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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Toney v. Glickman | 101 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir., 1996) | Plaintiffs were in the business of selling animals to research facilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that they had committed hundreds of violations of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq. The ALH then imposed what was, to that point, the harshest sanction, $200,000, in the history of the Act. The Judicial Officer affirmed the ALJ's findings and denied the Plaintiffs' request to reopen the hearing for consideration of new evidence. While the 8th Circuit affirmed most of these findings, it held that the evidence did not support all of them. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the Department for redetermination of the sanction. The court also affirmed the Judicial Officer's refusal to reopen the hearing and denied the Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence. The Plaintiffs were free, however, to seek leave to offer this additional evidence on remand to the extent it was relevant to the sanction. | Case | |
| MT - Trusts - Chapter 2. Upc--Intestacy, Wills, and Donative Transfers. | MCA 72-2-1017 | MT ST 72-2-1017 | This Montana statute states that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid (but for no longer than 21 years, even if the trust provides for a longer term). The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the transferor's intent. Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument, no portion of the principal or income may be converted to the use of the trustee or to any use other than for the trust's purposes or for the benefit of a covered animal and a court may reduce the amount of the property transferred if it determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use. | Statute |
| IL - Humane Slaughter - Humane Slaughter of Livestock Act | 510 I.L.C.S. 75/0.01 - 8 | IL ST CH 510 § 75/0.01 - 8 | This Illinois section comprises the state's humane slaughter laws. It begins with a statement of policy that calls for the humane slaughter of commercial animals. Animals must be slaughtered in a manner that renders them insensible to pain prior to hoisting or shackling. As a result, the use of a manually operated hammer, sledge or pole-ax or shackling as well as the hoisting or hanging any animal while such animal is conscious are prohibited. Any violation of this Act or of the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director is a petty offense. | Statute |
| Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family Market, Inc. | 230 Mich.App. 131 (1998) | 583 N.W.2d 509 (Mich.App.,1998) | Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed that the Federal Meat Inspection Act prevents states from adding or modifying federal requirements on meat producers. Claims that purchased meat products are adulterated must be based on federal standards, not Michigan standards. The United States Department of Agriculture elected not to address E. coli contamination, thus Michigan may not impose liability on manufacturers for not addressing possible E. coli contamination. | Case |
| In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo | 785 F.Supp. 100 (N.D. Ohio, 1991) |
This case involves a challenge by several organizations to the proposed move of Timmy, a lowland gorilla, from the Cleveland Metroparks Zoo to the Bronx Zoo in New York for the purposes of mating Timmy with female gorillas at the Bronx Zoo. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 25, 1991, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, and moved for a temporary restraining order. The District Court held that the claim was preempted under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ESA. Further, the court held that plaintiffs had no private cause of action under the AWA. |
Case | |
| Swilley v. State | 465 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 3637850 (Tex. App. 2015) | In the indictment, the State alleged Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting a dog with a crossbow, a state jail felony. The dog in question was a stray, which fell within the statutory definition of an “animal.” After a jury found Appellant guilty, the trial court assessed his punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail. On appeal, Appellant contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of an extraneous offense also involving cruelty to animals. Since the video that mentioned the extraneous offense was admitted without objection, the court held the Appellant waived the error and the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for mistrial or by giving the instruction to disregard and overrule Appellant's first issue. Appellant further asserted the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The court, however, held the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting it with a crossbow. The trial court's judgment was therefore affirmed. | Case |
| MI - Exotic Pets - CHAPTER 287. ANIMAL INDUSTRY; ANIMAL INDUSTRY ACT | M. C. L. A. 287.731 | MI ST 287.731 | Michigan completely prohibits the importation into the state of "any species having the potential to spread serious diseases or parasites, to cause serious physical harm, or to otherwise endanger native wildlife, human life, livestock, domestic animals, or property." For other wild or exotic animals, Michigan regulates various aspects of their importation, such as requiring physical exams by vets, negative disease tests, and proper animal care and restraint. | Statute |
| FL - Disaster - 252.3568. Emergency sheltering of persons with pets | West's F. S. A. § 252.3568 - 3569 | FL ST § 252.3568 - 3569 | In Florida, there must be strategies for the evacuation of persons with pets in the state and local comprehensive emergency management plans. | Statute |
| Klitzka ex rel. Teutonico v. Hellios | 810 N.E.2d 252 (Ill.App. 2 Dist.,2004) | 284 Ill.Dec. 599 (2004); 2004 WL 1109781 |
In this Illinois case, the Appellate Court considered, as a matter of first impression, under what circumstances does a landlord owe a duty of care to his tenant's invitees to prevent injury from an attack by an animal kept by the tenant on the leased premises? A minor invitee (Alexus) of the tenants was bitten by tenants' dog and brought a negligence action against residential landlords. It was undisputed that the tenants held exclusive control over the premises and paid $700 a month in rent to the landlords. The Appellate Court held that even if landlords knew tenants' dog was dangerous, the landlords had no duty to protect the tenants' invitee because landlords retained no control over the leased premises where injury occurred. "Here, the tenants' affirmative conduct of bringing the dog into the living space of the home, an area over which the landlords had no control, is what might have been the proximate cause of Alexus' injuries." |
Case |
| PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA, EXPTE. N° 450237 | Sentencia definitiva numero: 86 "PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA – ORDINARIO – EXPSentencia número 86 de la Cámara de Apelaciones de lo Civil y Comercial y en lo Contencioso Administrativo, de la ciudad de Río Cuarto de 26 de octubre de 2012 | This case revolves around a dispute between German Luis Prieto (the plaintiff) and Luciana Andrea Colonna (the defendant) regarding the ownership of personal property acquired during their cohabitation. The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of the property assets and sought their return, while the defendant argued that these assets constituted community property acquired for their shared residence during their relationship. Additionally, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff granted her exclusive possession and gifted the property to her upon their separation, relieving her of any obligation to return it. The court held that the plaintiff had the right to take back the property, with the exception of Bauty, considering that the latter had developed a significant emotional bond with the defendant and that his surrender could cause unnecessary suffering. In the judge's view, dogs were not mere "things." Consequently, the judge upheld the lower court's decision in part, ordering all the assets to be returned to the plaintiff. At the same time, the defendant was allowed to retain custody of the canine companion. | Case |