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Displaying 61 - 70 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MO - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | V. A. M. S. 578.005 - 188; 566.111 | MO ST 578.005 - 188; MO ST 566.111 | These Missouri statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty laws. The term "animal" means every living vertebrate except a human being. The provisions of sections 578.005 to 578.023 do not apply to the care or treatment performed by a licensed veterinarian, bona fide scientific experiments, hunting, fishing, or trapping, publicly funded zoological parks, rodeo practices, and several other listed activities as described in 578.007. A person is guilty of animal neglect when he or she has custody or ownership or an animal and fails to provide adequate care, or when that person knowingly abandons an animal in any place without making provisions for its adequate care. Animal neglect and abandonment is a class C misdemeanor upon first conviction with enhancement to a class B misdemeanor for subsequent convictions. A person is guilty of animal abuse when a person intentionally or purposely kills an animal in any manner not allowed by law, purposely or intentionally causes injury or suffering to an animal, or, having ownership or custody of an animal, knowingly fails to provide adequate care or control which results in substantial harm to the animal. Animal abuse is a class A misdemeanor unless the defendant has previously been found guilty of animal abuse or the suffering involved is the result of torture or mutilation consciously inflicted while the animal was alive, in which case it is a class E felony. | Statute |
| Edmondson v. Oklahoma | 91 P.3d 605 (Okla. 2004) | 2004 OK 23 (2004) |
Petitioners sought relief from a temporary injunction for the Respondents, which prevented petitioners from enforcing the statute banning cockfighting. The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and held that the statute did not violate the Oklahoma State Constitution, and was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Relief granted for petitioners. |
Case |
| Fitch v. Eiseman | 2000 WL 34545801 (Alaska 2000) (unpublished opinion) | The trial court approved a divorcing couple’s agreement for dogs to be with their children (and so travel to the husband's and wife’s houses as part of a shared custody agreement of their children). The wife did not abide by the agreement, so the Supreme Court remanded back to the trial court to determine sole ownership of the dog. | Case | |
| MD - Vehicle - § 20-106. Duty of driver upon striking domestic animal with vehicle | MD Code, Transportation, § 20-106 | MD TRANS § 20-106 | Under this Maryland statute, if a motor vehicle strikes and injures a domestic animal, the driver of the motor vehicle immediately shall notify the appropriate State or local police of the accident. Once notified, the police shall notify the local organization or governmental agency designated by the appropriate local government to give the injured animals medical care. | Statute |
| Connecticut v. Devon D. | 321 Conn. 656, 138 A.3d 849 (2016) | 321 Conn. 656 (2016), 2016 WL 3194779 (Conn.,2016) | Devon D. was convicted of four counts sexual assault and three counts of risk of injury to a child upon allegations made by three of Devon D.’s biological children, C1, C2, and C3. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion by having the three cases to be tried jointly and by permitting C1 to testify with a dog at her feet. The appellate court had accepted these arguments and reversed and remanded for a new trial, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the appellate court. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the cases to be tried together because the evidence in all three cases was cross admissible,” and reversed on that issue. As to the appellate court’s determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a dog to sit near C1 during her testimony to provide comfort and support,” the Supreme Court also reversed, reinstating the verdict and judgment of the trial court. | Case |
| Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter | 29 A.D.3d 515 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2006) | 814 N.Y.S.2d 700, 2006 WL 1174110 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) | In this New York case, a cat owner brought suit against an animal shelter and its employee for their alleged misconduct in knowingly placing a champion cat stolen from her home for adoption by unidentified family. In ruling that the lower court properly denied the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment, the appellate court found that there are questions of fact, inter alia , as to whether “Lucy” is “Kisses." However, the Shelter defendants are correct that the plaintiff may not recover damages for the emotional harm she allegedly suffered from the loss of her cat. | Case |
| NM - Dangerous Animal - Chapter 77. Animals and Livestock. | NMSA 1978, § 77-1-10 | NM ST § 77-1-10 | This New Mexico statute provides that it is unlawful for any person to keep any animal known to be vicious and liable to attack or injure human beings unless such animal is securely kept to prevent injury to any person. It is also unlawful to keep any unvaccinated dog or cat or any animal with any symptom of rabies or to fail or to refuse to destroy vicious animals or unvaccinated dogs or cats with symptoms of rabies. | Statute |
| MD - Hunting - Title 10. Wildlife. | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-422 | MD NAT RES § 10-422 | This law reflects Maryland's hunter harassment provision. While on private land that is owned by another person or in a hunting area on land managed by the Department, a person may not intentionally interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife or harass, drive, or disturb any game animal intentionally for the purpose of disrupting a lawful hunt. A Natural Resources officer or other police officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has violated the section may order the person to leave the area or arrest that person if he or she refuses to leave. | Statute |
| IN RE: TERRY LEE HARRISON AND PAMELA SUE HARRISON, RESPONDENTS | 51 Agric. Dec. 234 (1992) | 1992 WL 17132 (U.S.D.A.) | Willful violation is defined as one where violator either intentionally does act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advice, or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements. | Case |
| McMahon v. Craig | 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2009) | 2009 WL 2344763 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.), 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9809, 2009 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,331 |
In this California case, the plaintiff appealed a demurrer granted by the trial court on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and portions of her complaint struck that sought damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship. The case stems from defendant-veterinarian's care of plaintiff's Maltese dog after surgery. Defendant also lied to plaintiff and falsified records concerning the treatment of the dog. On appeal of the trial court demurrer, this court held that an owner cannot recover emotional distress damages for alleged veterinary malpractice. The court found that it would be incongruous to impose a duty on a veterinarian to avoid causing emotional distress to the owner of the animal being treated, while not imposing such a duty on a doctor to the parents of a child receiving treatment. |
Case |