Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WA - Endangered Species - Chapter 77.15. Fish and Wildlife Enforcement Code | West's RCWA 77.15.120, 130, 135, 410, 420, 425, 430 | WA ST 77.15.120, 130, 135, 410, 420, 425, 430 | Under Washington endangered species provisions, a person is guilty of unlawful taking of endangered fish or wildlife in the second degree if person hunts for, fishes for, possesses, maliciously harasses, or kills fish or wildlife, or possesses or intentionally destroys the nests or eggs of fish or wildlife; the fish or wildlife is designated by the commission as endangered; and the taking of the fish or wildlife or the destruction of the nests or eggs has not been authorized. Additionally, a person is guilty of unlawful taking of endangered fish or wildlife in the first degree if the person has been previously convicted under the above provision within a five-year time period. Once convicted of unlawful taking of endangered fish or wildlife in the first degree (a class C felony), any licenses or tags used in connection with the crime are revoked and the person's privileges to hunt, fish, trap, or obtain licenses under this title are suspended for two years. | Statute |
| Friends of Animals v. Salazar | 626 F.Supp.2d 102 (D.D.C.,2009) | 2009 WL 1743501 (D.D.C.) | Plaintiffs brought an action against the Department of Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of Interior (“Defendants”) alleging that Defendants unlawfully promulgated a rule (the “Rule”) under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) exempting three endangered antelope species from the import, take and other prohibitions under the ESA. On the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court, District of Columbia granted Defendants’ motion in part and denied Defendants’ motion in part, finding Plaintiffs lack representational standing with respect to wild antelope and antelope in captivity, but have organizational standing under Section 10(c) of the ESA. The Court granted Plaintiffs motion with respect to their Section 10(c) claim, finding that the promulgated rule violates Section 10(c) of the ESA. | Case |
| OR - Vehicle, unattended animal - 30.813. Entrance into motor vehicle to remove unattended child or domestic animal; | O. R. S. § 30.813 | OR ST § 30.813 | This Oregon law enacted in 2017 gives immunity from civil or criminal liability to a person who enters a motor vehicle, by force or otherwise, to remove a child or domestic animal if he or she follows steps listed in the law. The person must first determine the vehicle is locked and there is no reasonable method for the animal or child to exit the vehicle. That person must also have a good faith and reasonable belief based on the circumstances that entry is necessary due to imminent harm. Additionally, that person must notify law enforcement/emergency services before or soon as is reasonably practicable, use no more force than necessary to enter the vehicle, and remain with the child or animal until responders arrive. | Statute |
| Smith v. Kopynec | 119 So.3d 835 (La.App. 1 Cir.,2013) | 2012-1472 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13) |
The plaintiff appeals the lower court's dismissal of her claims against defendant-landowners and their insurers. The plaintiff was injured (for the second time) by the defendant-landowners' son's pitbull while walking past their home. While it was undisputed that the landowners did not own the dog, the issue was whether they had a duty to prevent the attack via "custodial liability." Here, the defendant-landowners asserted that they thought the son had gotten rid of the dog after it was confiscated and quarantined by animal control after it first attacked the plaintiff. Thus, this court found that defendant-landowners did not know of the dog's presence on their property and affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment. |
Case |
| CO - Hunting - Willful Destruction of Wildlife | C. R. S. A. § 33-6-117 | CO ST § 33-6-117 | Colorado has a unique statute specific to poaching for the purpose of acquiring parts or "trophies" from an animal with the intent of abandoning the carcass, or even soliciting someone else to do so. Taking or hunting big game, eagles, or endangered species with this intent results in a felony. The intent of the law is stated "to protect the wildlife from wanton, ruthless, or wasteful destruction or mutilation for their heads, hides, claws, teeth, antlers, horns, internal organs, or feathers." | Statute |
| TX - Counseling - § 54.0407. Cruelty to Animals: Counseling Required. | V. T. C. A., Family Code § 54.0407 | TX FAMILY § 54.0407 | For juveniles convicted under the Texas criminal animal cruelty statute (found at Tex. Penal Code § 42.09), psychological counseling is required. | Statute |
| Pearson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | Slip Copy, 2011 WL 559083 (C.A.6,2011) |
Petitioner seeks review of the decision and order of the Secretary of the USDA, terminating his license to own and exhibit wild animals (82 lions, tigers, and bears), issuing a cease and desist order, and imposing civil sanctions in the amount of $93,975 in violation of the AWA. In 2006, inspection showed 280 incidents of non-compliance. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first held that there was no abuse of discretion in failing to grant the continuance after a fire at Petitioner's home because he is unable to resulting establish prejudice. Further, the Court discounted Petitioner's challenge that the revocation of his license was not supported where the court found the evidence "substantial, perhaps overwhelming." |
Case | |
| CT - Education - § 10-18d. Animal dissection. Students to be excused from participation or observation | C. G. S. A. § 10-18d | CT ST § 10-18d | This Connecticut law states that a local or regional school district shall excuse any student from participating in, or observing, the dissection of any animal as part of classroom instruction, provided the parent or guardian of such student has requested, in writing, that such student be excused from such participation or observation. A student excused under this law shall be required to complete an alternate assignment to be determined by the local or regional school district. | Statute |
| Hamilton v. State | 128 So.3d 872 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) | 2013 WL 6670841 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
In this Florida case, the 82-year-old defendant was convicted of a third-degree felony animal cruelty violation (section 828.12(2)) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Defendant had his dog on leash and approached too close to a cat, whereupon the leashed dog began to attack the cat. In reversing the decision, the appellate court found that defendant's conduct did not rise to a criminal level, as it was "objectively unlikely" that a leashed dog walking with his owner would inflict such damage. Further, while the issue of sentencing was rendered moot by the reversal, the court found the consideration of a petition with approximately 3,000 signatures demanding the maximum sentence, "an affront to the very notion of due process of law . . ." |
Case |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden | 878 F.3d 1184 | 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 142 | In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get a job at an Idaho dairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights group, publicly released portions of the video, drawing national attention. The dairy farm owner responded to the video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family received multiple threats. Animal rights advocacy organization brought action against the Governor and Attorney General of Idaho, challenging statute that criminalized interference with agricultural production facilities as violative of the First Amendment's free speech protections, violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and preempted by federal law. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered summary judgment in favor of organization and granted organization's motion to permanently enjoin enforcement of the statute. The court held that 1) Idaho statute criminalizing entry into an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation violated First Amendment; 2) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate First Amendment; 3) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining records of an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation did not violate Equal Protection Clause; 4) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel, did not violate First Amendment; 5) Idaho statute criminalizing obtaining employment with an agricultural production facility by misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's operations, property, or personnel did not violate Equal Protection Clause; and 6) Idaho statute prohibiting a person from entering a private agricultural production facility and, without express consent from the facility owner, making audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations violated First Amendment. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. | Case |