Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IA - Dangerous Wild Animals - Chapter 77. Dangerous Wild Animals | IA ADC 21-77.1 - 14 | Iowa Admin. Code r. 21-77.1 - 14 | This set of rules defines a "dangerous wild animal" and prohibits the importation, possession, ownership, and breeding of those animals. Certain listed individuals and entities are exempt from the ban. Also, a person who owned or possessed a dangerous wild animal on July 1, 2007 may continue to own or possess that animal if the person complies with the legal requirements outlined in this Chapter. | Administrative | |
| Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles | 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 (Cal.App.2 Dist., 2011) | 194 Cal.App.4th 1219 (2011); 2011 WL 1601919 (Cal.App.2 Dist., 2011) |
Dog owners mounted a constitutional challenge to a Los Angeles municipal ordinance that required all dogs and cats within the city to be sterilized. The Court of Appeal held that the ordinance did not violate the owners’ freedom of association rights, free speech rights. or equal protection rights. The court held that it was not unconstitutionally vague, was not outside of the city's police powers, did not vest unfettered discretion in city officials, did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint or an unconstitutional taking. Finally, the law did not violate individual liberties under the California Constitution. |
Case | |
| IN - Breeder - Article 21. Commercial Dog Breeder Regulation | I.C. 15-21-1-1 - 15-21-7-4 | IN ST 15-21-1-1 to 15-21-7-4 | The laws set forth requirements for commercial breeders in Indiana. “Commercial dog breeder” means a person who (1) maintains more than nineteen (19) unaltered female dogs that are at least twelve (12) months of age; and (2) engages in the sale of dogs, resulting from the breeding of dogs, to a dog broker; a pet store; or the general public. Registration is required. Exemptions exist under the chapter. | Statute | |
| Australia -Farming - Agricultural Act | This Act allows the chief executive to make standards on all matters related to agriculture, including labelling, the marking of stocks and the selling or using of hormonal growth promotants. The chief executive may also establish an advisory committee on agricultural standards. For persons whose interests are adversely affected by a decision of the chief executive under this Act or by an inspector’s decision, this act provides appeal provisions. Enforcement and penalty provisions are also included. | Statute | |||
| Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground | 2002 WL 31789336 (Wash.App. Div. 2) | 114 Wash.App. 1062 (2002) (Not Reported in P.2d) |
In this case, exotic animal owners appeal a summary judgment order dismissing their various constitutional challenges to a City of Battle Ground ordinance that prohibits ownership of such animals within city limits. Specifically, the owners contended that the ordinance violated their right to equal protection under the constitution because it treats those who keep exotic pets within the City differently from those who keep dangerous dogs. The court held that it was within the city's police power authority to enact these laws if they were supported by a rational relationship. In fact, the court found that the local legislative body may draw a different conclusion from the Washington Supreme Court in areas of public safety and the exercise of the local government's police powers provided it does not conflict with the general laws of the state. ( Note : publication of case ordered Feb. 7, 2003 in 115 Wash.App. 752, 63 P.3d 142 ). |
Case | |
| LaRosa v. River Quarry Apartments, LLC | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 3538951 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2019) | No. 1:18-CV-00384-BLW | Plaintiffs, Robert and Iva LaRosa filed this action in August of 2018, alleging that the defendants violated their rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The Court dismissed the complaint and the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The Plaintiffs had applied to live at River Quarry Apartments in August of 2017. They requested a reasonable accommodation to keep their dog at the apartment without paying a fee. The Plaintiffs provided a copy of a note from a nurse practitioner stating that the companion dog helps manage Mr. LaRosa’s post-traumatic stress disorder. The Plaintiffs were approved for the apartment but told that their reasonable accommodation request was still being processed and received forms to fill out regarding the reasonable accommodation. River Quarry required Mr. LaRose’s doctor to fill out a form verifying the need for an assistance animal. Rather than completing the form, the plaintiffs provided a letter from Mr. LaRosa’s primary care physician which stated that in the doctor’s opinion, an emotional support animal would help mitigate the symptoms that Mr. LaRose was experiencing. River Quarry insisted on speaking with Mr. LaRose’s doctor directly to verify the information that the plaintiffs had given. After Kirk Cullimore, an attorney on behalf of River Quarry, spoke with the