Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NV - Domestic Violence - Chapter 33. Injunctions. Orders for Protection Against Domestic Violence. | N. R. S. 33.018, 33.030 | NV ST 33.018, 33.030 | In Nevada, a knowing, purposeful or reckless course of conduct intended to harass the other such as injuring or killing an animal, is included in their definition of Domestic Violence. A victim can then get a Protection Order and enjoin the adverse party from physically injuring, threatening to injure or taking possession of any animal that is owned or kept by the applicant or minor child, either directly or through an agent. | Statute |
| Lamare v. North Country Animal League | 743 A.2d 598 (Vt. 1999) |
Owners of a licensed dog that escaped while not wearing its tags filed an action against a local animal shelter that ultimately released the dog to others for adoption. The court held that the town's actions fully complied with its animal control ordinance and that its ordinance provided ample notice to plaintiffs consistent with state law and due process requirements. |
Case | |
| Wild Horse Observers Ass'n, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Bd. | 363 P.3d 1222 (N.M., 2015) | Certiorari Denied, Oct. 13, 2015, No. 35,504. | This case dealt with a determination made by the New Mexico Livestock Board that a group of undomesticated, unowned, free-roaming horses (the Placitas horses) were “livestock” and “estray” rather than wild horses under the Livestock Code. The Wild Horse Observers Association filed suit against the Board, but their claim was dismissed by the District Court. The Court of Appeals held that 1) the horses were not “livestock”, as they had never been domesticated and therefore could not be “estray”; 2) the Board had a statutory duty to test and relocate wild horses captured on public land; and 3) the Plaintiffs did state a claim that was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings | Case |
| New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Farmer Boy AG, Inc. | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 33125128 (S.D.Ind.) |
Lightning struck a hog breeding facility, which disabled the ventilation system and killed pregnant sows. Plaintiff Insurance Company sued defendant for damages. The Court held that evidence of damages relating to the lost litters and subsequent generations was excluded because damages for future unborn litters are not recoverable when damages are recovered for the injury to or destruction of the pregnant sows. |
Case | |
| RI - Impound - § 4-13-15. Collaring of dogs--Impoundment and disposition of uncollared dogs | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-15 | RI ST § 4-13-15 | This Rhode Island statute provides that every owner of a dog must collar his or her dog around its neck and distinctly marked with its owner's name and its registered number. Interestingly, it states that "any person" may cause any dog not so collared to be impounded in the public pound of the town or city where the dog is found. Further, if the dog is not claimed by its owner within a period of five days after the impoundment, the dog may be disposed of or destroyed. This statute also provides additional specific provisions for the towns of Glocester, West Warwick, and Exeter. | Statute |
| NC - Equine Activity Liability - Article 1. Equine Activity Liability | N.C.G.S.A. § 99E-1 to 99E-9 | NC ST § 99E-1 to 99E-9 | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor or equine professional, or any other person, including corporations and partnerships, are immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities. New provisions added in 2013 now also protect a farm animal activity sponsor, a farm animal professional, or any other person engaged in a farm animal activity, including a corporation or partnership, shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of farm animal activities. However, there are exceptions to this rule: a person, corporation, or partnership will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant. | Statute |
| COMMONWEALTH v. MASSINI | 188 A.2d 816 (Pa.Super 1963) | 200 Pa.Super. 257 (Pa.Super 1963) |
In this Pennsylvania case, defendant was prosecuted for killing a cat that belonged to his neighbor. The section under which he was prosecuted prohibited the killing of a 'domestic animal of another person.' However, a cat was not one of the animals defined as a ‘domestic animal’ by the Act. Using rules of statutory interpretation, the court found that the omission of 'cat' from the listed species of the penal code provision was intentional by the legislature, and thus the defendant's sentence was discharged. |
Case |
| Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue, Inc v. Bengal | 2011 WL 4867541 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2011) |
Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue rescued three dogs from North Carolina and had them delivered to Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement seized them and turned them over to Appellants PSPCA. The District Court ordered Appellants to return the dogs to Sixth Angel based on a state law conversion claim. The motion was affirmed because PSPCA deprived Sixth Angel of its unique property. Returning the dogs to their owner served the public interest by settling property rights and allowing Sixth Angel to fulfill its mission of finding homes for the dogs. |
Case | |
| Mitchell v. Snider | 41 N.Y.S.3d 450 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2016) | 51 Misc. 3d 1229(A); 2016 WL 3191291 | This is a case of an unmarried, co-habitating couple that jointly bought a dog and now dispute who should have the dog after the relationship has terminated. Mitchell brought this replevin action against his girlfriend, Snider, to recover possession of Django, their black lab. This court recognized the traditional way to treat such a case is to consider which party has superior possessory right to the dog. However, modern courts have started to recognize a special category of property in pets and have used a 'best for all concerned' analysis to decide who gets the animal. In this case, the court grants judgment for Snider in part because she had been solely responsible for the dog's care for the previous 20 months. No money was awarded to Mitchell because the expenses he paid were an expression of the parties' mutual love and desire to care for the dog. | Case |
| NY - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 108, 110, 118, 123-b; McKinney's General Obligations Law § 11-107; McKinney's Civil Rights Law § 47, 47-a to c; McKinney's Penal Law § 195.11 - 12; § 242.00 - .15; McKinney's Public Housing Law § 223-a, b | McKinney's Executive Law § 296; McKinney's Social Services Law § 303-a; McKinney's Transportation Law § 147; McKinney's Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1153 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |