Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OK - Restaurant, animals - 310:257-11-54. Prohibiting animals | OK ADC 310:257-11-54 | OAC 310:257-11-54 | This Oklahoma regulation relates to animals in food establishments. Subsection (d) states that dogs and cats may be allowed in outdoor dining areas, provided the dog or cat is controlled by the owner or handler of the animal and nine conditions are met. Among the conditions include a requirement for a separate entrance to the outdoor dining area, a prohibition on direct contact with the animals by employees, a process to keep the area clean from animal excrement, and a requirement that food and water receptacles for the animals be single-use, disposable containers. | Administrative | |
| NJ - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | N. J. S. A. 2A:42-101 to 2A:42-113; 2C:29-3.1; 4:19-1 to 4:19-43; 4:19A-1 - 17; 4:21B-1 - 3; 4:22A-1 to 13; 23:4-25, 26, 46; 26:4-78 - 95; 40:48-1; 54:4-83 | These statutes comprise New Jersey's dog laws. Among the provisions include laws regarding domesticated animals in housing projects, rabies control laws, licensing requirements, and dangerous dog laws. | Statute | ||
| McCall v. State | 540 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). |
Open fields doctrine; warrantless seizure. It was not unreasonable for humane society members to enter defendant's land and seize dogs where the dogs were kept in an open field clearly in view of neighbors and others, and where it was apparent that the dogs were emaciated and not properly cared for. |
Case | ||
| MN - Health - 1721.0500. IMPORTATION OF DOGS, CATS, OR FERRETS. | MN ADC 1721.0500 | Minn. R. 1721.0500 | This Minnesota regulation states that, unless otherwise provided, a dog, cat, or ferret imported into the state must be accompanied by a certificate of veterinary inspection. A dog, cat, or ferret three months of age or older imported into the state must be currently vaccinated for rabies unless they meet all conditions of subpart 1, item D, or are exempted by the board based on the written recommendations of a licensed veterinarian who has examined the animal and who has determined that vaccination is contraindicated due to a medical condition. | Administrative | |
| In re New Jersey Pinelands Com'n Resolution | 812 A.2d 1113 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2003) | 356 N.J.Super. 363 |
This case concerns the approval of a settlement agreement for a residential development project that contained habitat critical to the survival of a local population of timber rattlesnakes, an endangered species in New Jersey. The court's review of the record found that there is no reason to interfere with the determination by the Commission, since there was ample evidence to support the Commission's decision to approve the settlement. The court also agreed with the lower court that the environmental organizations lacked standing to bring an endangered species counterclaim before the lower court. Specifically, the court found that the Department of Environmental Protection and the Commission did not fail to act in implementing the endangered species act; thus, no standing was conferred upon the groups. The court also noted that the DEP and the Commission acted in their requisite complementary roles in effecting the Act. |
Case | |
| ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF CINCINNATI v. THE GORILLA FOUNDATION | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 414971 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2019) | In 1991, the plaintiff, Zoological Society of Cincinnati, transferred a western lowland Gorilla named Ndume who had been living at the Zoo to The Gorilla Foundation (TGF) in Northern California. Ndume was sent to TGF in hopes that he and another gorilla there, named Koko, would mate and produce offspring. That never happened. In 2015, the Zoo and TGF entered into a new written agreement which expressly superseded any prior agreements. The agreement provided that upon the death of Koko, Ndume was to be placed at an institution that is accredited by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA). TGF is not an AZA accredited institution. KoKo died and the Zoo now wants to transfer Ndume back to the zoo. TGF has not made arrangements for a transfer to be carried out. The Zoo brought this suit seeking specific enforcement of the 2015 agreement and contends that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. TGF argued that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable because the transfer would harm Ndume. TGF identified a number of potential risks, particularly, that Ndume has a Balantidium Coli infection. TGF contended that stress could trigger an outbreak which could be fatal. The court was unpersuaded and stated that TGF signed the 2015 agreement less than 3 years before the present dispute arose and that all of the circumstances that TGF contends makes compliance with the agreement risky existed when the agreement was negotiated. TGF also contended that the agreement is impracticable due to unreasonable (non-monetary) costs. However, the Court again stated that TGF knew these facts and circumstances when it entered into the agreement. The Court granted the Zoo's motion for summary judgment and denied TGF's request for a continuance to permit it to take discovery. The parties were ordered to confer and attempt to reach a consensus on as many aspects of the protocol for transporting Ndume to the Zoo as possible. If within 30 days of the date of the order the parties cannot reach a consensus, they will have to file a joint statement setting out any issues on which they have reached a stalemate. | Case | ||
| MS - Hunting, birds - § 49-1-39. Killing animals or birds injurious to agriculture; | Miss. Code Ann. § 49-1-39; Miss. Code Ann § 49-5-7 | MS ST § 49-1-39; MS ST § 49-5-7 | Mississippi amended its laws in 2000 to specifically disallow the killing of any bird protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and was further amended to prohibit the killing or molestation of any wild bird (other than a game bird and some excepted species). While the law was written with an evident bias toward agricultural protection, it does specifically mention the eagle as one of the species protected under federal law. | Statute | |
| Hampton v.Hammons | 743 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1987) |
The five-year-old child hopped a fence, which was in disrepair, into his neighbor's yard to retrieve a ball. As he was trying to leave, he was severely bitten by a pit bull that the neighbor was keeping for his son. In reversing the judgment in part, the court held that the keeping of a pit bull might be a violation of Tulsa, Okla., Rev. Ordinances tit. 2, ch. 1, § (2)(d) (1973), so the child's negligence per se theory was actionable. The court held that the neighbor was the dog's owner as a matter of law under the dog-bite statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 4. sec. 42.1 (1981). |
Case | ||
| Reid v. Kramer | Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 2866091 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2019) | In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court. | Case | ||
| People v. Parker (Unpublished) | 1999 WL 33435342 (Unpublished Mich. 1999) |
Defendants-appellees, who were bound over on the charge of knowingly attending an animal fight and of knowingly organizing, promoting, or collecting money for the fighting of an animal, filed a motion to suppress evidence and motions to quash the information. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed and the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact, and that evidence that had been obtained in violation of defendant Parker's Fourth Amendment rights was admissible against all defendants except Parker. Finally, as to the defendants' challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court declared that it had already determined that the language was neither vague nor overbroad. Reversed and remanded for trial. |
Case |