& The law also allows slaughter by a method in accordance with ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain. Any person who violates any provision of this act is guilty of a misdemeanor. | Statute |