Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Exotic pet - Chapter 26. Wild Animal Permit. | I.C. 14-22-26-1 to 6 | IN ST 14-22-26-1 to 14-22-26-6 | This set of Indiana laws concerns the keeping of protected and dangerous wild animals. Under the law, a person must obtain a permit to possess these classes of animals. A permit may be suspended if an emergency exists (e.g., the animal is in peril or the animal is in a position to harm another animal). | Statute |
| Conservancy v. USFWS | 677 F.3d 1073 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) | 2012 WL 1319857 (C.A.11 (Fla.)) |
In this case, many environmental advocacy groups petitioned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate critical habitat for a species, the Florida panther, which was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1967. The petition was denied. Claiming the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, the groups filed a citizens suit under the ESA in district court. At district, the group's complaints were dismissed and the groups subsequently lost on appeal. |
Case |
| Excerpt Federal Criminal Code of Mexico | Código Penal Federal de Mexico | This excerpt contains the provisions of the Federal Code of Mexico within "Crimes Against the Environment and Environmental Management." It contains a dedicated chapter to biodiversity, where it gives special protection to wildlife. It does not mention protection of domestic animals. However, it contains provisions prohibiting dog fighting (Article 419 Bis). According to Article 1, this code applies to federal crimes committed within the country. | Statute | |
| CO - Assistance Animals - Colorado Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | C. R. S. A. § 12-240-144; § 12-245-229; § 12-255-133; § 18-13-107, § 18-13-107.3, § 18-13-107.7; § 18-9-202; § 18-1.3-602; § 24-34-301; § 24-34-309; § 24-34-801 - 804; § 40-9-109; § 42-4-808 | CO ST § 12-240-144; § 12-245-229; § 12-255-133; § 18-13-107, § 18-13-107.3, § 18-13-107.7; § 18-9-202; § 18-1.3-602; § 24-34-301; § 24-34-309; § 24-34-801 - 804; § 40-9-109; § 42-4-808 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws. | Statute |
| U.S. v. Clucas | 50 F.Supp. 609 (D.C. Va. 1943) |
Defendant and several individuals went on a duck hunt in and were charged with exceeding the limit for migratory birds under Virginia law. The game wardens testified that the defendant, Clucas, admitted in the presence of the other parties that they had killed more than the 'bag', meaning thereby that they had killed more than ten ducks allowed for each person. The government held the position that the other individuals were hired for the reason of taking or killing the ducks. The court held that in view of the fact that January 6, 1943, was not the first day of the season the possession of twenty-six ducks by the two defendants did not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Virginia regulation. The possession being legal, the burden of proof did not shift to the defendants. |
Case | |
| GA - Endangered - Article 5. Protection of Endangered Wildlife | Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-130 to 133 | GA ST §§ 27-3-130 to 133 | These statutes provide for the definition of "protected" species and outline the duties of the board responsible for enforcing Georgia's endangered species law. Included in the Board's duties are inventorying and designating listed species and promulgating regulations. Violation of these regulations results in a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| U.S. v. Zak | 486 F.Supp.2d 208 (D.Mass., 2007) | 2007 WL 1427442 (D.Mass.) |
Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts under the MBTA after agents determined that he killed 250 great blue herons; he then went to trial on the remaining counts under the MBTA and BGEPA related to his killing of a juvenile bald eagle on his commercial fish growing operation. On appeal, defendant contended that he cannot be found guilty under the MBTA unless the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the bird he was shooting was protected and intentionally shot it with that knowledge (defendant stated that he shot a "big brown hawk'). The court disagreed, finding the overwhelming authority requires no such specific scienter on the part of the actor. With regard to defendant's contention that the government failed to prove the "knowingly" prong of the BGEPA, the court was equally unpersuaded. The evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly shot the eagle as it sat perched on the dead pine tree on the edge of his property, regardless of whether he knew the juvenile bird was an eagle or, as he said, “a big brown hawk.” |
Case |
| Ecuador - Farm animals - Organic Code of agricultural health | Ley Organica de Sanidad Agropecuaria de Ecuador | The organic code of agricultural health of 2017 has as its primary objective to 1) prevent the entry, dissemination, and establishment of pests and diseases; promote animal welfare; and 2) control and eradicate pests and diseases that affect plants and animals and that could represent a phytosanitary and animal health risk. This law creates the Regulatory agency for Phytosanitary and Zoosanitary Control. This agency is responsible for regulating and controlling animal health and welfare, plant health, and food to maintain and improve the adequate conditions of agricultural production. | Statute | |
| CA - Cruelty - Part 9. Societies for Prevention of Cruelty to Children and Animals. | West's Ann. Cal. Corp. Code § 10400 - 10406 | CA CORP § 10400 - 10406 | This set of statutes outlines the rights and responsibilities of corporations that are formed for the prevention of cruelty to animals. | Statute |
| Shumate v. Drake University | 846 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa. 2014) | Plaintiff Shumate was barred from bringing a dog that she was training, into the classroom and to another school event. Shumate worked as a service dog trainer, while she was a student at Drake University Law School, the Defendant in this case. In 2011, Shumate filed a lawsuit alleging that Drake University discriminated against her as a service dog trainer in violation of Iowa Code chapter 216C. She alleged that chapter 216C, implicitly provided service dog trainers with a private right to sue. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the statute does not provide service dog trainers with a private right to sue, nor did it include them under the coverage of chapter 216. The Court reasoned that although Shumate trained dogs to assist the disabled, she was not covered because she is not a person with a disability. The Court stated that closely related statutes expressly created private enforcement actions to aid the disabled while chapter 216C does not. Because an implied right of action would circumvent the procedures of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, the Iowa legislature purposely omitted a private right to sue from chapter 216C. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Shumate's petition with prejudice. | Case |