doctor, River Quarry wrote a letter to the Plaintiffs denying their request for a reasonable accommodation stating that the doctor declined to verify that Mr. LaRosa met the two prong test that one must be handicapped and there must be a nexus between the handicap and the need for the animal. Soon after this, Mr. LaRosa saw his primary care physician and had the actual form completed by his doctor and turned it in to River Quarry. Kirk Cullimore believed that the doctor’s signature on the form was forged and called Mr. LaRose’s doctor to speak with him again. The doctor’s secretary informed Cullimore that the signature was genuine. Mr. and Mrs. LaRosa argued that they were injured by the discrimination of the Defendants in violation of the FHA. The Court denied the Plaintiffs claim under the FHA because they did not sufficiently allege that the Defendants refused to make the requested accommodation. River Quarry allowed the dog to stay in the apartment while their request for an accommodation was reviewed. The Court stated that housing providers are granted a meaningful opportunity to investigate a request for an accommodation. Housing providers do not have to immediately approve a request for an accommodation right away. River Quarry ended up approving the request within 45 days after the initial request. The Court held that this was not an unreasonable delay considering that River Quarry did not have sufficient information to make a determination until after Mr. LaRosa’s doctor completed the verification form. Prior to that the doctor’s letter and the phone call between Cullimore and the doctor did not reveal enough information for River Quarry to make a determination on the accommodation. The Plaintiffs, however, succeeded on their interference claim. The LaRosas were engaged in a protected activity when they applied for a reasonable accommodation and they sufficiently alleged that they were subjected to adverse action and that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. The Defendants misrepresented the contents of Mr. Cullimore and Mr. LaRosa’s doctor’s conversation. The Court ultimately denied in part and granted in part the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss claims against Kirk Cullimore and his law office. | Case | |
| GA - Horse Meat - Article 4. Advertisement and Sale of Meat Generally. | Ga. Code Ann., § 26-2-150 to 161 | GA ST § 26-2-150 to 161 | As stated in the legislative intent, the General Assembly declares that purchasers and consumers have a right to expect and demand honesty and fair practices in the sale of meat for human consumption. It is the purpose of this Code to ensure that honest, fair, and ethical practices are followed in the advertising and sale of meat for human consumption. With regard to horsemeat, the Code prohibits the slaughter a horse in this state for the purpose of selling or offering for sale for human consumption or for other than human consumption the horse meat derived from such slaughtered animal unless certain conditions are met. Further, no horse meat shall be sold or offered for sale in this state for human consumption unless at the place of sale there shall be posted in a conspicuous location a sign bearing the words "HORSE MEAT FOR SALE." | Statute | |
| Habeas Corpus para Chimpanzé - Íntegra (portuguese) | Heron J. de Santana e Luciano R. Santana ajuizar ação nos termos do art. 5 °, LXVIII, Constituição do Brasil. E, art. 647, Código de Processo Penal. Os peticionários buscar a Grande Writ em nome de Suíça, Chimpanzé (nome científico Pan Troglodytes), que é um prisioneiro no Zoológico de Getúlio Vargas, para alívio de ato ilegal e abusivo perpetrado por o diretor da Secretaria de Governo para a Biodiversidade, Meio Ambiente e da Água Recursos. Este é o primeiro caso de considerar que um chimpanzé pode ser uma pessoa jurídica de vir perante o tribunal no âmbito de um pedido de Habeas Corpus. | Pleading | |||
| Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd | (2008) 244 ALR 161 | (2008) 165 FCR 510; (2008) 99 ALD 534; [2008] FCA 3 |
The applicant, an incorporated public interest organisation, sought an injunction to restrain the respondent Japanese company which owned several ocean vessels engaged in, and likely to further engage in, whaling activities in waters claimed by Australia. It was found that the applicant had standing to bring the injunction and the respondent engaged in activities prohibited by the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Orders were entered against against the respondent even though it had no assets in Australia and the likelihood of being able to enforce judgment was very low. |
Case | |
| Scotland - Wildlife - Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004 | 2004 asp 6 | This Act makes amendments to the protection of wildlife under the Countryside and Wildlife Act 1981, and the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, in respect of Scotland. Wild animal protection is extended to include reckless as well as intentional acts. The Act also makes it an offence to disturb or harass a dolphin, whale or basking shark, and amends the provisions for enforcement. | Statute |