Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Sharks - 379.2426. Possession of separated shark fins on the water prohibited; penalties | West's F.S.A. § 379.2426 | This Florida law prohibits a person from possessing in or on the waters a shark fin that has been separated from a shark or land a separated shark fin unless possession is authorized by a commission rule or such fin has been lawfully obtained on land, prepared by taxidermy, and is possessed for the purposes of display. A first-time violation is a misdemeanor of the second degree, which includes a fine of up to $4,500 and suspension of license privileges for 180 days. Subsequent violations result in enhanced penalties. | Statute | ||
| Sentencia C-889, 2012 | Sentencia C-889/12 | Decision C-889 grants constitutional value to animal protection. It establishes the parameters for tradition and social roots. It limits the scope of bullfighting in the national territory. On this opportunity, the court decided on the constitutionality of Arts. 14 and 15 of the statute of Bullfighting Statute. It establishes the criteria that must be met in order for bullfighting to be legal: (1) Bullfighting has to meet the legal conditions established for public shows in general; (2) Bullfighting must meet the legal conditions established in the statute that regulates the taurine activity, Ley 916 of 2014; and (3) Bullfighting must comply with the constitutional conditions, restrictions, and limitations established in decision C-666 of 2010 to satisfy the mandate of animal welfare, animal protection, and to avoid suffering and pain. It must also satisfy social ingrain, location, opportunity, the condition of no financial funds, and exceptionality. | Case | ||
| Canada - Ontario - Dog Owners' Liability Act | R.S.O. 1990, c. D.16, s. 1 - 20(4) | This Ontario, Canada set of laws comprises the Dog Owners' Liability Act. The main thrust of the law is to establish that an owner is liable for damages if his or her dog bites or attacks another person or domestic animal. Proceedings may be commenced in the Ontario Court of Justice against an owner of a dog if it is alleged that the dog attacked or bitten another person or domestic animal, or if the dog has behaved in a manner that poses a menace to the safety of persons or domestic animals. A court may then order the destruction of the dog, or measures for more effective control of the dog (leash restraint, muzzling, etc.). The Act also bans the owning, breeding, importing, or transferring of pit bull dogs in Ontario, save for dogs grandfathered in before the Act took effect in 2005 (then the dog is a "restricted pit bull" subject to further laws). | Statute | ||
| Moden v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 2008 WL 4763025 (D.Or.) |
Plaintiffs filed claim against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) alleging arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and failure to perform a nondiscretionary act under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The United States District Court, D. Oregon, granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ APA and ESA claims, and that it remains without jurisdiction to mandate action by the agency if rulemaking has not been initiated by the FWS at its discretion, regardless of whether a determination resulting from a five year review suggests a listing status should be changed or should remain the same. |
Case | ||
| Fuller v. Vines | 36 F3d 65 (9th Cir. 1994) |
Motion for leave to amend § 1983 civil rights complaint to add claims that police officer violated Fourth Amendment by shooting pet dog and by pointing gun at one plaintiff was denied and the United States District Court for the Northern District of California entered summary judgment in favor of police officers and city. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) killing of pet dog stated Fourth Amendment violation, but (2) no seizure of plaintiff occurred when police pointed gun. |
Case | ||
| First Time User Tutorial |
Welcome to the Animal Legal & Historical Center!Wondering where to go first?Try the front page |
Basic page | |||
| State v. Hearl | 190 A.3d 42 (Con. App. Ct. May 29, 2018) | 182 Conn. App. 237 , 2018 WL 2381893 (Con. App. Ct. May 29, 2018) | Defendant Hearl was convicted of nineteen counts of animal cruelty by jury. The convictions stem from the care of his goat herd used for his goat cheese manufacturing business in Connecticut in 2014. Defendant and his business partner moved a herd from Massachusetts to Cornall, CT in May of 2014, where they rented an open air barn space (mainly used for dairy cows), but did not negotiate any boarding or care of the goats. Another farmer (Betti) rented the other half of the barn space for his dairy cows. Betti became concerned about defendant's goat herd in Fall 2014. As the condition of the goats deteriorated (to the point of death for some of the goats), Betti informed the state Dept. of Agriculture and this spurred the investigation which culminated in the seizure of defendant's remaining living goats in January 2015. On appeal of his conviction, defendant