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Displaying 111 - 120 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TN - Cruelty, reporting - Part 4. Cross Reporting of Animal Cruelty | T. C. A. § 38-1-401 - 403 | Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-1-402 - 403 | This Tennessee statute requires employees of child or adult protective service agencies to report animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect that they know or reasonably suspect to have occurred in their county. The statute also describes the amount of time that an employee may have to make a report and ensures the confidentiality of the employee. The statute also makes clear that it does not impose a duty on the employee to investigate known or reasonably suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect. | Statute |
| Carroll v. Cnty. of Monroe | 712 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2013) | The Plaintiff-Appellant appeals a decision/order by the lower court to deny her motion to set aside the jury verdict or grant a new trial. At the original trial, a jury found plaintiff failed to prove her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the shooting of her dog during the execution of a search warrant was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff's dog was shot during a "no-knock" search warrant at plaintiff's residence, but the warrant team was aware that a dog would be present during the search. On appeal, this court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial because she failed to provide any “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to show that the jury would find in her favor. The court believed that it was unlikely that a jury would find in her favor because of the fact that the dog was killed during a “no-knock” search of the home and the dog “quickly and aggressively” ran towards the police officer after he entered the home. Although the court agreed that the officers should have advised a plan to deal with the dog in a non-lethal way, it maintained that a jury would unlikely find that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable given the circumstances of this case. Affirmed. | Case | |
| CA - Horse docking - § 597q. Docked horses; unregistered; prima facie evidence | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597q | CA PENAL § 597q | This statute provides that driving, working, keeping, racing or using any unregistered docked horse 60 days after the passage of this act is prima facie evidence of the fact that the party engaged in such activity docked the tail of such horse. | Statute |
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef v. United States Department of Agriculture | 517 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.,2007) | 2007 WL 1020786 (D.D.C.,2007) | Creekstone Farms Premium Beef (Creekstone) sought to independently test their slaughtered cows so they could more safely provide meat to consumers. Creekstone requested testing kits from the USDA, the same kits that USDA inspectors use to test for BSE. The district court ruled that Creekstone could perform the tests. | Case |
| Laws Banning Cosmetics Testing on Animals | This map contains links to the twelve (12) states that ban cosmetics testing on animals as of 2024. These laws generally prohibit manufacturers from importing or selling cosmetic products where the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that animal testing was conducted or contracted by or on behalf of the manufacturer or any supplier of the manufacturer. These laws have some exceptions and typically include civil remedies for violation. | State map | ||
| In re: JOHN D. DAVENPORT, d/b/a KING ROYAL CIRCUS. | 57 Agric. Dec. 189 (U.S.D.A. May 18, 1998) | 1998 WL 300096 | Since 7 USCS § 2140 requires that exhibitors make their records identifying animals available for inspection at all reasonable times, it is not unreasonable to expect that records be with animals as they are transported | Case |
| US - Cruelty - § 48. Animal crush videos | 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 | This federal law was amended in November 2019 to expand its prohibition on "animal crush videos" to "crushing" that affects interstate or foreign commerce or occurs within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. "Crushing" is defined as "actual conduct in which one or more living non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians is purposely crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 and including conduct that, if committed against a person and in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, would violate section 2241 or 2242." Exceptions exist for things like veterinary care, animal husbandry, animal slaughter, hunting and fishing, medical or scientific research, personal protection, and animal euthanasia. Violation incurs a fine or imprisonment for not more than 7 years or both fine and imprisonment. | Statute | |
| Wolf Timeline hmtl |
Pre 1930’s |
Article | ||
| Pete Mansour v. King County, a municipal corporation; King County Animal Control; King County Licensing and Regulatory Services | In this Washington case, Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals reversed a King County Animal Control decision declaring a dog vicious and ordering her removed from the county. This decision overrides the practice of a dog being presumed guilty until proven innocent in that county. The court found that for Mansour or any other pet owner to prove effectively present his or her case and rebut the evidence against him or her, due process requires that he or she be able to subpoena witnesses and present records. Mr. Mansour was prejudiced in his case because he was not allowed to do so and was not given sufficient notice for the hearing. | Pleading | ||
| Zimmerman v. Wolff | 622 F.Supp.2d 240 (E.D. Pa. 2008) | Plaintiff initiated this action against defendant in his official capacity as Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, asking the Court to enjoin defendant from seizing plaintiff's dogs and from preventing him from operating his dog kennel under his federal license. Plaintiff simultaneously filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The State moved for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Since the Animal Welfare Act did not create a private cause of action, the district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s constitutional claims were also dismissed because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought against state actors directly. Plaintiff’s motions were therefore denied and defendant’s motion was granted. The court went on to address whether it would be appropriate to grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to bring the Commerce and Supremacy clause claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and found that it would be futile for both. | Case |