Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NJ - Disaster - Article 6. Emergency Powers of Governor | N. J. S. A. App. A:9-43.1 - 2 | NJ ST App. A:9-43.1 | In New Jersey, the State Office of Emergency Management, and each county and municipality, is directed to adopt a emergency operations plans that include provisions to support the needs of animals and individuals with an animal under their care, including a service animal, in a major disaster or emergency. | Statute | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 11 Núm 3 |
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| VA - Restaurants, animals - 2 VAC 5-585-3310. Prohibiting animals. | 2 VA ADC 5-585-3310 | 2 VAC 5-585-3310 | This Virginia regulation states that dogs may be allowed in outdoor dining areas if: (1) the outdoor dining area is not enclosed with floor-to-ceiling walls; (2) there is a separate entrance; (3) there is a sign at the main entrance stating that dogs are allowed in the outdoor dining area that is easily observable by the public; (3) food and water provided to dogs is served using equipment not used for human food service or is put in single-use receptacles; (4) dogs are not allowed to sit on chairs, benches, seats, or tables; (5) dogs are kept on a leash or within a pet carrier and under the control of adults at all times; (6) the establishment provides a means for picking up dog messes; and (7) there is a sign outlining some of these requirements observable to the public. | Administrative | |||||||
| U.S. v. Mitchell | 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993) |
Defendant, a zoologist working for the Department of Interior, was charged in nine count indictment taking and transporting animals in violation of foreign law under the Lacey Act among other violations. Defendant filed motion to dismiss and government filed motion to determine foreign law. The government alleged in Count 8 that in September of 1987, Mitchell transported the hides and horns of a Punjab urial (wild sheep) and a Chinkara gazelle out of Pakistan and into the United States knowing that the animals had been taken, possessed or transported in violation of Pakistani law; the Pakistani Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950 and the Punjab Wildlife Act of 1974. The court rejected defendant's reading of the imports and exports law and found it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the Punjab Wildlife Act as the Lacey Act impinges on whether defendant violated the portions of the law prohibiting possession of the animals without a permit. |
Case | ||||||||
| California Veterinary Medical Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood | 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318 (2007) | 152 Cal. App. 4th 536; 2007 WL 1793052 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.), 152 Cal.App.4th 536 | This California case centers on an anti-cat declawing ordinance passed by the city of West Hollywood in 2003. On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court concluded West Hollywood's anti-declawing ordinance was preempted by section 460 and entered judgment in favor of the CVMA, declaring the ordinance invalid and enjoining further enforcement. On appeal, however, this Court reversed, finding section 460 of the veterinary code does not preempt the ordinance. Although section 460 prohibits local legislation imposing separate and additional licensing requirements or other qualifications on individuals holding state licenses issued by agencies of the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA), it does not preclude otherwise valid local regulation of the manner in which a business or profession is performed. | Case | |||||||
| DE - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | 16 Del.C. § 3041F - 3059F; 7 Del.C. § 570; 7 Del.C. § 1701 - 1708; 22 Del.C. § 116; 29 Del.C. § 327 | These statutes comprise Delaware's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning hunting field trials, and the dangerous dog subchapter. | Statute | ||||||||
| Stanton v. State | 395 S.W.3d 676 (Tenn. 2013) | 2013 WL 239099 (Tenn.2013) |
The defendant, a self-employed oil distributor, was charged with 16 counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide food and care for his horses. After being denied a petition for pretrial division and a petition for a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who granted the defendant permission to appeal, but affirmed the lower court's decision that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. |
Case | |||||||
| OR - Exotic Pets - Chapter 609. Animal Control; Exotic Animals; Dealers. | O. R. S. § 609.205 - 355 | OR ST § 609.205 - 355 | These Oregon laws concern the regulation of exotic pets in the state. An "exotic animal" for purposes of the section means a member of the family Felidae not indigenous to Oregon (except the domestic cat), any nonhuman primate, any nonwolf member of the family Canidae not indigenous to Oregon (except the domestic dog), any bear except the black bear, and any member of the order Crocodylia. A person may not keep an exotic animal in this state unless the person possesses a valid State Department of Agriculture permit for that animal issued prior to the effective date of this 2009 Act. | Statute | |||||||
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton | 239 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, twelve conservation organizations and one individual involved in Lynx conservation efforts, challenge a final decision by the USFWS declaring the Lynx in the contiguous United States to be a "threatened," rather than "endangered," species under the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that the designation of the Lynx as threatened is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Service has violated the ESA by failing to designate "critical habitat" for the Lynx as required by that statute. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the FWS's conclusion that, "[c]ollectively, the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies do not constitute a significant portion of the range of the DPS," (three of the Lynx's four regions) were collectively not a significant portion of its range was counterintuitive and contrary to the plain meaning of the ESA phrase "significant portion of its range." With regard to the FWS's failure to designate critical habitat, the excessive delays experienced by the FWS ran completely counter to the mandate of the ESA and were without proper justification. |
Case | ||||||||
| MO - Ordinances - Chapter 77. Third Class Cities | V. A. M. S. 77.590, 79.110, 80.090, 82.300 | MO ST 77.590, 79.110, 80.090, 82.300 | This set of statutes authorizes municipal governments to regulate animals and animal-related nuisances. | Statute |