raises four main arguments: (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the trial court did not provide the jury with a proper instruction on the required mental state; (3) § 53–247 (a) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct; and (4) his conviction and sentencing on nineteen separate counts of animal cruelty violates the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. As to defendant's first insufficiency of the evidence claim, defendant's argument centered on whether he had charge or custody of the goats necessary to impute responsibility to him. The court found that there was ample evidence before the jury to support the finding that the defendant confined, or had charge or custody of, the goats. Not only did the defendant play an active role in the management of the goats according to testimony, but.in converstations with officers, defendant “took the lead on telling me what was being done with the management of the goats” and that he “predominated the conversation” about the mortality rates in the herd. In fact, the court found compelling evidence of defendant's custody role where since he had authority to order the euthanization of the animals. Defendant's attempts to characterize his role as mere "ownership," with no role in the particulars of confinement, were unpersuasive. Ownership itself "can still be probative evidence that the defendant bore the responsibility of caring for the goats and authorizing their confinement." Equally unpersuasive was defendant's claim that his business partner was the was who alone confined the 20 plus goats in the open air barn. However, the court noted that there is "no authority limits liability under the statute to a single actor when the facts demonstrate that more than one person may have confined the goats or had charge or custody of them." The jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant, having confined, or having charge or custody of, the goats, failed to give the goats proper care or food, water, and shelter. On defendant's second claim, the court concluded that the mens rea required for a conviction under the relevant portion of § 53–247 (a) is general intent and that the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on criminal negligence. Defendant's third argument - that § 53–247 (a), was unconstitutionally vague - was also dispensed by the court. Even if the terms "charge" or "custody" are susceptible to some degree of interpretation, the record here shows that defendant had definite notice that his conduct violated the law. Further, the evidence at trial showed that he had notice from the state on things like heat lamps and shelter from the wind and failed to protect the animals by acting on those instructions. Finally, the court considered defendant's final double jeopardy argument and whether the legislature intended to authorize multiple convictions for cruelty for each goat or one conviction for the cruel treatment of the nineteen goats under § 53–247 (a). In looking at previous versions of the anti-cruelty law and other laws within the chapter, the court found that defendant's separate abuse and maltreatment of each goat supports the nineteen separate counts filed by the prosecutor. The judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| US - AWA - Subpart B. Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care, etc. of Guinea Pigs and Hamsters. | 9 C.F.R. § 3.25 - 3.41 | These regulations provide the specifications for the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of Guinea Pigs and Hamsters. | Administrative | ||
| Australia Animal Protection Law Journal | This page lists the volumes of the Australian Animal Protection Law Journal. Volume 1 (2008) through Volume 9 (2013) are available at the top of page as pdf downloads. Below this list of pdf links is a list of the table of contents for each volume of the journal. The table of contents contains the names of the articles, authors, and page numbers for each journal. More information about the journal is available at the Australian Animal Protection Law Journal website at http://animalprotectionlawjournal.com/. | Policy | |||
| State v. Ancona | 991 A.2d 663 (Conn.App.,2010) | 120 Conn.App. 324 (Conn.App.,2010), 2010 WL 1190539 |
Defendant Michael Ancona appealed his conviction of permitting a dog to roam at large in violation of General Statutes § 22-364(a). The defendant claims that (1) the court improperly held him responsible as a keeper of a dog when the owner was present and known to the authorities, and (2) the state adduced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The plain language of the statute § 22-364(a) states that an “owner or keeper” is prohibited from allowing a dog to roam on a public highway. Either the owner or keeper or both can be held liable for a violation of the statute. The court also found sufficient evidence that defendant was the keeper of the pit bull: the dog stayed at his house, he initially responded to the incident and tried to pull the dog away, and defendant yelled at the Officer Rogers that she was not to take "his dog." |
Case |