Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Authorities confiscate night monkeys from FUCEP | Slideshow Images | |||
| Whelen v. Barlow | 1975 CarswellAlta 242 | [1976] W.W.D. 35 |
Plaintiff Whelen was drunken, threatening and disorderly in defendant Barlow's hotel bar, where he kept guard dogs for the purpose of preventing break-ins and keeping the peace. After the plaintiff and friends were asked to leave the premises and not return, he later returned, making threatening gestures and was bitten on the face and arm by one of the guard-dogs. The court held that the plaintiff was 2/3 contributorily liable for his injuries, since when he returned he was trespassing; the defendant was 1/3 contributorily liable since the court held that keeping volatile guard-dogs as bouncers was not reasonable. |
Case |
| TX - Animal Regulation - § 215.026. Animals at Large | V.T.C.A., Local Government Code § 215.026 | Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 215.026 (West) | This statute gives municipalities in the state of Texas to establish and regulate pounds and the running at large of horses, mules, cattle, sheep, swine or goats. The statute also allows municipalities to handle the capture, impounding, and sale of any animal at large that is in violation of this statute. Municipalities may also impose penalties on the owner of the animal that is in violation of the statute. | Statute |
| Westberry v. Blackwell | 577 P.2d 75 (Or. 1978) | 282 Or. 129 (Or. 1978) |
In this Oregon case, plaintiff filed this action to recover for personal injuries sustained when she was bitten by defendants' dog. The complaint alleged a cause of action for strict liability and another for negligence. The trial court granted a judgment of involuntary nonsuit on both causes of action. On appeal, this court found the previous biting, which had occurred only one hour before, could reasonably lead a jury to believe that the dog had dangerous propensities, and that the defendants had knowledge of them. Thus, the court found that the involuntary nonsuit on the strict liability cause was improperly granted. Further, the question of whether the owner, who knew the dog had bitten the guest while on her way into the owner's house, was negligent in failing to control or confine the dog, was for the jury. Reversed and remanded. |
Case |
| Wyno v. Lowndes County | 331 Ga. App. 541, 771 S.E.2d 207 (2015), cert. denied (June 15, 2015) | 2015 WL 1318263 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) | Victim was attacked and killed by her neighbor's dog. Victim's husband, acting individually and as administrator of his wife's estate, brought action against dog owners and several government defendants, whom he alleged failed to respond to earlier complaints about the dog. The trial court dismissed the action against the government for failure to state a claim, concluding that sovereign and official immunity or, alternatively, the Responsible Dog Ownership Law (OCGA § 4–8–30), barred action against the government defendants. Husband appealed. The appeals court held the trial court did not err in dismissing the action against the county and its employees in their official capacities. The former version of OCGA § 4–8–30, effective at the time of the attack, provided immunity to local governments and their employees from liability for all injuries inflicted by dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. The appeals court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the action against the employees in their individual capacities based on official immunity, however. By applying the former OCGA § 4–8–30 (2012) to dismiss the action against the employees in their individual capacities, the trial court implicitly rejected the husband’s constitutional challenge to the statute. Judgment was therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court to enter a ruling specifically and directly passing on the husband’s constitutional challenge. | Case |
| NY - Licenses - Chapter 69. Of the Consolidated Laws. Article 7. Licensing, Identification and Control of Dogs | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 110 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 110 | This New York statute provides the schedule of license fees for all dogs. It also enables local municipalities to enact licensing ordinances in addition to the fee proscribed by statute. This additional revenue shall be used only for controlling dogs and enforcing this article and any rule, regulation, or local law or ordinance adopted pursuant thereto, including subsidizing the spaying or neutering of dogs and subsidizing public humane education programs in responsible dog ownership. | Statute |
| Ley Federal de Responsabilidad Ambiental | Ley Federal de Responsabilidad Ambiental | This law governs environmental responsibility arising from environmental harm and addresses the legal damages and consequences resulting from such harm. It recognizes damages caused to the environment regardless of the damages caused to the owner of the land and the natural resources. | Statute | |
| Downey v. Pierce County | 267 P.3d 445 (Wash.App. Div. 2, 2011) | 2011 WL 5931911 (Wash.App. Div. 2) |
Dog owner sued county challenging county's dangerous animal declaration (DAD) proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that charging a fee to obtain an initial evidentiary review of a DAD violated owner's due process rights because it impacted owner's property and financial interests and potentially subjected her to future criminal sanctions. The court also held that the lack of an adequate evidentiary standard regarding review of DADs violated due process because the ordinance required only that the reviewing auditor determine if there was sufficient evidence to support the DAD. |
Case |
| State v. Crosswhite | 273 Or. App. 605 (2015) | 2015 WL 5439355 (Or. Ct. App., 2015) | After being tipped off about a dog fight, authorities seized several dogs from a home. Defendant was charged with one count of second-degree animal abuse and four counts of second-degree animal neglect. After the presentation of the state's evidence in circuit court, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, arguing, as to second-degree animal neglect, that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant had custody or control over the dogs. Circuit court denied the motion and defendant was convicted on all counts. Defendant appealed the denial of the motion, again arguing that the state failed to prove that he had “custody or control” over the dogs. The appeals court concluded that the plain text and context of ORS 167.325(1), together with the legislature's use of the same term in a similar statute, demonstrated that the legislature intended the term “control” to include someone who had the authority to guide or manage an animal or who directed or restrained the animal, regardless if the person owned the animal. Given the facts of the case, the court concluded that based on that evidence, a reasonable juror could find that defendant had control over the dogs, and the trial court had not erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. | Case |
| Mercado v. Ovalle | 973 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., 2013) | 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 06810, 2013 WL 5712557, 110 A.D.3d 539 |
In this New York case, plaintiff appealed the lower court's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in a dog bite case. Defendants, a grocery store and its owner, asserted that they did not own the two pit bulls that attacked plaintiff. The only evidence plaintiff presented showing defendants' ownership and control over the dogs were hearsay statements from the mechanic who operated the lot that the dogs guarded. The court found this evidence that defendants occasionally walked and fed the dogs insufficient to show that they "harbored" the dogs. Affirmed. |
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