Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. Cochran | 365 S.W.3d 628 (Mo.App. W.D., 2012) | 2012 WL 1499893 (Mo.App. W.D.) |
Prompted by a phone call to make a return visit to the defendant's house, the Missouri Department of Agriculture and Animal Control were asked, by the defendant, to wait at the door. After waiting by the door for some time, the officers discovered the defendant in the backyard, where she housed at least eleven dogs, trying to remove dog excrement from a pen and trying to remove ice from dog bowls. After further investigation, the defendant was charged with one count of animal abuse and with one count of violating a city ordinance for failure to vaccinate. At the trial, the defendant was convicted on both accounts. On appeal, however, the defendant was found guilty of animal abuse, but was cleared from the ordinance violation. |
Case | |
| Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh | 438 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Md. 2020), vacated and remanded, No. 20-1631, 2021 WL 4452349 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) | The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed. | Case | ||
| Moser v. Pennsylvania Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | Slip Copy, 2012 WL 4932046 (E.D. Penn.) |
After the defendants confiscated mare without a warrant and required that the plaintiff surrender another mare and a few other animals in order to avoid prosecution, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for violating the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Civil Rights Act and Pennsylvania statutory and common law. However, the plaintiffs lost when the district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all counts. |
Case | ||
| WI - Impound - 173.23. Disposition of animals | W. S. A. 173.23 | WI ST 173.23 | This Wisconsin statue provides the necessary elements for an owner needs to retrieve his or her impounded dog. Included are reasonable proof of ownership, licensure if required by statute or ordinance, proof of vaccination as required by ordinance, and payment of charges. If an animal is not claimed, the statute outlines several dispositions, such as adoption, euthanization, and sale of the animal at public auction, including sale at a licensed animal market. | Statute | |
| PA - Exotic Pets - Subchapter D. Permits Relating to Wildlife; Chapter 147. Special Permits. Subchapter N. Exotic Wildlife Posse | 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2961 - 2965; 58 Pa. Code § 147.261 - 262 | PA ST 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2961- 2965; 58 PA ADC §§ 147.261 - 262 | These Pennsylvania statutes represent the state's exotic pet laws. "Exotic wildlife" includes all bears, coyotes, lions, tigers, leopards, jaguars, cheetahs, cougars, wolves and any crossbreed of these animals. The commission may issue a permit to a person to act as an exotic wildlife dealer. No permit shall be granted by the commission until it is satisfied that the provisions for housing and caring for the exotic wildlife and protection for the public are proper and adequate and in accordance with the standards which may be established by regulations. It is unlawful to release any exotic wildlife into the wild, fail to exercise due care in safeguarding the public, or recklessly engage in conduct that places another person in danger of attack from exotic wildlife. | Statute | |
| Johnson v. Douglas | 734 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Mem) (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2001) | 289 A.D.2d 202 (2001) |
Plaintiff appealed an order denying her claim to emotional distress damages presumably for the death of her dog. The court held that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent killing of a dog. |
Case | |
| The Future of Animal Law |
The Future of Animal Law, David Favre, Professor, Michigan State University College of Law, Edward Elgar Publishing (2021).
|
Policy | |||
| Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. Department of Navy | 725 F. Supp. 475 (1989) |
The Progressive Animal Welfare Shelter ("PAWS") and fourteen other environmental and animal rights groups brought this action for a preliminary injunction against the Navy's plan to "deploy" Atlantic bottlenose dolphins at the Bangor submarine base. |
Case | ||
| US - Birds - Part 15. Wild Bird Conservation Act | 69 FR 4557 | 50 CFR 15.1 to .53 | The regulations in this part implement the Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992, Pub.L. 102-440, 16 U.S.C. 4901-4916. Exotic bird means any live or dead member of the Class Aves that is not indigenous to the 50 States or the District of Columbia. This Act prohibits the importation of exotic birds into the U.S. except by permit. Permits authorizing the importation of exotic birds will be issued under the regulations for the following purposes only: scientific research; zoological breeding or display programs; cooperative breeding programs designed to promote the conservation and maintenance of the species in the wild; or personally owned pets accompanying persons returning to the United States after being out of the country for more than 1 year. The regulations further provide that no individual may import more than two exotic birds as pets in any year. | Administrative | |
| UT - Trusts - § 75-2-1001. Honorary trusts--Trusts for pets | U.C.A. 1953 § 75-2-1001 | UT ST § 75-2-1001 | This Utah statute provides that a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. Trusts under this section shall be liberally construed to presume against the merely precatory or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the general intent of the transferor. | Statute |
