Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sentencia T-760, 2007 | Sentencia T-760/07 | The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’, arguing that ‘CORPOCALDAS’ had violated the fundamental rights to health, personal integrity, life and human integrity of the Plaintiff’s wife, who became severely depressed when the Defendant confiscated an amazonian parrot she kept as her pet. The Plaintiff argued that the parrot was the only company the Plaintiff’s wife had for over five years, and that the confiscation of their parrot, was a violation of the Plaintiff's wife's fundamental rights. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that his wife was 65 years old, had raised the parrot that was never abused or neglected and who was allowed to move freely as her wings were never trimmed. The Plaintiff sought the the return of the parrot by the environmental authority ‘CORPOCALDAS’ to his wife, as well as the granting of the parrot’s title to her. The Court was able to find that the Plaintiff’s wife’s health was indeed diminished after the confiscation of the bird and the she had to undergo treatment as a result of it. However, the court found that the Plaintiffs were unable to provide evidence tending to prove that they had acquired the animal in a legal manner, as no permit, hunting license, or evidence that the parrot was obtained from a legal breeder were provided. The court determined that CORPOCALDAS did not overstep its responsibilities, as it is its duty to protect the wild fauna of the nation. Touching on the issue of whether the the fundamental rights of the plaintiff had been violated, the court concluded there was not such violation, as the environmental authority’s action was legal, reasonable, necessary and legitimate, and the Plaintiff did not obtained the parrot in accordance with the requirements legally established. In this case, the collective right to a healthy environment prevailed over the personal interest of the Plaintiff. The Constitutional Court affirmed the judgment of the ‘Juzgado Segundo Laboral del Circuito de Manizales’. | Case | |
| UNITED STATES of America v. Robert J. v. STEVENS, Appellant |
The Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, the federal law that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty, is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. This brief supports the United States' petition for certiorari. Cert. was granted in April of 2009 by the U.S. Supreme Court. |
Pleading | ||
| Priebe v. Nelson | 140 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2006) | 39 Cal.4th 1112, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 |
A kennel worker who was bitten by a dog while the dog was in the care of the kennel sued the owner of the dog under a theory of strict liability under a statute and under the common law. The court found that the dog owner was not liable to the kennel worker because under the "veterinarian's rule," the kennel owner had assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog. |
Case |
| UT - Ecoterrorism - § 76-6-110. Offenses committed against animal enterprises--Definitions--Enhanced penalties | U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203.16 (Formerly cited as UT ST § 76-6-110) | UT ST § 76-3-203.16 | This section comprises Utah's animal enterprise interference law. A person who commits any criminal offense with the intent to halt, impede, obstruct, or interfere with the lawful operation of an animal enterprise or to damage, take, or cause the loss of any property owned by, used by, or in the possession of a lawful animal enterprise, is subject to an enhanced penalty. These penalties enhancements raise the level of the crime one degree (e.g., a class C misdemeanor becomes a class B misdemeanor and a class A misdemeanor becomes a third degree felony). | Statute |
| United States v. Charette | 893 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir., 2018) | 2018 WL 3117903, 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6479 (9th Cir. June 26, 2018) | Defendant Charette was convicted by bench trial of taking a grizzly bear behind his home in Montana in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act. On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction on three grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to infer that he did not have a permit to take the grizzly bear; (2) his request for a jury trial was improperly denied; and (3) the lower court incorrectly analyzed his self-defense claim under an objective standard as opposed to the correct subjective standard. On appeal here, the court observed that the plain language of the ESA and legislative history makes it clear that permits and exceptions under the ESA are affirmative defenses, and not elements of the crime. In this case, Charette had the burden of proving the existence of a valid permit, which he did not do at trial. The court also quickly dispensed with the Sixth Amendment jury trial issue, finding that the taking of a grizzly bear is a petty offense. As to defendant's last argument on his self-defense claim, this court did find that the trial court erred in applying an objectively reasonable standard. This error was not harmless because it affected defendant's decision to testify as to his subjective belief in the need for self-defense. As a result, this court reversed the district court's decision, vacated defendant's conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. | Case |
| AU - Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (QLD) | Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 |
The Nature Conservation Act 1992 is an act of the Parliament of Queensland that provides for the legislative protection of Queensland's threatened fauna and flora. As originally published, it provided for native animals and plants to be declared presumed extinct, endangered, vulnerable, rare or common. In 2004 the act was amended to more closely align with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources categories: presumed extinct was changed to extinct in the wild and common was changed to least concern. |
Statute | |
| Hatfield v. Bd. of Supervisors of Madison Cty. | 235 So.3d 18 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | 2017 WL 3452426 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed. | Case |
| KS - Maize - Breed - Pit Bull Ordinance | MAIZE, KS., CITY CODE, §§ 2-401 - 2-420 (2003) |
In Maize, Kansas, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog unless the dog was registered on the date of publication of this article. A registered dog is subject to requirements, such as the uses of a leash and muzzle if not confined and “Beware of Dog” signs. Dogs that are a subject of a violation may be seized, impounded, and even killed, if necessary. A violation may result in a $200 to $500 fine and/or imprisonment for up to 30 days, as well as removal of the dog from the city. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth | 177 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (2001) |
Environmental groups challenge implementations of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act ("IDCPA") which amended the MMPA and revised the criteria for banning tuna imports. |
Case | |
| SC - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Code 1976 § 16-13-60; Code 1976 § 23-1-100; Code 1976 § 23-23-140; Code 1976 § 1-1-655; Code 1976 § 47-3-10 - 990; Code 1976 § 47-5-10 - 210; Code 1976 § 47-7-10 - 170; Code 1976 § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780, and § 51-3-145; Code 1976 § 50-19-960 | ST SC § 16-13-60; ST SC § 23-1-100; SC ST § 1-1-655; SC ST § 47-3-10 - 990; SC ST § 47-5-10 - 210; SC ST § 47-7-10 - 170; SC ST § 50-11-65, § 50-11-770, § 50-11-780; § 51-3-145; § 50-19-960 | These statutes comprise South Carolina's state dog laws. Among the provisions include laws concerning damage done by dogs (especially to livestock), rabies control provisions, and registration requirements. | Statute |