Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re: DELTA AIR LINES, INC. | 53 Agric. Dec. 1076 (1994) | 1994 WL 657125 (U.S.D.A.) | The Judicial Officer affirmed the Decision by Chief Judge Palmer (Chief ALJ) assessing civil penalties of $140,000, with $60,000 held in abeyance for 1 year, for transporting 108 dogs and cats in a cargo space that was without sufficient air, causing the death of 32 dogs. The Order also directs Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act, regulations and standards, and, in particular, to cease and desist from failing to ensure that dogs and cats have a supply of air sufficient for normal breathing. On appeal, the court held that when regulated entity fails to comply with Act, regulations or standards, there is separate violation for each animal consequently harmed or placed in danger. | Case | |
| Stephens v. City of Spokane | Slip Copy, 2007 WL 3146390 (E.D.Wash.) | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 3146390 |
Before the court here is defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to certify a class. Plaintiffs claim is based on Spokane's "barking dog" ordinance" for which they were each issued an infraction by animal control officers. Plaintiffs contend the ordinance is void for vagueness. The court disagreed, finding that the ordinance has incorporated the reasonableness standard and is presumptively constitutional. In the ordinance, the citizen of average intellect need not guess at the prohibition of allowing an animal to unreasonably disturb persons by “habitually barking, howling, yelping, whining, or making other oral noises.” |
Case | |
| IN - Domestic Violence - 31-9-2-42 “Domestic or family violence” | I.C. 31-9-2-42 | IN ST 31-9-2-42 | This section of the Family Law Code defines "domestic or family violence" as "[a]busing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), torturing (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), mutilating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5), or killing a vertebrate animal without justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or household member." | Statute | |
| CO - Emergency - § 25-3.5-203. Emergency medical service providers--certification | C. R. S. A. § 25-3.5-203 | CO ST § 25-3.5-203 | This law concerns emergency medical service providers. An emergency medical service provider may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats to the extent the provider has received commensurate training and is authorized by the employer to provide the care. Requirements governing the circumstances under which emergency medical service providers may provide preveterinary emergency care to dogs and cats may be specified in the employer's policies governing the provision of care. “Preveterinary emergency care” means the immediate medical stabilization of a dog or cat by an emergency medical service provider, in an emergency to which the emergency medical service provider is responding, through means including oxygen, fluids, medications, or bandaging, with the intent of enabling the dog or cat to be treated by a veterinarian. “Preveterinary emergency care” does not include care provided in response to an emergency call made solely for the purpose of tending to an injured dog or cat, unless a person's life could be in danger attempting to save the life of a dog or cat. | Statute | |
| US - Endangered - Emergency Petition to List the Pygmy Three-Toed Sloth | Submitted by the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) | The Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) formally requests that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) list the pygmy three-toed sloth (Bradypus pygmaeus) as endangered under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) on an emergency basis. Alternatively, if the USFWS determines that an emergency listing is not warranted in this case, AWI requests that it process this listing petition pursuant to the standard timetable as required under the ESA. | Administrative | ||
| US - Chimpanzees - Research | NIH Working Group Report (2013) | This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the Working Group on the Use of Chimpanzees in National Institutes of Health (NIH)-Supported Research. The NIH formed this committee within the Council of Councils, a federal advisory committee, to advise the NIH on the implementation of the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM’s) Committee on the Use of Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research regarding the use of chimpanzees in NIH-sponsored research. | Administrative | ||
| AK - Ordinances - § 03.55.070. Power of village council to control dogs | AS § 03.55.070 | AK ST § 03.55.070 | This Alaska statute enables a village council the power to destroy loose dogs in the village and otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. The council may impose and enforce the provisions of a dog control ordinance in the total area within 20 miles of the village. | Statute | |
| Anays Rodriguez-Porras, Plaintiff v. Miami-Dade Animal Services, Miami-Dade Police Department, Miami-Dade County, Defendants |
This Miami-Dade County, Florida case concerns the unauthorized euthanization of the plaintiff's dog, "Cowboy." Cowboy was a beloved family pet who was fitted with an identification microchip in case he was ever lost. In August of 2005, Cowboy got loose after being frightened by a storm and picked up by an animal shelter officer. The plaintiff was inaccurately informed that no dog matching Cowboy's description was at the shelter (records from the shelter showed he was actually picked up the same day he escaped from his home). Five days later, she was informed that Cowboy was at the shelter. After telling the shelter she would be there the next day to pick up Cowboy (since the shelter was closing and would not wait for her to arrive), the shelter euthanized the dog despite assurances to plaintiff that he would be kept safe. Plaintiff sued animal control, the county, and police department for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, wrongful disposition of a body, and negligence. |
Pleading | |||
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton | 239 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, twelve conservation organizations and one individual involved in Lynx conservation efforts, challenge a final decision by the USFWS declaring the Lynx in the contiguous United States to be a "threatened," rather than "endangered," species under the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that the designation of the Lynx as threatened is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Service has violated the ESA by failing to designate "critical habitat" for the Lynx as required by that statute. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the FWS's conclusion that, "[c]ollectively, the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies do not constitute a significant portion of the range of the DPS," (three of the Lynx's four regions) were collectively not a significant portion of its range was counterintuitive and contrary to the plain meaning of the ESA phrase "significant portion of its range." With regard to the FWS's failure to designate critical habitat, the excessive delays experienced by the FWS ran completely counter to the mandate of the ESA and were without proper justification. |
Case | ||
| People v. Spence | 212 Cal.App.4th 478 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2012) | 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,151, 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 27, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,325 |
In this California case, a jury convicted James Spence of two counts of sexual offenses against a child 10 years old or younger (his housemate's daughter). He was sentenced to a total term of 55 years to life. Among other issues on appeal, Spence argues the court erred by allowing a therapy dog or support canine to be present at the child's feet while she testified, and contends this was “overkill” with the additional support person present on the witness stand. Section 868.5 of the Evidence Code allows up to two support persons during testimony. The court found that the dog was not a "person" for purposes of the code. The trial judge's decision to allow the dog was discretionary. The jury was given instructions to base its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial and not on any sympathies. Further, the court found even if more specific express findings of necessity would have been proper prior to allowing both the dog and support person on the the witness stand, any error was harmless. |
Case |