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Displaying 5781 - 5790 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WA - Gold Bar - § Sec. 6.02.019 Foster care or rescue or placement. | § 6.02.019 | This municipal code provides the provisions for foster care or rescue placement program for dogs and cats. The code requires the shelter to maintain records. The code also limits the length of fostering and the number of dogs and cats that an individual may foster at one time. | Local Ordinance | |
| WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.070. Dangerous dogs and related definitions | West's RCWA 16.08.070 | WA ST 16.08.070 | This Washington statute provides the definitions related to dangerous dogs, including dangerous dog, potentially dangerous dog, severe injury, and owner, among others. | Statute |
| WA - Cathlamet - Breed - Chapter 6.10 
PIT BULL DOGS | CATHLAMET, WA., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 6.10.010 - 6.10.030 (1991) |
It is unlawful to keep, or harbor, own or in any way possess a pit bull dog in Cathlamet, Washington, with exceptions for dogs licensed before the effective date of this chapter. Such dogs are subject to certain requirements, such as proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, posting “Beware of Dog” signs, the use of special orange collars, photographs and tattoos for identification purposes, keeping $100,000 liability insurance, and vaccinating the dog against rabies. Any pit bull dog found to be the subject of a violation may be confiscated and even destroyed. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd | (2001) 208 CLR 199 | (2001) 185 ALR 1; (2001) 76 ALJR 1; (2001) 22(19) Leg Rep 11; (2001) 54 IPR 161; (2001) Aust Torts Reports 81-627; [2001] HCA 63 |
The respondent was successful in obtaining an injunction against the appellants from publishing a film displaying possums being stunned and killed at an abattoir. The film had been obtained from a third party while trespassing. The Court found that it was not unconscionable for the appellants to publish the film and a corporation did not have a right to privacy. |
Case |
| Thorp v. District of Columbia | 319 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C.), reconsideration denied, 327 F. Supp. 3d 186 (D.D.C. 2018) | Two officers were stationed in a church parking lot near the home of Plaintiff, Mark Thorp. The two officers claimed they saw and heard the plaintiff “forcefully strike” his dog. The plaintiff then took the dog inside and would not speak with the officers. The officers reported the incidence to a Washington Humane Society Law Enforcement Officer who applied for a search warrant of plaintiff’s home. The warrant was subsequently approved. The Lieutenant who led the team that executed the search warrant on the plaintiff’s home previously had a sexual relationship with the plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend. During the search, the officers secured the dog and concluded that the dog was uninjured and in good health exhibiting no signs of abuse. The search warrant was only approved for evidence of animal cruelty/neglect, however, the search continued even after the plaintiff’s dog had been found in good health. The plaintiff believes that the search continued because the officers wanted to find drugs in his home. Plaintiff believes that the search for animal cruelty was just a disguise so that the officers could search for drugs. The officers found in the plaintiff’s freezer two zip-loc bags full of capsules which turned out to be amphetamines. The plaintiff insists he had a prescription for the pills. A second warrant was issued for evidence of drugs and related materials. After the second search, the officers found additional drugs and drug paraphernalia in the house. The plaintiff was charged with animal cruelty and possession of illegal drugs, however, the prosecutor abandoned the case and all criminal charges were dismissed. Plaintiff brought this action seeking redress for his injuries against the Lieutenant who led the search and the District. Both parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff claims his fourth amendment rights were violated under section 1983. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the first animal-cruelty warrant application was deficient and made at the behest of the Lieutenant and that false information was used on the warrant application. The Court rejects this argument because the plaintiff abandoned the fact that the two officers fabricated the warrant application at the behest of the Lieutenant. The Court, therefore, concluded that the Lieutenant played no role in preparing or submitting the warrant application. Next the plaintiff contends that the Lieutenant’s reliance on the warrant was improper. The Court concluded that since the Lieutenant had no part int the warrant application, he had no reason to distrust its contents. The warrant was facially valid and as a result, the Court cannot hold the Lieutenant responsible for executing it. Plaintiff contended that the Lieutenant exceeded the scope of the first warrant because the rummaging around in closed spaces after the search was considered finished exceeded the scope. The Court disagreed and concluded that the warrant authorized a search for animals that were dead or alive and an animal can surely fit in a freezer. The Court said that the Lieutenant’s “judgment that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was not plainly incompetent.” Next the plaintiff argues that the second warrant was invalid. The Court reasoned that since the Lieutenant could have reasonably believed that he had authority to search the freezer, it would also be reasonable for him to obtain a warrant based on its contents. Plaintiff also contended that the pills in the freezer were not in plain sight. However, the photos that the plaintiff used to prove his point actually belies this claim because the Court could clearly make out the same clear plastic baggies with pills in both pictures. Next the plaintiff argues that the warrantless field test of the methamphetamines was improper. The Court concluded that field tests of methamphetamine are not recognized as a search and therefore do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Even if that were the case, qualified immunity would shield the Lieutenant from civil liability. Next the plaintiff argues that his arrest was without probable cause. The Court stated that given the amount of drug evidence that was found in the second search, there was enough probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Next the plaintiff argues that the execution of the warrants unnecessarily cause property damage. The plaintiff failed to challenge this claim because he did not accompany it with specific points of law to support it. The Court refused to decide this matter. Finally, plaintiff argues that the officers unlawfully seized more than $53,000 in cash from the apartment. This claim also falls outside of the lawsuit because the plaintiff failed to make mention of it in his complaint. The plaintiff lastly alleges that the district negligently supervised and retained the lieutenant and he asserts a claim of abuse of process. The plaintiff failed to show that the Lieutenant engaged in behavior that should have put his employer on notice that he required additional training or that he was dangerous or otherwise incompetent. As for the abuse of process claim, plaintiff alleges two acts: Lieutenant’s arrest of him and the seizure of his property. The court held that the Lieutenant’s warrantless actions cannot sustain an abuse of process claim. The Court ultimately granted the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. | Case | |
| TX - Registration - Subchapter C: Regulation of Dogs | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.021 - 035 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.021 - 035 | Chapter 822, Sections .031 through .035 address the regulation of dogs. Specifically, these provisions cover the registration requirements, prohibit unregistered dogs from running at large, and enumerate the treatment of dogs that attack other domestic animals. | Statute |
| Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreation Enterprises | LCa 1684?96 |
Court held that holding a fighting match between a human and an alligator was a violation of the Israel Anti-Cruelty laws. |
Case | |
| Downing v. Gully, P.C. | 915 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. App. 1996) |
Appellant dog owners challenged the decision of the County Court at Law No. 2 of Tarrant County (Texas), which granted summary judgment in favor of appellee veterinary clinic in appellants' negligence, misrepresentation, and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee veterinary clinic because appellee's veterinarians provided affidavits that were sufficiently factually specific, describing experience, qualifications, and a detailed account of the treatment, so that appellee negated the element of the breach of the standard of care, and because Deceptive Trade Practice Act claims did not apply to state licensed veterinarians. |
Case | |
| MD - Research - § 15-101. Adoptions of dogs or cats used in research facilities | MD Code, Agriculture, § 15-101 | MD AGRIC § 15-101 | This Maryland statute provides that a research facility located in the State in which dogs or cats are used for scientific research purposes shall take reasonable steps to provide for the adoption of a dog or cat after a determination that the animal is no longer needed for research. This shall be done through a private placement process for adoption, establishing a list of animal rescues willing to take in these animals, or offering a dog or cat to the rescues. | Statute |
| Sentencia C-666, 2010 | Sentencia C-666/10 | The Constitutional Court decided on an unconstitutionality claim against Article 7 of the Statute of Animal Protection Ley 84 of 1989 that corresponds to the exceptions to the duty of animal protection. This decision established the conditions that must be met for the exceptions of Article 7 to apply. Put in different words, through Decision C-666, the court limits the scope of the legality of bullfighting, establishing certain requirements. In its holding, the Court stated that the seven practices in Article 7 would not violate the Constitution, so long as they were done within the following parameters: (1) As long as it is understood that these animals should, in all cases, obtain special protection against suffering and pain during the execution of these activities. This exception allows the continuation of cultural expressions and entertainment with animals, so long as exceptionally cruel acts against these animals are eliminated, or lessened in the future in a process of adaptation between cultural expressions and duties of protection to animals; (2) These practices can only take place in municipalities and districts in which the practices are themselves a manifestation of a regular, periodic and uninterrupted tradition, and therefore their execution responds to a certain regularity; (3) These practices can only take place during occasions in which they have commonly taken place and in the municipalities and districts where they are authorized; (4) These are the only practices that are authorized to be part of the exception in Article 7 to the constitutional duty to protect animals; and (5) Municipal authorities cannot economically support the construction of installations for the exclusive execution of the activities listed in Article 7 with public funds. | Case |